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# The Canadian Historical Association

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## TWO WAYS OF LIFE: THE PRIMARY ANTITHESIS OF CANADIAN HISTORY

Presidential Address by A. R. M. LOWER  
*United College, University of Manitoba*

THE school-boy, with unerring judgment, picks out as the dullest subject of his acquaintance, Canadian History. Given the way it is usually presented to him, the school-boy is right. But need he be? Does his judgment arise from the intrinsic nature of the material? I do not think so. On the contrary, the historian of Canada has at his command exciting and diversified resources, if he have but the skill to make them diversified and exciting.

Foremost among them, surely, are the glaring contrasts upon which this country rests, its sharp antagonisms, the diversity of the groups within it, its unbelievable geography, the ringing clashes everywhere upon all the great fundamentals. The human scene in Canada, both in time and space, is as full of bold colours as a typical Canadian landscape. The painter has used these effects: if the historian cannot, but puts everything into dull grey, it is his fault if people pass him by.

Of all our clashes, who will deny that the deep division between French and English is the greatest, the most arresting, the most difficult? Here is the most resounding note in our history, the juxtaposition of two civilizations, two philosophies, two contradictory views of the fundamental nature of man. For the historian, to neglect it is to leave the battle line. I propose therefore to devote this paper, with what skill I can command, to a short exploration of this primary antithesis of Canadian history. Since it is nothing less than two historic ways of life that I am going to look at, it is especially necessary to keep in mind the warning against "the dilettante who believes in the unity of the group mind and the possibility of reducing it to a single formula."<sup>1</sup> Whatever I have to say will, I hope, be taken by members of both races in the same spirit in which it is uttered, with a wish to understand but no desire to wound. While I shall be as objective as I can, I am well aware that to one of the divergent groups I myself belong.

\* \* \*

A paper of this sort, attempting to look at a few of the fundamentals upon which this country is built, with a view to securing some of that release of tension so necessary to our national well-being, should logically begin with medieval Catholicism and St. Thomas Aquinas, for no one who wishes to understand Canada will get very far until he has studied the medieval structure which a section of this country preserves with singular integrity. Failing the possibility of so comprehensive an approach, the movement which stands at the threshold of our present era, the Reformation, may serve as a point of departure. To that revolt against ecclesiastical metropolitanism, the medieval church, which had been rapidly disintegrating in the liberal world of the Renaissance, owed the renewal of vitality that expressed itself in the Counter or Catholic Reformation. In France, the first of our mother countries, the historical process was delayed for three-quarters of a century by civil strife. This gave to the religious problem a solution not in terms of compromise, as in England,

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<sup>1</sup>Max Weber, quoted in Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Pelican edition), 256, note 7.



but in those of the new Catholicism. The French Reformation, when in the first quarter of the seventeenth century it at last began to formulate itself, soon showed that it was not merely an imitation of that of Spain or Italy. It was French and northern. It was not particularly intellectual or artistic—no earnest religious movement can be—it had little either of the subtlety or the cruelty of the true Latins beyond the mountains. It was enthusiastic, serious, moral, evangelical. There was about it none of the fireside comfort of Anglicanism, little of the cold selfishness of Calvinism. It was a warm, human faith, full of visions and harmless miracles, strict in the standards of conduct it enjoined on its adherents. For those whose roots lie in nineteenth-century Protestantism, it diffused a religious atmosphere which, save for its ritualistic and sacramental basis, is not difficult to understand: it was a kind of nineteenth-century Methodism in a seventeenth-century Catholic setting. It was above all things missionary, and the missionaries it was to give the New World, the Brébeufs and Lalemants, were to become in the manner of their deaths, strong pillars of France in America. Their shadows have loomed the larger as they have receded and today the proud memory of the martyrs gives to French-speaking Canadians a centre of loyalties and a support which their English-speaking fellow countrymen have nothing to match.

It was in the man who was to be the first bishop of Quebec and in the nature of the church he established that the French Catholic Reformation was most deeply to affect Canada. François de Laval was strong-willed, haughty, eager for power, a puritan in morals, ultramontane—as was perhaps natural in a man whose younger days were passed among the confusions of the Fronde, with its tarnishing of royal power—jealous of the privileges of the church as opposed to the state, jealous of his rights as bishop, jealous of his personal dignity in the presence of the Governor. Such traits have many times been repeated among his successors.

The ecclesiastical system whose foundations he laid was never to falter in proper loyalty to the King but within the orbit of that loyalty was to become as strong as the state itself. Education was in its hands from the first—as was inevitable in a period where education was universally a department of religion. The priesthood under him was formed into a disciplined body of men who were not allowed to become incumbents of “livings,” but remained missionaries—fighting troops to be moved about from station to station at the discretion of their commander. The system still holds. The instrument Laval fashioned has proved its strength and its worth.

After Laval's time, Canadian-born became more and more common among the priesthood. This had its advantages and disadvantages. The Canadian priests were at one with their people: they were the natural shepherds of their flocks. On the other hand, they were provincials, with little experience except in their own small world. Their culture contrasted unfavourably with that of highly trained Jesuits and Sulpicians from France, but this lag in culture in the period following the original immigration is a familiar story in all new countries, a stage that must be worked through as a new society forms itself. It was as nothing compared with the asset of the curé's closeness to his people. When the evil days came, he had been fitted to become their natural leader, their salvation in tribulation. He retains his place to this day. A moment's glance at history should be



sufficient to take all meaning out of that charge so often levelled by bigoted people that the French Canadians are "priest ridden."<sup>2</sup>

Laval built on natural foundations, for Catholicism of this popular, even democratic, northern type reflected the genius of the French people who came to Canada, the peasantry of Normandy and its neighbourhood, just as its close relation, Anglicanism, has suited the neighbouring peasantry of southern England, and as paternalistic and sacramental religions suit any peasantry. The life of the peasant is a series of ritual occasions—planting and harvesting, being born, coming of age, begetting, dying. The land has always been there and it always will be. Man's occupancy is transient and the individual is only one in a long chain from forefathers to descendants. All are one family, inter-related if not in this generation, in the last or the next. All give unquestioned obedience to the great mother goddess, the earth-mother, who can easily be made to wear a Christian dress. The restless strivings, the desire for change, "improvement," "progress," "opportunity," which we today take as the normal condition of life, are absent. Man is subject to nature and to nature's moods: he learns to acquiesce in the drought and the flood, the good years and the bad. As his animals and plants grow and come to harvest, so he grows and comes to harvest. His religion is among the simplest and oldest of all creeds, Catholic almost by accident.

The business of the peasant—or *habitant*, as he became in Canadian parlance—was not to make progress but to "make land": to "make land" many hands were necessary. Nature responded, as she always does. Practically all pioneer peoples are prolific, the transplanted French were especially so. There was lack neither of food nor function for every new child. A socially minded people saw no evil in being surrounded with their own and in the swift, steady widening of the family connection. Quite the reverse. They found happiness in life, not in things. A new and finer house meant less to them than sons and daughters growing up in the neighbourhood. If some died, others came: they would all meet hereafter. If some were lame or halt or blind, that was God's will. It was life that He and nature commanded, not the saving of life. This other-worldliness, still so marked in the countryside of Quebec, and not at all divorced from practical wisdom, was re-inforced by the immemorial teaching of the church: man's real life begins hereafter. A genuine belief in immortality works profound effects on the manner in which a people lives. Catholicism and the countryside, simple French peasant traditions, as old as agriculture, and the French joy in human companionship, came together into a strong complex which to this day shows little sign of giving way.

Yet for decades the countryside of New France was a neglected plant, overshadowed by the adventurous foliage of fur trader and missionary. Old France had men for high tasks but not peasants for export. Nor did the home-loving peasantry of a non-emigrating race wish to leave their native soil. The English separate themselves from home and family with ease—and often with relief: they dislike the cramping atmosphere of small communities. The French cling to the ties of mutual support: they dislike going away from the near and the familiar. They accept and enjoy the life

<sup>2</sup>It is well known that after the conquest, the habitants were very glad to escape from the obligation of the tithe, but that indicates no general dislike of the clergy, simply a healthy independence, which has been demonstrated on more than one subsequent occasion, as, for example, in the elections of 1896.

of small communities. It is not surprising that only a few of them came to the new province, less than ten thousand, it is said, but all of them firm in their Catholicism and carefully guarded from taint or touch of heresy! From these all persons of French-Canadian race are descended. The combination of a faith kept free from all possibility of contamination, of a close environment, the banks of the St. Lawrence, and this extraordinary degree of inbreeding, produced a stock whose homogeneity surely can have few parallels. For the rest of us, with our multitudinous descents, this close-knit world is almost impossible of entry. All its members have clouds of common ancestors, all have had identical historical experiences and all hold the same creed. Even today, amid the complexities of the modern world, the degree of differentiation seems relatively slight. All French Canadians are, as it were, the same French Canadian.

The process of forming a new people began as soon as the first children were born. By the Conquest, it was for practical purposes, complete. The seventy thousand Canadians of 1760, in a century of wrestling with the wilderness, had created a new society: one resembling the old peasant societies of France but with its own orientation, especially with its own family clans and its own passionate love of the land it had made its own and the soil it had won from the wilderness and the natives; a society entirely cut off from the rest of the world, turned inward upon itself to a degree few people of English speech can grasp; a society unbelievably parochial but in every sense a strong blood brotherhood. This was the little world that was to crash under the triumph of English arms. The heart of the French nation had never been in empire and it saw the vision of Champlain fade without regret. But what of the children of France, the Canadians, those who had taken such firm root in the soil that was to pass under the alien flag? What of them, isolated now in the hostile, Protestant, English continent of the conqueror?

It is hard for people of English speech to enter imaginatively into the feelings of those who must pass under the yoke of conquest, for, except in the Southern States, there is scarcely a memory of it in all their tradition.<sup>3</sup> Conquest is a type of slavery and of that too we have no memory—except as masters. Conquest, like slavery, probably must be experienced to be understood. But one can intellectually perceive what it means. The whole life structure of the conquered is laid open to their masters. They become second-rate people. Wherever they turn, something meets their eyes to symbolize their subjection: it need not be the foreign military in force, it need not be the sight of the foreign flag, it may be some small matter—a common utensil of unaccustomed size and shape, let us say, taking the place of one familiar. And then there is the alien speech, perhaps not heard very often, but sometimes heard, and sometimes heard arrogantly, from the lips of persons who leave no doubt that the conquered are in their estimation inferior beings. Even the kindness of the superior hurts.

Nor does conquest sit easiest on the humble. The educated may make their peace, learn the foreign language, and find many areas in common, but the humble cannot cross the gulf—they feel pushed aside in their own homes. Hence it is that nationalism will always live longest, even if not

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<sup>3</sup>Yet as late as the nineteenth century an historian like Freeman could draw a line between the Saxon people, with whom he identified himself, and their conquerors, the Normans. In his writings the Saxons were always "we," and the Normans "they." The memory of conquest dies hard!



blazing up into fierce flame, in the hearts of the people, who will seek to maintain their own ways by the passiveness of their behaviour, and little by little, as opportunity offers, will edge forward into any chance space left vacant by their masters.

Conquest in the forces it sets in motion may be tantamount to a revolution. The conquered are so bludgeoned by fate that they come to find new spiritual springs of life. Something like this did happen in French Canada. French Canadians are strong as a group today not least because they passed through the valley of the shadow a century and three-quarters ago.

No one can suggest that the English conquest was cruel, as conquests go, or the English government harsh. If the French in Canada had had a choice of conquerors they could not have selected more happily. But conquerors are conquerors: they may make themselves hated or they may make themselves tolerated. They cannot, unless they abandon their own way of life and quickly assimilate themselves, in which case they cease to be conquerors, make themselves loved. As long as the French are French and the English English, the memory of the Conquest and its effects, will remain. Not until the great day comes when each, abandoning their respective colonialisms, shall have lost themselves in a common Canadianism, will it be obliterated.

Within the old régime the French-Canadian type was formed: all its history since has been merely a superstructure on the foundation then laid. Anyone understanding the conquered people and gifted with a sufficiently prophetic eye could in 1760 have foretold the attitude of the French Canadians toward conscription in 1941, or for that matter in 2041. In external affairs, including war, it is, was and will be, simply that of most of the other small Latin and Catholic peoples of the hemisphere who have been cut off from their parent stock and find themselves in a world that has moved far away from the pole about which they swing, they whose metropolitan centre is not London, or Moscow, or New York, but Rome. If we can understand the reactions of Ecuador or Paraguay to this northern world of Anglo-Saxons, Slavs, and Germans in which we live, we shall understand that of Quebec readily enough.

In the 180 years since the Conquest, new phases of the basic situation have naturally presented themselves. As numbers and wealth increased and as English parliamentary institutions were introduced, a new class grew up—the intellectuals who spilled over from the too abundant material for the priesthood into the secular professions, especially the law. In French Canada, where everyone likes to talk and to hear good talk, the lawyer, *l'avocat*, has had a field day. His opponent invariably being another lawyer, every election has turned itself into an oratorical contest and since a superbly convenient whipping boy has always stood ready to hand, it has been inevitable that every contest should involve him—*les sacrés Anglais*, the damned English. Is it therefore too much to suggest that every political fight from 1791 to the present day has had as its fundamental, if unexpressed issue, the English conquest? If the situation were reversed, the same would be true of us—as it is to some degree true in the Southern States. But why does the point need labouring? Does not the municipal government of the capital of our largest and wealthiest province turn on an even more ancient issue than the Plains of Abraham—on that obscure Irish skirmish, the Battle of the Boyne?

The French-Canadian intellectual, whether lawyer, journalist, or priest, has run true to type. He has lived in a world of ideas—or notions—but he has been better at talking, perhaps, than doing. He has had a difficult road, because for him there cannot be that free play of the intellect so naturally assumed by his opposite numbers in the English camp. His education has formed his mind before the world has opened to him and he has had to do his thinking within a system whose boundaries are rigid. The results have been the weak development of the objective studies, the slam-banging personal tone of French-Canadian journalism (which is also agreeable to the spirit of the French race), its sometimes rather tenuous connection with facts, but above all the shoving-over of discussion and emotion to another concept, that of the race. The intellectual, priest or layman, has been the protagonist of the race. It is a natural, if somewhat unhealthy role. Any virile group cut off from free expansion will necessarily turn inward and console itself with its own virtues. It will at all costs seek survival and an opportunity to break its bonds. This is the motive power behind Nazi-ism, Fascism, and “Japanese-ism”: Germans, Italians, Japanese, all suffer from a species of claustrophobia. So do many French Canadians, marooned in an English continent. Like causes produce like results. The utterances of extreme racialists everywhere, whether in Germany or in Canada, come back to about the same thing. But it has been our good luck, here in Canada so far, that the extremists of neither race have captured control of the state.

Nevertheless as the outside world has pressed more and more on the French island in America,<sup>4</sup> racialism has become more and more self-conscious and has absorbed into its concepts more and more of life, so that today it is impossible to tell whether the race is the bulwark for the faith or the faith for the race. Possibly the latter. It would appear to the outsider as if the French church today could to some extent stand apart from its own spiritual significance as a manifestation of Christianity and find its function in binding together people of common blood and speech.

We English Canadians have not until recently been very much plagued by intellectuals. Most of them who have not been drained off into practical tasks, we have managed to ship to the United States. The French have not had that easy solution. Their society was completed long ago and there has not been a great deal for the intellectual to do except watch the English men of business tear it to pieces. The French intellectuals cannot enter into that world, any more than can our own. They can merely stand at the threshold, their sensitive souls lashed with the thought that they may be regarded by the bustling representatives of the conquering race as second-class citizens. Hence their discontent. Hence much of the explanation for the Papineaus, the Bourassas, the Chaloult, with the rather pathetic cry, repeated from generation to generation, for more “posts,” more safe government jobs, free from the rude blasts of English initiative.<sup>5</sup>

But French Canada, even if its people so desired, has not remained frozen in Maria Chapedelaine-ish postures. Things do move. The most

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<sup>4</sup>And how heavily it does press! Note how American persuasiveness has at last drawn the “Quints” out of their backwoods French environment and put them on a public platform singing English songs! The reference is to their appearance at Superior, Wisconsin, during May, 1943, to sponsor certain ship launchings.

<sup>5</sup>It is in the 92 Resolutions of 1834 and in one of Mr. Chaloult’s speeches of May, 1943.



conspicuous change is the coming of industrialism and the swing from rural to urban.<sup>6</sup> In 1871, 80 per cent of the French people of Quebec were rural, today only 42 per cent are. One of the most interesting questions that confronts the social scientist is what urbanism and industrialism will do to the Canadians of French speech. Will this unique peasant structure, this strong fortress of the Catholic Reformation be able to adapt itself to the new kind of life? French Canada today is in the grips of the first revolution its people have ever known, the Conquest excepted, the industrial revolution. What will be the outcome of the clash of medievalism and modernism, of the régime of the natural law and the acquisitive ethic? Will Catholicism adapt itself? Can the countryside continue to send out its sons and daughters in such a strong tide that peasant values, the faith and the church, will continue to dominate the cities? Will the race as binding concept more and more displace the faith under the dissolving forces of urbanism? Will urban values work back into the countryside and give to rural Quebec, as they have already given to rural Ontario, a kind of suburban atmosphere? Will the forces of continentalism triumph over this strong fortress of localism? Will the international unions displace the Catholic? Whatever the future holds, the appointed guardians of race and faith will put up a good struggle.<sup>7</sup> The rural clergy will not be tempted overly much by the English shibboleth of a "high standard of living": they see the trap that lurks in that. They will not be too much in favour of high wages and only mildly of progressive and social measures, for their people have not yet reached the stage where they feel it necessary to be parsimonious of life. Heaven may not be quite as close as it once was and temporal values may be getting more emphasis than they used to do, but the group is still more than the individual, life still more than the means of livelihood, and the simple standards of the countryside will for a long time carry themselves into the cities.

## II

From this exploration of French Canadianism one figure is absent, the man of business. With very good reason. Except in minor roles, he is an inconspicuous figure. If one takes his *Manual of Canadian Securities* and looks at the serried ranks of Directors listed therein he will find only a corporal's guard of French names. The explanation is simple. Here is a society founded under a philosophy that admitted only a subordinate place to the man of business and his pursuits, that, even in his luxuriant fur-trading days, managed to keep him more or less in his place and that by

<sup>6</sup>RURAL AND URBAN FRENCH POPULATION OF QUEBEC, 1871-1941

Year	Rural	Urban	Total	Per cent rural
1871	745,125	184,692	929,817	80.3
1881	806,960	266,860	1,073,820	
1891	No returns	.....	.....	.....
1901	848,229	473,866	1,322,115	
1911	904,357	702,138	1,606,495	
1921	920,553	968,716	1,889,269	
1931	945,035	1,325,024	2,270,059	41.2
1941	1,107,380	1,587,652	2,695,032	41.7

Table from 1931 census, 1,755, table 35, and 1941, bulletin A-4. The total rural increase in Canada 1931-41 was 310,000 of which the French in Quebec contributed 162,000.

<sup>7</sup>In the last decade the French added to their population almost 70 per cent more people than those of British origin did to theirs, 553,000 as compared with 331,000.

historical accident was rather thoroughly purged of him. It is possible to find Catholic societies in which a degree of capitalism has prevailed, though it is to be suspected that in them Catholicism has been subject to very severe strains. Sometimes, as in nineteenth-century France, it has been shouldered aside. But in such a preserve of the church as French Canada, it would be vain to expect any striking development of native capitalism—except the special form of capitalism represented by ecclesiastical corporative organization. Both historically and today the weight of French-Canadian society is against capitalism. The values it seeks to conserve are quite other. The business man does not walk among the French as a god. Honours are paid not to the captains of industry but to the political, and especially to the ecclesiastical figures. I can see no end to English-Canadian domination of the machinery of production in Quebec except the abandonment by the French of their attitude to life and their acceptance of ours—either that, which they will not deliberately make—or the invocation of the power of the state to take over English enterprise and thus a slipping back into a more or less efficient paternalistic socialism, in which the intellectuals at last have all the *postes* they want as public factory managers.

No; for this characteristic phenomenon of yesterday, the business man, we shall have to turn to the other side of the house, where he may be examined in riotous abundance. Our first contact with him is shortly after the Conquest when he comes rushing in on the heels of the military. He is in a hurry. He wants to get things done. He has ends to gain, an object in life. That object is one comprehended only remotely by the peasant. From the first the New World has released in men the passion of greed. Greed in itself as a human quality the peasant can understand well enough but not greed erected into a way of life and fortified not only with the majesty of the law but with the sanction of a religion. Yet no other group has so systematically set up acquisition as an object in itself and made it the centre of a cult as have the men of business of the English-speaking world.

In 1760, the new creed had not gone as far as it has since, and there continued to resist it the older elements in English life, feudalism in its eighteenth-century form of aristocracy and certain sections of the Church of England. It was in the fighting and governmental services that these elements found their strongest expression. It was therefore these that were to have the best relations with the conquered Catholics. The weight of the English thrust into the conquered territories was not, however, to consist in officials and the military, but in men representing the new way of life, which had already appropriated for itself a theology by which it could rationalize its conduct. This way of life became dominant in Canada and remains so.

The connection between Protestantism, especially Calvinism, and material achievement has been the subject of much investigation. Wherever Calvinism has prevailed, societies largely committed to the acquisitive way of life have arisen. The coincidence seems logical, for while the spirit of acquisition is as old as man, Calvinism subtly reinforces it. The burning question it presented to its adherents—and in altered terms still presents—was whether God had elected them unto salvation.<sup>8</sup> There was no infallible

<sup>8</sup>Today this question is put in much terser and secular form: "Can I make good?" C. A. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, makes the point that since about mid-nineteenth century, the ethic of success has dominated the older ethics: not "Is it



means of finding out but God might give a sign. And what more visible sign could the individual receive than that he should be prospered? But the sign would not come if one merely sat and waited for it. So the faithful set about each to his own individual duty, doing, as he believed, God's work. As someone has said, there is no more awesome sight than a churchful of Scotch Presbyterians upon their knees praying God to give them strength to do His will unto their fellow men, and then arising to go forth and do it! Calvinism created strong men, strong in their convictions, strong in their demands for elbow room to carry out their allotted tasks. But not men who were much concerned with their fellows. That was God's business. While the Jesuits were threading the wilderness to bring Christianity to the Indians, the New England Puritans were burning them alive in their own villages.<sup>9</sup>

In countless ways the Calvinistic type of Protestantism accentuated the motives of accomplishment and success. Everywhere it found its most congenial soil in urban areas, among the middle classes. In industry, it became the support of self-made men, men who "did not need the government to help them in *their* business," and in politics, it came to stand for *laissez-faire* and the policeman state. Its spirit reigned supreme in Victorian England, the spirit of drive, of providence and thrift, of smug success. How far it all was from the scriptural injunction to take no thought for the morrow!

Nowhere was the acquisitive ethic more at home than in the New World. There the field was open and nature invited exploitation. Hence the strong link between it, the Scotch or New Englanders, the staple trade, and the characteristic expression of the staple trade, the metropolitan-hinterland relationship. Traditions that might have held it in check were weak. Nearly everything sooner or later was bent in the one direction—the contempt of the older ideals and the intolerance that the new and the moving invariably manifests for the old and the static. The goal of material success passed over easily into success in terms of accomplishment or of power and in these forms afforded the driving energy that has mainly made America.

No one would assert that there have been no other aspects of life represented among the English-speaking population of Canada. Among our farmers many of the traits of peasant societies survive, and the antithesis between the country way of life and the urban has been almost as sharp at tempt of the older ideals and the intolerance that the new and the moving settlement come close to the French countryside itself in their conformity to older social patterns.<sup>11</sup> In the region of religious or cultural tradition there is the Anglican emphasis on service to the state and on the ideal of the gentleman; or the Scottish ideal of the learned man, the philosopher. Very prominent is humanitarianism, that powerful body of emotions, sentiments, beliefs, and actions, which has penetrated every nook and cranny

just, is it right?" becomes the question, but "Can I succeed?" To fail in the presence of the group emerges as the unpardonable sin.

<sup>9</sup>A century later the *bourgeois* of the North West Company were zealously supporting the first Presbyterian Church in Montreal but that church showed a conspicuous absence of interest in the activities at the other end of the fur trade.

<sup>10</sup>It had a large share in the Upper Canadian Rebellion of 1837, the Clear Grit party, and of course in the more recent agrarian movements, especially Alberta "Social Credit."

<sup>11</sup>See Dr. Enid Charles's article on Prince Edward Island and its population characteristics in *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, May, 1942.

of our Canadian life. It would be interesting to analyse the complex way in which these all twine around each other. But space does not permit. English-speaking Canada has fallen under these various traditions in about the same way as the United States, though at a retarded rate, for here there have been influences restraining their free play. For example, our continuing connection with Great Britain has provided some shelter for a class structure and a quasi-official church, the Church of England. For the first seventy-five years after the Conquest, this older English tradition—the “squire and parson” concept of society—made a strong fight of it with commercialism—as in its modern form it is doing again today, under the special circumstances of the war, with its strengthening of the forces of history. But it too became more or less assimilated to the dominant tone, as witness the business relationships of the Family Compact men, and left the field pretty clear for the exploitive and acquisitive attitudes, which had an almost unchecked run until a decade or two ago. There must be few English Canadians of middle life who were not brought up on the conviction that their business in life was to succeed, “to make good,” “to get on,” “to get to the top,” “to amount to something.”

Methodism, whose social gospel also opposed a certain counterweight to acquisition, split under its pressure. The industry and thrift inculcated by the creed brought worldly success to many of its followers, who trailed off into the acquisitive camp, taking with them the phraseology of simpler days and the shell of the old attitudes of brotherhood and often leaving awkward gaps between profession and performance. But the genius of Methodism continued to assert itself in characteristic social movements, temperance, social service, and so on. Eventually it found logical expression in a more or less formal political socialism: much of the drive in Canadian socialism comes out of Canadian Methodism and as it does battle with Canadian individualism, it carries forward the Christian ethic of support for the weak and the lowly against the strong and the established.

These are the two most significant traditions at work in our English-speaking community today: they represent its sharpest antithesis, and the future will witness a battle over which shall organize it. Neither one is now very firmly attached to its original religious base. The Methodist-humanitarian tradition satisfies itself with a social gospel and a social task: it resorts easily to perfectionism—to Utopianism, pacifism, a vague internationalism, and a “planned society.” The Calvinist-individualist-success conception of life, stripped of its fine phrases about election unto salvation, initiative, individualism, being nothing more than mere selfishness, was the first to run beyond Christian bounds. Those who live in this area find themselves today confronting life either on the basis of a rather mechanical benevolence and simple good fellowship or face to face with a frank hedonism and a stark paganism.<sup>11a</sup>

The dynamics of acquisition have transformed the world but the societies dominated by them—of which our own is one—despite their brilliance, are hollow at the centre. For deep in the heart of this way of life there seems to be a denial of life. It sets up for itself a goal of goods, of plenty, of a “high standard of living,” and here finding common ground with humanitarianism, surrounds itself with devices designed to smooth out life’s ills, to make life easier, to prolong and save life. It secures food and

<sup>11a</sup>The American divorce tradition, which is paganism, is a descendant of the individualism of American Puritanism.



shelter of an excellence never before attained. It increases the span of life, makes individuals healthier, stronger, taller, more alert. It decreases illness, physical disabilities, infant mortality, maternal mortality. And yet solicitous as it is for the individual's well-being, the societies it has created are slowly withering. Speaking of the disappearance of the English from the Eastern Townships, the authors of a recent book on Quebec say: "A peaceful victory, a grand victory, for today there are 300,000 French there as against less than 50,000 English. Note that the relations between them are excellent because our people have not returned the blows which their ancestors received. . . . 'The French are right to act in this way: it is better (instead of retaliation) to give the English splendid funerals' . . . . The majority of the English have become a population of old people . . . who having sold their property to the French, live in retirement in the villages. These villages present as it were 'the foretaste of a cemetery'."<sup>12</sup>

Many people become indignant because they would say the French are pushing the English out. I cannot see that the French are to blame. They are a virile people who can see no virtue in childlessness. If we have no instinct for group survival and choose the easy way out of comfort and race suicide, we have ourselves to blame.

Our two Canadian ways of life exemplify the antithesis that in general terms might be put somewhat as follows: The nearer what might be called the peasant-spiritual, or rural-natural, the primitive outlook on life, the stronger the hold on life, the greater the survival value of the group, the less considered the individual, the greater the complaisance in taking what life brings, good fortune or bad, good health or bad, sound limbs or crooked. In contrast, the more in the other current, acquisition, materialism, commercialism, urbanism, individualism, Calvinism—call it what you like—the greater the parsimony with life, the more concern for the individual, the more strenuous the efforts to keep him from blemish, to make perfect specimens, to patch up the defective, to prolong life, the less ability to create it. *The "high standard of living" seems to destroy life.* The one complex, in its extreme, leads to mere animalism, the other to extinction. Where is the happy medium and what philosophy will support it?

In Canada, the two outlooks have had marked geographical correlations. The urban-acquisitive complex has deepened in proportion to the longitude west. Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia have been less affected by it than Ontario, Ontario than Manitoba, and Manitoba than British Columbia. Under the weight of the depression this tendency is not now so marked. The English in Manitoba and Saskatchewan alike are decreasing, and in Ontario and British Columbia they are being kept afloat by immigration from other provinces. In Saskatchewan the pattern stands out with especial clearness: in the last ten years, those races close to the soil have held their own despite misfortune—Ukrainians, Germans, Hungarians, etc. But the commercial races—those who do not see life as existence but as opportunity—have gone sharply down in numbers, the English, the Syrians, the Jews, and the Chinese.

There is also a decided religious correlation. Believe it or not, you will have a considerably larger family if you are a Pentecostal than if you are a Presbyterian. The further one moves away from the simple, rural,

<sup>12</sup>*Notre Milieu* (Montreal, 1942), 98.

pietistic groups, such as the Mennonites, among whom there were in 1931, 159 children under the age of five for every 1,000 persons, into the more sophisticated, urban, middle-class, acquisitive areas, which make large demands on life, the less is the likelihood that his group will replace itself in the next generation. At the extreme stand the Christian Scientists, just where one would expect them, with 45 children under five per 1,000, the perfect embodiment of prosperous middle-class dessication. When its characteristics are analysed every denomination falls exactly into the anticipated place.<sup>13</sup>

Correlations of group survival value may in fact be made by the bushel. There are positive correlations such as the rural life, pietistic or authoritarian religion, religious dogma, pioneer areas, old static areas, poverty, short life-expectancy, religious communism, communal segregation, lower class, labour in new industries, possibly aristocracy: and negative correlations such as urbanism, size of urban unit, individualism, altitude in the middle class, commercial attitudes, professional occupations, income, divorce, "feminism," the size and newness of automobile, exploitive economies, such as the mining and logging economy of British Columbia, suburbanized rural areas, humanitarianism, possibly agnosticism, intellectualism. In general it is the humble who have survival value. It is the meek who shall inherit the earth.

It is an ironic commentary upon history that that group which began with a return to life, with a triumphant affirmation of life, with a "*Welt-Bejahung*," the Protestant, should now, with minor exceptions, have fallen into a denial of life, a fear of animal "robustiousness," while the other group, which persistently belittled this life and lived in the shadow of immortality, should be exhibiting in our day every evidence of that affirmation which Protestantism once made. Protestantism as a traditional way of life has got too far away from nature. Sophistication has been too much for it. Given our present attitude to life, we are probably fighting our last victorious war. If the test comes again in the future, we shall have too few young men to fend off the races such as the Japanese that ask less return from life but are more able to live. Our people are willing to make every effort to ensure by military means the immediate survival of their group but they seem not to have the slightest interest in what may happen to it a few years into the future. It may therefore be that their fate, too, is to

<sup>13</sup>CHILDREN 0-4 YEARS OF AGE PER 1,000 OF TOTAL

<i>Denomination</i>	<i>Children 0-4 per 1,000 of total</i>
Mennonites .....	159.3
Roman Catholics .....	125.5
Mormons .....	123.3
Greek Orthodox.....	121.7
Pentecostals .....	103.7
Lutherans .....	97.8
Baptists .....	90.5
United Church.....	87.5
Anglicans .....	85.5
Presbyterians .....	80.5
Salvation Army.....	75.5
Jews .....	75.0
Christian Science .....	45.3

Table compiled from 1931 census, vol. III, p. 310.



pass under the harrow and from intimate contemplation of the arrogant superior, find for themselves the secret that the humble already know. *Deposuit magnifices de sedibus. . .*

Does this mean that we shall have to choose between the way of life we have built up and our survival as a group? Shall we have to return to what most of us would feel to be a much poorer kind of civilization? I trust not, though if our civilization is to survive I am certain that some kind of compromise will have to be effected and many aspects of our present way of life greatly modified. Amid much that is good many of them are just idiotic. Everyone can amuse himself by compiling his own list of lunacies, but conspicuous among the major changes that will have to come is a modification of the ethic of acquisition, the *appetitus divitiarum infinitus*, the unbridled indulgence of the acquisitive appetite, as Tawney puts it and the degenerate indulgence that surely accompanies it.

If our urban civilization were to fall through dry rot, through failure of man-power, hardly less ironical a fate would be in store for the non-acquisitive group, which is, in Canada, the French. Without the initiative of the English Protestant man of business, the present-day mechanical civilization could not have come into existence. Without it, the French would have remained a quiet rural people, probably not more than a quarter as numerous as they are now. If old William Price, or some other, had not opened up the Saguenay a century and a quarter ago, and if his successors had not built on to his achievements, instead of the lumber, the pulpwood, the water-power and the aluminum that now come out of that valley, there would have been a few farms on the shores of Lake St. John, a few small local saw-mills, and that would have been all. There would have been that many fewer opportunities for life. The industrial structure of Quebec rests on this initiative, which has provided work for the hundreds of thousands from the countryside who otherwise would have had to stay on the farm as bachelors and spinsters, or divide and subdivide the land in Malthusian misery. The question forces itself, "who has created the French race in America?" I make bold to say that the English industrialist has created about three-quarters of it.<sup>14</sup>

So the fate of the two peoples seems indissolubly linked. At present they complement each other, unhappily and acrimoniously. But may the day not come when understanding will be greater? May the English not learn a little tolerance, the French gain a little breadth? May the English, through suffering, perhaps, lose a little of their arrogance, the French a little of their touchy vanity? May the extreme commercialism of the English not be modified, the more obvious blatancies of their civilization overcome, their acquisitive ethic toned down? May the French not come forward and take their place in running a modern state, finding constructive ideas to contribute, getting a little further away from medievalism, from a philosophy that sacrifices nearly everything to survival value? May the deep fear which afflicts both sides—the fear of the French of losing their identity and the fear of the English of being outnumbered—not be dissipated in a common loyalty to a common country?

That day may come and it may not. Pressure from the outside world may bring it, though of that I am doubtful. The lessening numbers of the English may induce in them more of a live-and-let-live attitude. The

<sup>14</sup>Reckoning in the industrial French population of the United States.



penetrative qualities of North American civilization may bring French society closer to the continental norm. Most likely of all, it seems to me, the tensions and troubles of our times, which are not going to end with the peace, will some day burn out the grosser aspects of our English materialism, giving us a truer and deeper insight into life than what we have now, reforming our society in some such way as society was reshaped at the end of the middle ages and thereby establishing a new set of values in which both races can share. The two communities will never be one, there can be no question of a blood brotherhood, but sooner or later they will take up their respective weights, some kind of equilibrium will be reached, of that I am sure. We have not lived together for nearly two centuries merely to see the Canadian experiment fail. It will not fail. This country of high colours and violent contrasts will not fail. One of these days the two races, forgetting lesser allegiances, will unite in mutual loyalty to it, and build it into a structure of which our successors will be proud.

# DURHAM ET LA NATIONALITÉ CANADIENNE-FRANÇAISE

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J'AI écrit "nationalité," mais ce travail se rattache aux trois autres qui portent sur le "nationalisme" canadien-français.

Pour comprendre l'attitude de Durham sur cette question il faut dire un mot des idées de Durham sur les nationalités.

Durham, on le sait, fut en politique un libéral, un radical, un réformateur. En cela il subit, peut-on dire, l'influence des révolutionnaires français. En Angleterre il fait figure de précurseur; il provoque ou favorise des réformes politiques, sociales, religieuses, éducationnelles. En Europe, il se fait le champion des petits peuples contre leurs tyrans. Il appuie de toutes ses forces le peuple espagnol dans sa révolte contre le despotisme; il forme le "Spanish Committee." Il défend la Norvège contre le Danemark. Il s'intéresse à l'indépendance de la république de Gênes. Il travaille en faveur de la libération de la Belgique et de celle de la Pologne. Il appuie la Turquie contre la Russie, et la Grèce contre la Turquie. Il parle même en faveur de l'Irlande.<sup>1</sup>

On aurait donc pu s'attendre à ce qu'il accordât la même faveur et le même appui à la petite nation canadienne-française. Sans doute, il part d'Angleterre, en 1838, avec des préjugés contre ce peuple, remarque Buller;<sup>2</sup> où a-t-il puisé ces préjugés? Est-ce dans les bureaux officiels de Londres? Est-ce chez certains d'entre les parlementaires britanniques?

La réception que les Canadiens français lui firent à Québec dès son arrivée fut sympathique et pourrait avoir atténué son antipathie; de même les conversations qu'il tint avec les représentants des Canadiens français, peut-être aussi, dans une certaine mesure, l'approbation que les radicaux canadiens-français recevaient aux Etats-Unis et en Europe.

Il me semble qu'il y a contraste, dans le rapport de Durham, entre la première partie et les conclusions, la première partie étant plus sympathique, les conclusions l'étant moins, aux Canadiens français. Il se pourrait bien que ces deux portions du Rapport aient été écrites à deux différents moments, la première alors que Durham voyait les Canadiens français animés de respect et de confiance en lui, la seconde alors qu'il les vit se détacher de lui; il est sûr que le rapport n'était pas écrit en entier lorsque Durham arriva à Londres.

Pour expliquer ce changement d'attitude on peut recourir à une hypothèse celle d'une influence qui se serait exercée sur lui pendant son séjour au Canada, et ce serait l'influence américaine.

Durham fut inquiet, dès l'abord, de l'opinion américaine. A ce moment les Américains éprouvaient une hostilité marquée envers l'Angleterre; plusieurs d'entre eux plaignaient les Canadiens français de subir ce qu'ils estimaient être la même tyrannie que celle dont ils avaient souffert; ce

<sup>1</sup>Sur ces faits consulter Stuart J. Reid, *Life and Letters of the first Earl of Durham* (2 vols., London, 1906).

<sup>2</sup>Charles Buller, *Sketch of Lord Durham's Mission to Canada in 1838*, dans Sir C. P. Lucas (ed.), *Lord Durham's Report* (Oxford, 1912), III, 340: "I used indeed then to think that Lord Durham had too strong a feeling against the French Canadians on account of their recent insurrection."

sont eux qui approuvaient nos radicaux. Durham s'employa à amadouer l'opinion américaine; il multiplia les politesses; en voyage ou chez-lui, au Château St-Louis, il reçut les Américains qu'il rencontra, qui vinrent le voir, qu'il invita chez lui. Les conversations qu'il tint avec eux l'auront sans doute influencé. En quel sens? Dans un sens contraire aux intérêts des Canadiens français. On le voit par la longue explication que Durham donne sur les Hollandais de l'Etat de New York et sur les Français de l'Etat de Louisiane.<sup>3</sup> Et qui, sinon ses commensaux américains, aurait pu lui expliquer le jeu de l'assimilation qui s'exerçait sur ces deux groupes étrangers?

Il y aurait lieu de se demander dans quelle mesure l'assimilation s'était faite. Mais Durham ne paraît pas s'être posé cette question. Il accepta comme un fait accompli l'œuvre de transformation des sujets de ces deux états en citoyens américains, et il en appliqua les conclusions au groupe canadien-français. Toutefois ce ne fut pas sans hésitations. On sait qu'il procéda sur place à de nombreuses enquêtes, qui, avec ses observations et ses contacts personnels, lui fournirent beaucoup de données sur le peuple canadien-français.

A ce peuple il reconnaît maintes qualités. La première est sa valeur morale.

Durham note qu'on ne voit chez ce peuple ni attentats à la propriété ni recours à la violence; que ce peuple est honnête, vertueux, frugal, hospitalier, poli. Et c'est là, certes, un fonds très riche à exploiter, c'est une base solide sur laquelle on peut asseoir l'édifice du progrès.

Durham et ses amis virent bien quelle était la source de cette vertu. A n'en pas douter, c'était bien l'Eglise catholique. Son enquêteur sur l'éducation, Arthur Buller, écrit, dès le début de son mémoire: "Il est impossible de rendre assez hommage aux mérites de cette Eglise très exemplaire. Sa présence s'est constamment manifestée par des bienfaits; sa carrière a toujours été marquée par le plus fidèle accomplissement de ses devoirs sacrés et par son inébranlable loyauté à la Couronne Britannique."<sup>4</sup>

Dans le mémoire sur les municipalités on lit ceci: "Le clergé paroissial est le seul guide de l'habitant; son autorité, dans les districts ruraux, est incontestée; il est un gardien vigilant de la morale, et son travail efficace a créé les habitudes de sobriété et de bon ordre."<sup>5</sup> Ce témoignage a d'autant plus de poids qu'il est signé par Adam Tombs.

Voilà une assertion bien explicite. Cependant elle ne va pas encore aussi loin que celle de Durham lui-même. Voilà ce qu'il dit:

Le clergé catholique de cette province s'est concilié de façon très remarquable l'amitié des gens de toutes croyances. Je ne connais au monde aucun autre clergé paroissial qui, pour la pratique de toutes les vertus chrétiennes et pour le zèle à remplir ses devoirs ecclésiastiques, ait mérité une reconnaissance aussi universelle, et ait produit de meilleurs résultats. Pourvu de revenus suffisants, voire considérables, selon l'idée qu'on s'en fait ici, possédant l'avantage de l'instruction, ce clergé (catholique) a vécu sur un pied d'égalité et de

<sup>3</sup>Lucas, *Report*, II, 299-303.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 241.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 143.



cordialité avec les habitants les plus humbles et les moins instruits dans les districts ruraux. Bien au courant des besoins et du caractère des habitants les prêtres ont été les promoteurs et les dispensateurs de la charité; ils ont été les gardiens efficaces de la moralité du peuple; alors que les institutions de gouvernement civil étaient pratiquement absentes l'Eglise Catholique a été, pour ainsi dire, le seul rempart efficace de la civilisation et de l'ordre. Le clergé catholique du Bas-Canada a droit à cette expression de mon estime, et parce que mon témoignage est conforme à la vérité; et parce que je dois à ses services éminents dans la résistance aux intrigues des rebelles une reconnaissance explicite.<sup>6</sup>

Un clergé qui s'était si bien comporté ne pouvait-il pas servir d'instrument dans la marche vers le progrès?

Premier avantage: une haute moralité chez le peuple. Deuxième avantage: un clergé excellent. En était-il d'autres? Durham en reconnaît implicitement un troisième, à savoir que les points faibles du Canadien français ne sont pas son fait à lui, mais bien le fait de la France métropolitaine; celle-ci ne l'a pas dressé à la vie politique; elle ne l'a pas préparé aux activités du commerce et de l'industrie; elle ne l'a pas doté d'une agriculture progressive; elle ne lui a pas donné d'imprimerie; elle lui a interdit le prêt à intérêt; elle lui a laissé un code civil qui retarde ou empêche le règlement rapide des transactions de propriétés. Mais ces "vices" de caractère politique, comme dit Durham, pouvaient se corriger par une éducation appropriée.

Et il y avait encore un autre atout, un quatrième, c'était la forte natalité du peuple canadien-français. Durham ne le mentionne pas, probablement parce qu'il était déjà imbu des théories de son contemporain Malthus. Le seul moyen de peupler le Canada, pour Durham, c'est l'immigration, sans doute parce que Durham était saisi d'admiration en face des rapides progrès des Etats-Unis grâce à l'immigration. Durham aurait dû, en homme d'état bien averti et bien avisé, tenir compte de l'avantage énorme que possédaient les Canadiens français dans leur taux élevé de natalité. Pourquoi l'a-t-il négligé? Peut-être parce qu'il regarda plutôt le taux, élevé lui aussi, de la mortalité infantile et de la mortalité par les épidémies, faiblesse dont nos ancêtres auraient bien dû s'inquiéter eux-mêmes. Remplir le ciel avec des petits anges "made in Canada" leur sembla préférable; mais pour les trois millions que nous sommes maintenant en ce pays, des hommes en chair et en os nous seraient plus utiles que les petits chérubins qui sous le regard paternel du très-haut s'amuse avec leurs palmes et leurs couronnes.

Si Durham avait bien observé il aurait remarqué une autre force qui agissait en faveur de notre peuple, et cela sous ses yeux. C'est la force d'assimilation. Déjà bon nombre d'Anglais, d'Ecosseis, d'Irlandais, d'Allemands, de Juifs, après avoir épousé des Canadiennes françaises, avaient aussi embrassé la langue française, la culture française, la cause canadienne-française. Durham pouvait en voir même parmi les rebelles qui avaient pris les armes contre la bureaucratie. Il s'en rend vaguement compte; il note, même à la fin de l'année 1838, qu'il y a encore une cinquantaine d'Anglais qui sont nettement en sympathie agissante pour les

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 138.

Canadiens français;<sup>7</sup> il affirme (p. 27) que même parmi les officiers d'administration, de langue anglaise, plusieurs se déclarent en faveur des Canadiens français. Si Durham avait regardé, des fenêtres du Château St-Louis, vers les toits pointus du Séminaire de Québec, il y aurait remarqué un phénomène extraordinaire, la présence, en cette forteresse de la nationalité canadienne-française, de jeunes gens de langue anglaise, qui suivaient là un cours où l'anglais tenait peu de place.

En consultant les archives du Séminaire je remarque, pour les années 1836 à 1839 les noms suivants : Austin, Bailey, Barwis, Blumhart, Boston, Brown, Burns, Croft, Crosscomb, Daly, Dowling, Duggan, Feagan, Foley, Forcade, Fraser, Glackmeyer, Graveley, Green, Hammond, Hetherington, Houstain, Hunt, Jackson, Jones, May, McAvoy, McCord, McDougall, McGrath, McPherson, Mitchell, Murphy, Nesbitt, O'Farrell, Patton, Peachey, Poston, Powell, Prendergast, Quigley, Shea, Sheppard, Seins, Stansfield, Stewart, Tims, Van Felson, Wegend, Wolf, Worthington.

N'est-ce pas très significatif ? On voit bien, parmi ces noms, de braves Irlandais catholiques ; mais il y avait aussi des protestants, des anglosaxons, qui avaient conçu une sympathique estime de la vie française et qui se soumettaient volontiers aux disciplines intellectuelles des langues classiques, à l'influence de la vie française. Depuis la conquête jusqu'à 1799 je relève 64 noms anglais d'élèves du Séminaire de Québec. De 1800 à 1840 j'en trouve 274. De la Cession à l'année 1937 on en compte 1,560. Un travail du même genre fait dans les archives du Collège des Sulpiciens, à Montréal, et dans les registres des collèges classiques fondés avant 1840 (l'Assomption en 1832, Nicolet en 1803, Ste-Anne en 1827, St-Hyacinthe en 1811, Ste-Thérèse en 1825) laisserait sans doute voir un semblable état de choses.

C'était le jeu normal de la force assimilatrice du peuple canadien-français ; Durham aurait pu remarquer cette force, la ranger au nombre des atouts que possédait notre peuple, et pour survivre, et pour progresser.

Ce qui surtout dut frapper l'esprit du gouverneur c'était le mauvais usage, pour ainsi dire, que notre peuple faisait de tous ces avantages. La moralité était excellente, mais elle était plutôt négative que positive ; elle paraissait consister surtout à ne pas faire le mal ; elle n'était pas assez active ; elle semblait pousser le peuple à se contenter de peu dans tous les domaines. Le clergé était magnifique, mais certains éléments du peuple lui échappaient, je veux dire les voltairiens, les disciples de La Mennais, les esprits forts qui allaient jusqu'à s'inscrire dans les loges maçonniques, les politiques qui se soustrayaient, grâce à un certain gallicanisme, à l'influence du clergé. Durham a soin de noter que dans le district de Montréal surtout l'influence du clergé a beaucoup diminué. Le régime seigneurial avait joué un bon rôle jadis, mais le monde évoluait et on aurait pu abandonner ce régime sans risques de perdre son caractère national ; cependant on s'y raccrochait, non pas pour ses mérites intrinsèques, mais simplement parce que c'était un héritage laissé par les aïeux. Le Code civil avait ses avantages certains ; mais la France l'avait déjà modifié ; les Canadiens pouvaient aussi se dégager d'une routine excessive et accomplir des réformes qui auraient révélé chez eux un esprit de progrès. Revenons,

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<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 20.



aussi, à la force d'assimilation. Si nos collèges et séminaires avaient voulu exercer cette force à son maximum, ils auraient transformé la face du pays. Il eût été facile d'ajouter au programme ordinaire un bon cours de langue et de littérature anglaises, et des cours de sciences. Par là ils auraient attiré une plus grande clientèle anglaise; ils auraient gardé au Canada, et dans le Bas-Canada, dans le Québec en un mot, ce flot de jeunes anglo-Canadiens qui allaient aux États-Unis chercher leur instruction, une instruction qu'ils ne pouvaient pas trouver ici, puisqu'il n'y avait pas de collèges anglais. De cette façon la force d'assimilation eût agi à plein rendement; notre peuple aurait multiplié le nombre de ses amis dans l'élite anglo-canadienne et son influence aurait singulièrement grandi. Le Séminaire de Québec paraît s'être rendu compte de l'importance de ce rôle. A cette époque, en effet, il refusait de vendre à l'évêque une maison que celui-ci estimait nécessaire pour agrandir son évêché; le motif du refus, c'était qu'on perdrait par la vente le seul espace disponible pour la classe d'anglais.

Durham aurait dû approfondir l'étude du cas des Hollandais et des Français de la Louisiane. Il aurait alors constaté que les Canadiens français étaient mieux placés que ces deux groupes pour survivre comme nation. Ils étaient plus nombreux, mieux groupés; mieux organisés grâce au système paroissial, grâce à leurs écoles; ils avaient pour eux la force du fait accompli dans l'usage de leur religion, de leur langue, de leurs lois civiles; leur forte natalité militait pour eux; ils exerçaient une réelle force d'assimilation. Je crois que les Hollandais de l'Etat de New York et les Français de Louisiane n'avaient aucun de ces avantages.

En méconnaissant la puissance de ces facteurs Durham heurtait violemment le sentiment national des Canadiens français. En 1839 ceux-ci s'intéressaient surtout à la responsabilité ministérielle que le Rapport de Durham préconisait. Avec l'Acte d'Union de 1840 et l'outrage fait à la langue française—qui perdait son caractère de langue officielle—le réveil fut presque violent.

Durham avait commis une grave erreur, la suite des événements devait le prouver à l'évidence.

#### DISCUSSION

*Professor New* said that he was almost in entire agreement with the author, and welcomed the new suggestions about Durham that had been made. He said the first part of Durham's *Report* had been rewritten later; that the first part was an analysis of the French-Canadian situation, and the second part a series of recommendations. Durham had an idyllic view of French-Canadian society until his death. Durham's recommendations were not surprising in view of his political and social background. Durham was too much of an Anglo-Saxon, being all for progress; that is, economic and social progress. He was a Fox Liberal and an industrial magnate who saw North America as a continent which was to be dominated by the concepts of the Industrial Revolution. The French Canadians did not fit into this picture and should be "Anglified." Durham was entirely and utterly wrong on this matter. Lafontaine saw quickly that the *Report* contained its own antidote: i.e., the recommendation for responsible government. The French Canadians owed Durham a debt on one hand but could damn him on the other.



*Father Maheux* said that Durham's *Report* was written in large part after his arrival in London. He pointed out that Durham gives the English people of Canada and England much blame in the first part, and the French Canadians much praise and little blame. He said the worst clash between French and English was in 1839 over the religious issue after the publication of the *Report* and the organization of the French-Canadian Missionary Society.

*Professor New* asked Father Maheux, "Do you agree that this was not a serious clash?"

*Father Maheux* replied that Bishop Mountain was a zealot; that the next bishop changed the policy and refused to Protestantize the French Canadians saying that Christians must not be divided but must give the world an example of the higher religious life.

*Professor New* said Ryland would have stirred up trouble.

*Father Maheux* agreed and said, "Also Sewell." There was an end to these efforts when the policy was not accepted in England.

*Professor Adair* said that Durham must be thought of in the light of the *zeitgeist* of his day when the assimilation of other peoples was regarded as necessary. He cited Macaulay's *Report on Education in India* as favouring such assimilation; and gave the example of the Know-Nothing party in the United States which favoured the principle of America first; i.e., assimilation of foreigners to assure national power.

*Professor Brebner* stated that Durham had a good bit of Benthamite enlightened authoritarianism in him. He warned against confusing Benthamism and Individualism, Benthamites and the Manchester School, saying that Halévy makes the proper distinctions but that Dycie and Leslie Stephen do not.

*Professor Flenlley* said that he had thought that Durham had been decently interred at the time of the centennial celebration of the *Report* but that now he was reassured by Father Maheux and Professor New that Durham was not really to be disregarded but was as important as he once thought.

## HISTORY AND FRENCH-CANADIAN SURVIVAL

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THE writing of history in French Canada has been an instrument of French action, and a very important one in this country, on this continent. The French-Canadian historian has written to preach national survival to his compatriots, to inspire them with self-respect and pride, to gain a higher place for French Canada in this North American world. Mgr Emile Chartier has expressed this attitude recently in these words, written in 1941: "He [the French Canadian] undertook to relate his history that he might win respect for himself. This was the task, especially after 1840."<sup>1</sup> To increase his prestige, and to win in Canada a place of equality with his English-Canadian rivals, was, indeed, the task he set himself.

The man who envisaged the aim best, and who set his poetic pen to the work of achieving it, was François-Xavier Garneau. Classicist in style, yet stirred by the pulsating emotionalism of the Romantic mid-nineteenth century, disciple of Michelet and Augustin Thierry, Garneau approached the task; conceiving of the history of the French-Canadian people as the story of a passionate struggle for existence, comparable to the stirring strife of the Poles against their Russian masters, of the Irish against England. The unhappy ending of the Rebellion of 1837, and the imposing of the Act of Union in 1840 had darkened the outlook of all French-Canadians, so that a general air of depression and hopelessness prevailed amongst them. Against this Garneau reacted strongly, as he did, it seems, against the taunts of his English-speaking associates. He would bring his people to a true measure of themselves, give them hope and pride, answer the enemy's quips. In those days, France and all Europe were throbbing with the upsurge of adolescent nationalism. Nations, large and small, were reaching for unity, independence, power, a place in the sun. Why should there not be a French nation in Canada? Let the French Canadians strive to save themselves, to fulfil their mission in America. Under the impact of such impulses Garneau sat down to write.

His great work, the *Histoire du Canada*, published in three editions during his lifetime (1843, 1848, 1852) and in three editions since his death (1882, 1913, 1920), laid down a pattern of life for the French Canadians, a philosophy born of Garneau's emotions. From first to last this little people had had to fight for its existence, and it had made a dogged fight. So Garneau filled the pages of his book with a glorification of the French triumph over the Iroquois; of French successes against the Americans, of French-Canadian victories in the conflict for survival with the English; this last conflict, still in progress, had seen them in mortal peril; but because of this they must not sink into hopelessness and defeat. Let them remember their glorious past, and the proud record of ancient triumphs would inspire them to future victories. Let them be what they had been and they would win in the end. This philosophy of stubborn survival in the face of an unfriendly environment is summed up in the conclusion of Garneau's work thus:

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<sup>1</sup>Emile Chartier, *La Vie de l'esprit au Canada français, 1760-1925* (Montreal, 1941), 250.

This people, without the help of outsiders, has grown in religious faith and in national feeling. For one hundred and fifty years it struggled against the English colonies, thirty or forty times more populous, and its history tells us how it fulfilled its duty on the field of battle.

Though lacking in wealth and little favoured it has shown that it retains something from the noble nation whence its origin stems. Since the conquest, without letting itself be led astray by the theories of the Philosophes or by the declamations of rhetoricians on the rights of man, it has directed all its policy to its own conservation. It was too few in numbers to pretend to cut a new swath among societies, or to put itself at the head of any worldwide movement. It withdrew into itself; it rallied all its children around it; and despite the sarcasms of its neighbours constantly feared to lose one custom, one thought, one prejudice of its forefathers. Thus has it kept its religion and its language to this day, and by the same means a foothold for England in North America in the years 1775 and 1812. . . .

The French Canadians are a people of farmers, living in a hard, severe climate. In this capacity they have not the elegant and stately manners of southern peoples; but they do have gravity, character and perseverance. They have given proofs of these ever since they have been in America, and we are convinced that those who will read their history in good faith will recognize that they have shown themselves to be worthy of the two great nations to whose destinies their fate has been or is now linked. . . .

Let Canadians be true to themselves. May they be wise and persevering. Let them not allow themselves to be seduced by the glitter of social and political novelties! They are not strong enough to launch out upon such a career. It is up to the great peoples to test out new theories for in their spacious orbits they can give themselves full leeway. For us, a part of our strength comes from our traditions; let us not quit them or change them save gradually. In the history of our metropolis itself we shall find good examples to follow. If England is great today she has had to endure terrible storms, overcome foreign conquest, master religious wars and many other misfortunes. Though we have no desire to aim at so high a destiny our wisdom and our firm union will soften our difficulties, and, by exciting their interest, will make our course more sacred in the eyes of the nations.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, victory in the future by looking to the past, and by the cultivation of a granitic determination to be, and to remain themselves was the heart of Garneau's programme for the French Canadians. M. Lanctot's comment upon Garneau is pertinent here. He says: "Garneau's patriotism is such that it impregnates his whole work with a special character, for it may be said that he was a patriot before being an historian, and, perhaps, that he became an historian because he was a patriot."<sup>3</sup> Once crystallized and proclaimed in Garneau's resonant pages this philosophy of life, the quintessence of French Canada's natural impulses, became the basic pattern

<sup>2</sup>François-Xavier Garneau, *Histoire du Canada*, 5th ed. (Paris, 1920), II, 715-18.

<sup>3</sup>Gustave Lanctot, *François Xavier Garneau*, in "Makers of Canadian Literature" series (Toronto, 1926), 152.



for historians, poets, and other writers; and from it there has been no fundamental divergence to this day.

Garneau was hailed as a hero by his compatriots as a wave of public gratification arose in response to his defiant glorification of the French-Canadian nation. Crémazie, Fréchette, and the whole school of patriot poets followed the historian to the well of national pride for inspiration. There was one aspect, however, of the picture which Garneau had drawn that did not strike a responsive chord in the hearts of many, perhaps most. The role of the church had been neglected; the policies of the church, and of the government in behalf of the church had been criticized, as had the attitudes of certain ecclesiastical dignitaries such as Bishop Laval. Consequently, despite his stand that the preservation of the faith was a basic part of French-Canadian survival, and his counsel to the people to avoid social and political novelties, Garneau was accused of Gallicanism and anti-clericalism, of Voltairianism and revolutionary ideas. This note was sounded as recently as 1930 by Mgr Camille Roy in these words: "His [Garneau's] admiration for Voltaire and Michelet prepared him ill to understand the religious questions which arise in every page of Canadian history. The seductive theories of Gallicanism and liberalism have more than once inspired and falsified his judgments."<sup>4</sup> The strength of such criticism was great enough in his lifetime to force Garneau to remove certain passages from his book in its third edition, though the original text was restored in later editions by the author's grandson.

Such feelings led the Abbé J. B. A. Ferland, Professor of History at Laval University, to take up afresh the task of writing French-Canadian history. There is no doubt that Ferland's heart, like those of his friends Crémazie and Fréchette, beat in tune to Garneau's patriotism. But the balance must be restored so far as the church was concerned, and its true place in the history of French Canada clearly delineated. Garneau's theme of survival through conflict is reflected in the conclusion of a little book published by the Abbé Ferland in 1854, where he states: ". . . So! Despite the illwill of several governors and the favorites of power; in spite of the calumnies, injustices and insults which it has been made to swallow the French-Canadian population has sustained itself, has multiplied, and has taken its share of material progress while carefully preserving its faith, its language, and its institutions. . . ."<sup>5</sup> When the first edition of Ferland's *Cours d'histoire du Canada* appeared in 1861 it was clear that the purpose of the author was not to deny the validity of Garneau's main theme, but to retouch the picture so as to give the church the paramount place. This aim the author reveals in his introduction where he asserts:

Faith and honour! such was the gauge of union and love which France gave to her children whom she sent to create a new country in the west, on the banks of the great rivers of America. And, history teaches us, her children have respected the teachings of their mother.

If we find in the annals of Europe so many pages worthy of our attention, what interest must not the history of our own Country inspire in us, since it includes the lively picture of the trials, the sufferings, the successes of our ancestors; since it retraces for us the

<sup>4</sup>Camille Roy, *Histoire de la littérature canadienne* (Quebec, 1930), 57.

<sup>5</sup>J. B. A. Ferland, *Notes sur les régîtres de Notre-Dame de Québec* (Quebec, 1854), 74.

means which they used to found a Catholic colony on the banks of the St. Lawrence, and shows us at the same time the way which Canadians must follow in order to keep intact the faith, the language and the institutions of their fathers.

. . . religion exercised a powerful and salutary influence upon the organization of the French colony in Canada. It took the diverse elements, come from all the different provinces of France and fused them together. Out of them it formed a united and vigorous people which will continue to increase, as long as it remains faithful to the traditions of its fathers.<sup>6</sup>

The Abbé Ferland was lukewarm in his praise of Garneau, speaking of him as "a man of distinguished talent . . . who has consecrated a part of his life to the writing of a history of Canada which is well thought of in France as well as in our own country."<sup>7</sup> Yet, save for the difference in emphasis Ferland and Garneau had the same end in view, the national survival of the French Canadians. It was this fact that Crémazie had in mind when he wrote in 1866 to the Abbé H. R. Casgrain, "Messieurs Garneau and Ferland have already . . . laid a foundation of granite for our literary edifice."<sup>8</sup>

The Garneau tradition as modified by the Abbé Ferland found at once a host of advocates, a chorus in every field to sing its harmonies. Gradually two groups of writers began to form around two variant expressions of the tradition. In the field of historical writing the spiritual leaders of the two groups are men whose names are well known in French-Canadian historiography, the Hon. Thomas Chapais and the Abbé Lionel Groulx.

Like his predecessor, Abbé Ferland, Thomas Chapais was Professor of History at Laval University, and it was in his courses of lectures at that university that he developed his interpretation of the Garneau tradition. Garneau's patriotic mission Chapais accepted wholeheartedly. Indeed he rose in public forum to counter possible criticism of Garneau on that score saying,

The rigorous upholders of the new critical school of history will, perhaps, blame his [Garneau's] work for that quality which constitutes one of its most potent charms among the author's compatriots. They will accuse it of being above all a patriotic history, and according to them, patriotism has no place in history since history is a science, nothing else. . . . Yet . . . the historian has a heart and no law obliges him to stop his heart from beating. He has a country; under what head would anyone forbid him to love it with all the force of his soul? Doubtless patriotism must not suborn judgment, nor falsify equity, nor suppress impartiality in the writer of history. Justice and truth must be his inflexible law. But are they incompatible with love of race and country? We can admit no such thing.<sup>9</sup>

That Garneau's patriotism had sometimes led his judgment astray Chapais was prepared to admit but he was not ready, as he says, "to take the

<sup>6</sup>Ferland, *Cours d'histoire du Canada*, 2nd ed. (Quebec, 1882), iii-x.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, vii.

<sup>8</sup>Cited in Ian Forbes Fraser, *The Spirit of French Canada* (New York, 1939), 26.

<sup>9</sup>Thomas Chapais, "L'Histoire de Garneau" in *Semaine d'histoire du Canada: Compte rendu et mémoires* (Montreal, 1926), 29.



patriot-historian too much to task" for it, since it was "this love of country which brought his book to birth . . . which has made M. Garneau one of the noblest figures of our national Panthéon."<sup>10</sup>

Garneau's attitude toward the church Chapais was less willing to accept or to pass over. In this respect he aligns himself with the Abbé Ferland, the Abbé Casgrain and the other critics; with, that is, the Ferland modification of the Garneau tradition. Chapais agrees with the criticism that Garneau did not bring out clearly "the providential mission of French Canada"; and that though Garneau was a respectful son of the church he did not possess "that intimate fusion" of love of church and country which is "the very essence of Canadian patriotism." He finds it hard to explain why Garneau never saw that "religious unity is the greatest force and benefit which any nation can enjoy since it unites our souls in an unbreakable bond."<sup>11</sup>

Despite flaws of judgment, for his day and age and *milieu*, Garneau had given a remarkable example of historical scholarship. Upon this aspect of Garneau's work Chapais seized with avidity. During the period from 1890 to 1930 when Chapais was doing the bulk of his writing, the idea that history is a science was dominant in the historical fraternity. That Chapais was sensitive to the demands of "scientific history" is evident from the passage concerning patriotism quoted above. That he should understand such demands better than Garneau is easily comprehended from the chronological development of such ideas; that he abided by the rules of "scientific history" so fully is very much to Mr. Chapais' credit. With impartiality as a weapon, Chapais battled many misinterpretations, legends, and biases which had arisen in the previous writing of French-Canadian history. One passage from his *Cours d'histoire du Canada* will give convincing evidence of this fact. Speaking of the church during the troubled period after the Conquest he says:

Yes, if our Church got through the torment of 1763 and the following years without perishing it is to him [Mgr Briand], to his firmness, his loyalty, his prudence, his calm that we owe it. Honour to his pure and noble memory! Honour also to his devoted associates, to Montgolfier, La Corne, L'Isle-Dieu, Etienne Charest. And why should we not add?—Justice is the supreme law of history—honour to those enlightened Englishmen, to those British governors, officials and statesmen, Murray, Cramahé, Carleton, Burke, Rockingham whose uprightness and political sense made them second our leaders' efforts! All of them, though in varying degrees and for different reasons, have a right to our imperishable gratitude for having shared in the saving of that great national institution, the Canadian Church.<sup>12</sup>

It so happens that such a treatment of history fitted not only the requirements of scientific history, and a sense of fair play and justice, but also met the needs of French-Canadian action as conceived by M. Chapais. Garneau, living in a generation when fear was the predominant mood, always thought of the French Canadians as a *petit peuple*—a little people—whose hope of persistence lay in a policy of withdrawal, of

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 22-3.

<sup>12</sup>Chapais, *Cours d'histoire du Canada* (Quebec, 1919), I, 60.



avoidance of the rest of the world. True, he saw with intellectual if not emotional conviction that French Canadians must remain on good terms with Great Britain for in the British connection lay the chief hope of French-Canadian survival, and conversely Canada would remain British only if Quebec remained French.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless the main impression given by Garneau's book is that the French Canadians are a little people whose main task is to survive, and whose chief ambition must be to survive by and through themselves. With the insistence on the need of survival Chapais had no quarrel, but of the best method of survival he had different ideas. Clearly he was stirred less, if at all, by the fears of Garneau's generation. His hopes of French-Canadian survival were pinned on the policies of statesmen like Sir George Etienne Cartier, Sir Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, finding in wholehearted co-operation with English Canadians a larger sphere for French-Canadian influence and a surer guarantee of survival for French Canada than that given by any programme of survival by withdrawal. Without doubt M. Chapais' historical works have contributed, and have been meant to contribute to the spreading of belief in such policies as these among his compatriots. Like Garneau's work, they have been books of action, and to such a programme the rules of scientific history, the tenets of justice and fair play, obviously have been of considerable aid. Yet, in order that it may be seen that M. Chapais' views are no divergence from the Garneau tradition but a broadening of it in new circumstances, let us close our remarks about M. Chapais by citing his fervent approval of Garneau's advice, "Let Canadians be true to themselves!", in these words:

. . . may this greatest of all pleas prolong its echos in our hearts! Above all may it ever remain the sacred watchword of our youth! Let Canadians be true to themselves! Let them be true to their great and holy origins; let them be true to the faith of their forefathers; let them be true to the ancestral traditions; let them be true to their tongue and their religion; let them be true to the glorious mission which Providence has called them to carry out in the North American continent! And the future, which doubtless still holds trials and struggles for them, will see, of this we have a firm hope, not only the survival [of this people], but the ever greater increase and expansion of their national life!<sup>14</sup>

In marked contrast to the stand taken by Senator Chapais is the attitude of the Abbé Lionel Groulx, Professor of the History of Canada at the University of Montreal. If Chapais sees the survival of the French-Canadian people ensured by closer and closer co-operation with English Canadians in the development of a greater Canadian state, an essential component of a strong British Empire, the Abbé Groulx finds salvation and survival for the French Canadian to lie along the path of survival through withdrawal, of particularism defined through conflict.

The fears which tolled their dirges to the ears of Garneau's generation still ring their solemn peals for the Abbé Groulx. "We [the French Canadians]," he says, "belong to that little group of peoples . . . destined on earth for a special role, the tragic role. Their anxiety is not the question whether they will be prosperous or unfortunate tomorrow, great

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Lancot, *Garneau*, 150.

<sup>14</sup>Chapais, *L'Histoire de Garneau*, 31.

or small; but whether or not they will be at all, whether they will rise to salute the day or retire into nothingness."<sup>15</sup>

To combat fear was perhaps Garneau's chief reason for writing the *Histoire du Canada*. To overcome such fears he stressed continuously the successes of the French-Canadians in their endless conflict for survival. From past successes the people should take hope for the future, continuing the conflict with the same obdurate determination. His was a combative theme.

From Garneau's flame Groulx has lighted his torch. The conflict, however, which Garneau saw as an unhappy fact that had to be endured with stubborn hope became for the Abbé Groulx a necessary means to an end, a virtue. In *La Naissance d'une race*, Groulx cites with approval Joseph de Maistre's dictum: "... it is very essential to observe that, over and beyond the element of attraction which creates national unity and which is the result of a community of language, character, etc., this unity is also prodigiously reinforced by the element of repulsion which separates the different nations. In effect, it is a disagreeable truth, but none the less a truth: Nations do not love each other."<sup>16</sup> From beginning to end in his writings, Groulx has acted upon this view that the active cultivation of dislike and antipathy is an essential part of nation-building, and, in the case of the French Canadian, of survival. Readers of *La Naissance d'une race*, *Vers l'Émancipation*, and *Notre Maître, le passé*, are well aware of this.<sup>17</sup> The idea has been, apparently, that in learning to dislike Englishmen and Americans, the French Canadians would become surer of themselves, and so of survival. Such a view contemplates not an end to conflict but the perpetuation of conflict for the benefits it brings in the building of a French-Canadian nation. It is Garneau's negative combativeness transformed into a positive good.

In order to win in the eternal conflict, in order to conquer fear, French Canadians must above all, according to the Abbé Groulx, have pride in themselves, in their past, in all that they stand for. In 1924, he wrote:

Pride was one of the virtues, which in the recent past we most lacked, though little was as necessary to us as that. A people weak in numbers can, if need be, do without wealth and even without art but certainly not without pride. To live it is first necessary to convince oneself that life is worth the trouble. . . . [But] to be proud our youth has need only to know whom they are. It does not suit the sons of the great Frenchmen who built that masterpiece of history, New France, to seek elsewhere than at home the reasons for their dignity.<sup>18</sup>

The Abbé Groulx has bent all his energies in teaching and writing to the end that French Canadians might achieve this pride of nation, and that they might, one and all, work for the "common task," the future preservation for and by this people of "a Latin Christian culture, of the vocation of an apostolic race."<sup>19</sup> For this purpose he has written history

<sup>15</sup>Lionel Groulx, *Directives* (Montreal, 1937), 10.

<sup>16</sup>Groulx, *La Naissance d'une race* (Montreal, 1919), 86-7.

<sup>17</sup>Groulx, *Vers l'Émancipation* (Montreal, 1921); *Notre Maître, le passé*, 1ère série (Montreal, 1924); *Notre Maître, le passé*, 2ème série (Montreal, 1936).

<sup>18</sup>Groulx, *Notre Maître*, 1ère série, 9.

<sup>19</sup>Groulx, *ibid.*, 10.



as "a Catholic and a French Canadian";<sup>20</sup> has regarded the subject of history as "neither a speculative science, nor as a dilettante's discipline" but rather as an "essentially dynamic [subject] which cannot evade the obligation of inspiring, if not of formulating, disciplines of action."<sup>21</sup>

To the labours of inspiration the Abbé Groulx has brought a poet's temperament and a poetic pen. His books are filled with flashing colour, high imagination, and passionate feeling. Mgr Chartier has quite aptly called him "our poet-historian."<sup>22</sup> Only such a poet-historian could have penned the passage which closes *La Naissance d'une race*. It reads:

The little Canadian people of 1760 possessed all the elements of nationhood. It had a land of its own, it had ethnic unity, linguistic unity, it had a history and traditions. But above all it had religious unity, the unity of the true faith, and with it social balance and the assurance of the future. Legatee of the highest French civilization it strengthened its youth with all the forces of order and spirit. But when a people has on its side the truth and morality of Catholicism, the perfect essence of that Christianity which Taine called "the best auxiliary of the social instinct"; when the generous will of a long series of ancestors has made of the highest Christian virtues and ethnic tradition, a spirited heritage transmitted with life itself; when this same people further possesses, through its faith and from its ancestors the sovereign law of hierarchic progress; when the dignity of morals, respect for the laws of life, the peace of families and classes, the cult of justice, prayer and the spirit are placed above all material grandeurs; when this people possesses an immense, fruitful and lovely land, immense and fruitful in the amplitude of its horizons and its riches, in the promises it offers to labour; lovely in its material countenance and in the form of its soul, in its historic patrimony which sanctions every pride of blood: such a people, invested with all these titles and guardian of all these hopes may appear the last and the least in the eyes of materialist policy. None the less it bears on its forehead the seal of the predestined, for it is of that number through whom divine deeds will yet be accomplished.<sup>23</sup>

The conquest of fear, the enhancement of antagonisms, the cult of pride, as understood by the Abbé Groulx can and must have in his eyes but one ending, the crystallization of a French-Canadian nation. We have already seen in the passage quoted above his conviction that French Canada had all the elements of nationhood in 1760. This idea he condensed into the title of the book from which the citation comes, *La Naissance d'une race*. The concept has been repeated in more explicit language in the title, *La Naissance d'une nation*, given to a book published in 1937 which was written by Gérard Filteau, a disciple of the Abbé Groulx. That the formation of a "race" or nation is a slow process, Groulx is ready to admit. "God," he says, "cannot form a race as he does an individual." Such creation is a matter of a gradual accumulation of energies, "the slow blossoming of an ideal."<sup>24</sup> That the realization of this ideal would mean

<sup>20</sup>Groulx, *Vers l'Emancipation*, 8.

<sup>21</sup>Groulx, *Directives*, 9.

<sup>22</sup>Chartier, *La Vie de l'esprit*, 251.

<sup>23</sup>Groulx, *La Naissance d'une race*, 293-4.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 180.



the creation of a separate French state in America he denies. This "French state" will remain within the Canadian confederation but on the basis of a greater autonomy than French Canada now enjoys. The conclusion at which he aims would appear to be a state within a state. To those of his compatriots who in 1937 thought this an idle dream the Abbé Groulx hurled defiance in these words:

Too late? But do you not see, do you not hear what is coming? The breath of greatness is beginning to stir a generation. Our youth, intelligent, bustling, resolute, carry our dawning future in their eyes. That is why I belong to those who hope. Because there is God; because there is our history, I hope. I hope with all our ancestors who have hoped; I hope with all those who hope today; I hope above my time, above all the discouraged. Whether they wish our French state or not, we shall have it; we shall have it young, strong, radiant and beautiful, the spiritual home, the dynamic pole of all French America. We shall have a French country too, a country which will carry its soul in its countenance. Snobs, *bonne-ententistes*, defeatists can shout at us as much as they like: "You are the last generation of French Canadians." I reply to them along with all our youth: "We are the living generation. You are the last generation of the dead."<sup>25</sup>

During the last thirty or forty years French-Canadian historians have divided according to their preference for the attitude of Thomas Chapais or for the views of the Abbé Groulx. Undoubtedly the majority have chosen to follow Chapais' lead. But the Abbé Groulx has raised about him an ardent, very vocal, and very loyal minority group. At heart the two groups have but one objective, the preservation of the French-Canadian people. Consequently, their differences, sharp and bitter as they have often been, are the result of divergent opinions as to the best method of achieving the goal, rather than a dispute about the goal to be achieved. A contemporary French-Canadian historian has written of Garneau's *Histoire* that it was "an act of faith and hope in national survival. Through the voice of the historian, it was the cry of a whole race refusing to give in, refusing to die"<sup>26</sup> For a hundred years and more the goal of national survival has been kept unswervingly in view in French Canada. For the attainment of this goal the voice of the historian has been raised in an act of faith and hope. Thus has French-Canadian historiography been a work of action.

#### DISCUSSION

Professor New said that Garneau made two errors: first in speaking of a conflict against the British government since the real enemy was the local oligarchy and the British government almost always interfered in favour of the French Canadians; secondly in speaking of the conflict as being strong in the early days of the legislature since the only example of bad feeling in the first legislature was the struggle over the selection of a Speaker. Only later when social and economic strife occurred did feelings become very strained. There was never any serious religious clash, the religious clash being not one of Catholic and Protestant but one between

<sup>25</sup>Groulx, *Directives*, 241-2.

<sup>26</sup>Lanctot, *Garneau*, 172.

the Catholic tradition and the Papineau (French Revolutionary and Philosophe) tradition.

*Professor Lower* said there was no religious trouble until the Irish immigrants brought their religious quarrels with them.

*Professor Trotter* stated that we are now having to "think through" once more some of the problems which faced the men of the 1860's. There is a fresh realization of the vitality and sure permanence of the French-Canadian tradition. French Canadians are passing through a phase of re-accepting some things previously accepted. They have found their Chinese wall not as effective as they hoped it would be and readjustments which they do not like are needed.

*Professor Brown* said that English Canadians have had a problem of survival too. Is it recognized by the French Canadians?

*M. Marion* stated that Professors Saunders and Rothney go to the root of the question, and that their papers should be mimeographed and distributed widely. With reference to Professor Brown's question he said that next year's programme should concern itself with English-Canadian nationalism. French Canadians have no monopoly of nationalism; and there is no conflict between French-Canadian nationalism and the nationalism of Canada.

*Father Maheux* recommended that English Canadians accept more of the French language as a barrier against the United States.

# PAPINEAU ET L'ORIENTATION DU NATIONALISME QUEBÉCOIS

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IL est impossible de définir le nationalisme en général et le nationaliste québécois en particulier. Nous essaierons plutôt de nous représenter ce qu'il était chez les Canadiens français dans le premier quart du dix-neuvième siècle. Comme en France et dans beaucoup de pays à la suite de la Révolution française, il était une idéologie plutôt qu'un système philosophique bien défini, un ensemble de sentiments plutôt qu'une doctrine, une phraséologie encore un peu vague plutôt qu'un groupe d'idées. Notre nationalisme à ses débuts était très différent de la forme de patriotisme professé jusque-là. Comme chez les nouveaux "citoyens" des Etats-Unis ou chez les nouveaux républicains de France, le nationalisme devenait facilement une passion, un sentiment très fort, une poussée du fond même du peuple et ce n'est que plus tard qu'on essaiera de le définir et de le réduire en formules.

Aussi, pour dire l'orientation du nationalisme québécois sous la conduite de Papineau, faudra-t-il nous contenter de décrire les manifestations successives d'un sentiment assez complexe. Ce qui nous oblige à suivre la courbe des faits plutôt que la ligne droite des principes et des définitions. Et tout uniment, nous verrons la naissance du nationalisme avant Papineau (1760-1815), son développement sous la Présidence de Papineau (1815-1827) et son orientation sous la conduite de Papineau (1827-1837).

## I. LE NATIONALISME AVANT PAPINEAU (1760-1815)

Le nationalisme de nos jours est plutôt un attachement profond à la nation. Mais chez les Canadiens après la Conquête, il fut avant tout un instinct de conservation. Sans être formulé en doctrine, il existait un sentiment canadien dès avant 1760. Sous la Domination française, il y eut, sinon lutte, du moins froissement fréquent entre Canadiens et Français venus de France, entre Habitants et Français de passage. La différence de mentalité était assez accentuée depuis 100 ans pour opposer deux formes d'attachement au pays d'origine. Les Canadiens commençaient à préférer la Nouvelle-France à l'Ancienne, au moins dans le cours ordinaire de la vie. Cet attachement à des façons un peu nouvelles de penser et de sentir, il se manifesta souvent de 1700 à 1760. Et quand le Canada fut cédé à l'Angleterre, les 65,000 Canadiens se virent en possession d'un héritage que leur instinct leur fit deviner très précieux à conserver.

Dès les premières années l'idée de patrie se précisa d'autant plus qu'ils étaient pratiquement les seuls vrais habitants du pays. Il fallut plusieurs années pour constater qu'une autre nation viendrait partager la possession de ce pays avec eux. Car, alors, les quelques centaines de sujets anglais qui arrivèrent ici y venaient surtout pour tenir garnison, remplir les fonctions ou faire le commerce. Par opposition ou comparaison instinctive, chez les Canadiens, "nouveaux sujets" mais anciens et seuls habitants, se fortifia l'instinct de conservation de leur présent : première forme de leur nationalisme.



Il se changea d'ailleurs bientôt en un instinct de défense. Ce à quoi ils tenaient le plus, leurs traditions, leurs habitudes canadiennes, leur foi catholique, était ou semblait menacé. La Proclamation Royale (1763) établissait le gouvernement civil. Les Instructions à Murray ajoutaient en toutes lettres: "Afin de parvenir à établir l'Eglise d'Angleterre et que les habitants puissent être graduellement induits à embrasser la religion protestante et à élever leurs enfants dans les principes de cette religion, nous ordonnons que tout l'encouragement possible soit donné à la construction d'écoles protestantes." Déjà le Traité de Paris spécifiait la liberté de culte catholique mais sous la réserve de la suprématie du Roi et autant que le permettaient les lois de la Grande Bretagne. Quand on sait que les lois anglaises enlevaient simplement aux catholiques le droit d'exister légalement, on constate que cette suprématie du Roi n'était rien d'autre qu'une menace la plus directe pour la foi catholique. Les Canadiens le virent tout de suite comme ils virent ailleurs des menaces pour leurs lois françaises et leurs écoles. Leur nationalisme fut dès lors un réflexe de défense. Le clergé s'occupa de la défense religieuse par le rétablissement de l'épiscopat. Les laïcs luttèrent activement pour la conservation des lois civiles françaises. Ils y voyaient plus qu'une série de réglementations; ils savaient qu'elles étaient le produit d'un esprit national et l'arme la mieux adaptée par les siècles à la défense de cet esprit.

La menace se précisait du point de vue économique aussi. Ils voyaient les nouveaux venus s'emparer, légitimement sans doute, s'emparer tout de même, du commerce et ne laisser aux Canadiens que la culture des terres qu'ils ne pourraient jamais aggrandir sans difficulté. Ils s'y attachèrent donc jalousement et leur nationalisme fut, d'une part, plus rustique et paysan, d'autre part, doublement défiant des nouveaux venus au pays, maîtres de la vie économique.

Avec l'Acte de Québec (1774), les Canadiens recevaient un semblant de Constitution; ils connurent même un soupçon de "démocratie": le Gouverneur devait avoir un Conseil censé représenter le peuple et à qui fut donné une ombre de pouvoir législatif et exécutif. Mais l'essentiel, c'était la reconnaissance textuelle de la religion catholique toujours sous la même réserve mais moins menaçante dans l'intention, de la Suprématie du Roi. De même ils obtenaient la conservation des lois civiles françaises. A ce moment, le nationalisme canadien n'avait pas le loisir de se livrer à des discussions sur ses droits écrits ou naturels: l'invasion américaine lui fournit l'occasion de se manifester de façon concrète. Les Canadiens prouvèrent qu'ils voulaient défendre non seulement leur passé et leurs traditions mais le pays lui-même contre les envahisseurs. Leur nationalisme se montra tout simplement loyal à leur allégeance britannique. Ils étaient les "nouveaux sujets" mais les anciens habitants et ils sauvèrent le Canada par la défense de Québec. L'élite surtout en profita pour formuler la première doctrine du nationalisme canadien: loyauté envers la Couronne, fidélité à eux-mêmes. C'était d'autant plus méritoire, que les "anciens sujets" (anglais) refusèrent de participer à la défense.

La Constitution de 1791, fut pour le nationalisme canadien une suggestion à se développer dans un sens libéral. Le Bas-Canada était créé, à côté d'un Haut-Canada anglais, avec une population en très grande majorité française, dans la proportion d'un à quinze. Cette province devenait officiellement une sorte de patrie à population homogène invitée à développer sa vie propre et son esprit particulier.

La défense s'y organiserait de façon plus systématique. Et justement la nouvelle constitution fournissait aux Canadiens d'excellents moyens de défense. Ils ne savaient pas encore que les Instructions secrètes au Gouverneur leur enlevait pratiquement ce que la Constitution leur accordait. Ils ne voyaient que le texte officiel, qui rééditait les droits déjà reconnus en 1774 et, encore plus, ajoutait la représentation parlementaire dans une Chambre d'Assemblée élue par le peuple. Désormais, les questions essentielles à la nation seraient discutées et réglées non seulement par l'élite mais encore par le peuple lui-même; ces questions deviendraient plus nationales et populaires. L'esprit national pénétrerait dans le peuple pour réagir ensuite sur les députés et la législation. Pourquoi même le peuple n'influerait-il pas sur le pouvoir exécutif dans le sens de ses aspirations? Les Canadiens, d'abord un peu défiants du système représentatif, crurent bientôt à une ère de paix nationale et de progrès. Ils eurent même l'air surpris de l'arme puissante qu'on leur mettait en mains; ils s'en servirent d'abord très peu pour se défendre. Ils firent à la minorité anglaise des offres de collaboration, qui ont scandalisé quelques historiens. On a parlé spécialement de "la trahison" des seigneurs et des classes dirigeantes parce qu'ils furent d'abord députés puis acceptèrent de siéger dans les Conseils. C'est que ceux-là y allèrent en toute franchise et ne soupçonnaient pas la machiavélisme des Instructions secrètes. Ils voyaient dans la Constitution de 1791 une réplique formelle de la Constitution britannique; ils crurent qu'ils pouvaient mettre cette arme au service de leur nationalisme.

Les menaces directes de l'Instruction Royal—Université anglaise et protestante de forme et d'intention—les actes et paroles de fanatisme agressif du trio Craig-Sewell-Ryland et le fonctionnement de la vie parlementaire tel que le suggérait ou le tolérait le Ministère de Londres détrompèrent les Canadiens. Et vers 1805, le nationalisme canadien redevint méfiant. Les députés et le peuple virent plus clair dans les intentions du pouvoir; les réflexes de défense furent plus violents. Pourtant ces sentiments ne s'exprimaient pas aussi violemment qu'on l'a cru, pas plus dans le journal *Le Canadien* que dans les discours à la Chambre d'Assemblée. Le journal appuyait les réclamations nationales sur la constitution britannique. Pierre Bédard y exposait la doctrine constitutionnelle avec une modération qui plus tard passera pour du loyalisme exagéré. Le nationalisme s'organisait donc, il se formulait, il essayait d'une doctrine. Il demandait non pas des réformes mais l'application simple de la constitution dans son esprit. Ces luttes firent trouver au nationalisme son véritable objet de lutte immédiate: le vice ou du moins la contradiction du système gouvernemental.

En effet, le Gouverneur par son droit de veto et le droit pratique de nomination aux Conseils gardait ses pouvoirs absolus; la Chambre d'Assemblée représentait le peuple mais n'avait plus aucun pouvoir pratique. On avait donné au peuple le goût de la politique et on lui refusait de le satisfaire. Il savait plus clairement ce qu'il devait conserver, défendre et faire progresser; il connaissait déjà la puissance de l'arme qu'on lui avait mise en mains et il entendait bien ne pas se laisser enlever tout cela par l'absolutisme de tel ou tel gouverneur. De là, les tendances plus doctrinales et plus positives du nationalisme.

La guerre de 1812-14 mit une trêve à ces luttes qui menaçaient de



devenir très violentes, au moins en paroles et en discussions parlementaires. Le nationalisme, encore une fois, répondit à l'appel du pouvoir contre l'attaque américaine. Dès ce moment, semble-t-il, se formula la distinction qui a si souvent scandalisé depuis cent ans : défendre non pas une colonie britannique mais le pays et la nation contre l'étranger. Chateauguay et toutes les campagnes de 1812-14 furent de très belles réponses du nationalisme canadien dans le Bas-Canada.

## II. SOUS LA PRÉSIDENTE DE PAPINEAU (1815-1827)

Après la guerre, (1815) Papineau fut élu Président de la Chambre. Il était député depuis 1808. Elu à 22 ans, il avait été formé à la vie publique par son père, longtemps chef des Canadiens dans la région de Montréal, et sous la direction de Pierre Bédard, chef parlementaire durant une quinzaine d'années. Papineau avait, comme tous les autres, le culte de la Constitution britannique et croyait y trouver tous les moyens de faire valoir les droits de la nation. Depuis 1808, il voyait le nationalisme canadien devenir plutôt politique et chercher à influencer le pouvoir exécutif autant que le législatif. Lui aussi, comme beaucoup de députés, était officier de milice et était prêt durant la dernière guerre à aller au combat, à la tête de ses électeurs. Il a donc tout ce qu'il lui faut pour "présider" les forces nationales qui sont à s'organiser. Grand orateur déjà, très intelligent et studieux, il pourra être le porte-parole et l'expression éloquente des réclamations populaires. Les circonstances en font même une sorte de chef de parti.

C'est en effet la position singulière d'un Président de la Chambre, à cette époque ; il est forcément, et quoi que veuille la tradition parlementaire, représentant de la très grande majorité des députés auprès du pouvoir qui voit en eux les adversaires des Prerogatives royales. Le Gouverneur appuyé sur les deux Conseils (Exécutif et Législatif) est de gré ou de force le défenseur du pouvoir absolu contre les "empiètements" de la Chambre. Qui n'est pas au pouvoir est dans l'opposition ; l'opposition, c'est la Chambre et le Président en est le chef.

Malgré leur sincère désir de collaborer dans les affaires du pays, la très grande majorité des députés, représentants des 4/5 de la population, constitue un parti national qui ne peut rien sur l'exécution des lois qu'ils sont chargés de voter. De là, la tendance oppositionniste de Papineau et de ses "partisans." Sous sa Présidence, du moins jusqu'en 1827, les nationaux canadiens remplirent leur fonction de loyale opposition de façon en somme irréprochable.

Le jeune chef présida à l'organisation systématique du "parti." En Chambre, il dirigea les débats selon la meilleure tradition parlementaire qu'il connaissait mieux que personne. S'agissait-il d'un discours de loyauté à l'avènement du Roi, il le prononçait avec une maîtrise et une sincérité admirables. S'agissait-il de législation, il faisait donner aux lois une forme impeccable et légalement inattaquable. Le Conseil Législatif ou le Gouverneur n'avaient plus que le moyen de rejeter les projets de lois. Ils en usèrent abondamment et l'on croirait parfois qu'ils voulurent tout faire pour irriter la majorité parlementaire et son chef.

Une question tenait beaucoup au cœur de nos députés : la législation scolaire. L'Institution Royale n'était pas acceptée et fonctionnait très peu. On voulut donc créer un système d'écoles acceptables pour les



catholiques français. La Chambre vota 9 projets de lois, de 1814 à 1824; ils furent rejetés, amendés ou réservés à l'approbation du Roi. L'arme parlementaire se révélait impuissante à assurer un droit essentiel de la nation. Hors de la Chambre, Papineau présidait encore, mais cette fois comme chef du peuple lui-même. Par son éloquence et son emprise sur les foules, il contribua beaucoup à faire descendre les questions nationales dans la foule. Sous son impulsion ou à son exemple, les députés rendirent compte de leur mandat, firent signer des pétitions, réunirent des assemblées populaires. Le nationalisme se formulait en public.

En 1822, Papineau crut que la meilleure tactique contre la mauvaise volonté évidente du Gouverneur serait une offensive à Londres même. On nomma des délégués dont il fut de chef, mais ils ne furent jamais reçus ou écoutés officiellement. Papineau rivait avec une certaine rancœur et une foi diminuée dans les "bienfaits" de la Constitution britannique. A travers lui, toute la nation ressentit l'injure.

Cependant, Papineau n'était pas encore le chef incontesté de ses compatriotes. En marge de ces activités nationales qui tournaient facilement à l'opposition systématique, il y eut des offres de collaboration au pouvoir. Plusieurs Canadiens acceptèrent d'entrer dans les Conseils avec l'espoir d'y défendre les intérêts de la nation. Mgr Plessis lui-même y siégea durant 10 ans. Et la Chambre elle-même fit à l'Exécutif une avance généreuse, au moins à première vue. Elle offrit, en 1810, puis accepta, en 1818, de fournir tous les subsides nécessaires à l'administration. La condition posée par les députés de contrôler les dépenses publiques n'aurait pas dû tant scandaliser; on n'avait qu'à se rappeler le principe fondamental des libertés populaires anglaises: *no taxation without representation*. Par l'affirmation et la pratique de ce principe, le nationalisme de nos députés se faisait plus britannique que le gouvernement lui-même. Pourtant cette question des subsides fut le sujet de luttes continuelles sous la Présidence de Papineau. C'est qu'au fond se trouvait tout le contrôle politique: le Gouverneur garderait-il le pouvoir absolu que ses Instructions secrètes lui accordaient? La Chambre d'Assemblée n'aurait-elle qu'un pouvoir illusoire? Au reste, le royalisme prouvé de façon peremptoire en 1814 avait donné à la population et aux députés conscience de ce qu'ils pouvaient réclamer, non en récompense mais en reconnaissance. Ils avaient fait leur devoir de Canadiens et ils prétendaient que cela confirmait simplement les droits qu'ils avaient depuis toujours dans leur pays.

Joint à l'instinct de conservation et défense, ce sentiment de fierté et de loyalisme favorisait le progrès des idées nationales. Les Canadiens les puisaient aussi dans les écrits français. Mais il faut se rappeler qu'ils lisaient les œuvres du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle et non la littérature proprement révolutionnaire. Les idées de la Révolution n'eurent pas de cours dans le Bas-Canada. Le sentiment général fut même absolument hostile à la Révolution et à Napoléon qui les représentait aux yeux des Canadiens.

Mais ils trouvaient dans les œuvres des Encyclopédistes tout un vocabulaire dont ils se mirent à se servir pour exprimer des aspirations et des sentiments proprement canadiens: "droits du peuple, droits de l'homme, peuple souverain, résistance à la tyrannie" tous ces mots à la signification sanglante en France désignaient simplement ici le désir de conserver des droits naturels et politiques. Le vocabulaire révolutionnaire exprimait

l'instinct de conservation et les réflexes de défense. En somme, les fameux "droits due peuple," c'était des aspirations encore un peu imprécises vers l'autonomie politique et la responsabilité ministérielle.

Papineau, très cultivé et grand liseur des œuvres du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle, comme d'ailleurs des livres anglais, s'assimila et mit en circulation des formules françaises couvrant, en somme, des idées de libéralisme politique anglais.

L'admiration de ses compatriotes et des circonstances spéciales feront de ce porte-parole, un chef, un conducteur et sa moindre parole, son plus petit geste seront des mots d'ordre et des exemples pour ses partisans et ses compatriotes.

### III. SOUS LA CONDUITE DE PAPINEAU (1827-37)

Papineau, Président de la Chambre et porte-parole des nationaux depuis 1815, prit nettement l'attitude et la fonction de chef en 1827.

Il était déjà une sorte de chef d'opposition depuis que la politique coloniale de Londres maintenait la Chambre dans une opposition perpétuelle. Il le deviendra davantage par suite de démêlés avec le Gouverneur Dalhousie qui en fit une question personnelle. Dalhousie refusa un jour de reconnaître Papineau comme Président de la Chambre. Naturellement, les députés se groupèrent plus étroitement autour de leur président-chef qui fut accepté sur l'ordre formel de Londres. C'était une victoire pour la nation entière. Désormais, menacer Papineau ce sera menacer tous nos droits et la liberté elle-même.

Dans les années qui suivirent, la lutte personnelle entre Papineau et le gouverneur s'envenima encore. La question du contrôle des subsides se changea en discussions acerbes sur le contrôle politique: ou Papineau et les députés, ou le Gouverneur et les Conseils. Les sentiments personnels et collectifs se regroupaient en une sorte de programme; plus que cela, l'idée d'autonomie commença à s'exprimer en face du colonialisme, dans les manifestes de partis.

Cette idée grandissait d'ailleurs dans les Provinces voisines, depuis longtemps. Papineau et ses partisans étaient en communications avec Lyon-Mackenzie du Haut-Canada. Et là, les réformes demandées n'étaient pas moins radicales que nos réclamations. Papineau savait aussi les luttes autonomistes commencées par Joseph Howe, en Nouvelle-Ecosse. D'Angleterre même venaient des expressions d'idées libérales qui mettaient violemment aux prises les Tories et les Whigs.

Papineau pouvait donc croire que son nationalisme n'avait rien de déloyal même s'il s'exprimait avec autant de violence verbale que dans les Provinces voisines ou en Angleterre. Les réclamations, les plaintes, les demandes de réformes furent rédigées dans les 92 Résolutions votées à la Chambre, en 1834. On y trouvait tout ce que les Canadiens avaient sur le cœur, tout ce que leur suggéraient, depuis 75 ans, leur instinct de conservation, leur réflexes de défenses, l'inutilité apparente de leurs luttes et leur convictions d'avoir, comme sujets canadiens et britanniques, des droits égaux à leurs devoirs. La grande réforme demandée était la "démocratisation" de l'Exécutif, ou mieux encore sa responsabilité devant le peuple et les députés.

A cette date se produisit une scission parmi les Canadiens. Jusqu'ici, on s'était parfois un peu divisé sur les moyens à prendre, mais sur les droits à réclamer l'entente était parfaite. Voici que Papineau et ses



partisans veulent orienter la lutte sur un objet trop particulier : l'éligibilité du Conseil Législatif. Cela pouvait faire oublier l'objet principal. Dès lors il y eut ceux qui suivaient aveuglement Papineau dans sa politique d'opposition à outrance et ceux qui croyaient encore aux moyens constitutionnels. Durant trois ans, les extrémistes furent encore au tout premier plan ; ils multiplièrent les assemblées populaires, ils subirent des élections et siégèrent dans des sessions inutiles, ils proclamèrent partout les 92 Résolutions sur les hustings et dans leurs journaux. Ils parurent plus que jamais représenter tout le nationalisme canadien. Les modérés, patriotes aussi sincères, ne furent peut-être pas assez actifs ou furent trop timides devant les accusations de "trahison" dont ils étaient chargés.

Les tergiversations du Ministère anglais, l'aveuglement de sa politique de temporisation, les nouvelles des autres colonies firent monter encore le sentiment extrémiste. Le nationalisme exacerbé, poussé à bout par les provocations vraiment stupides des groupes fanatiques anglais, ne parurent faire oublier toutes les idées d'ordre, de loyauté ou de simple bon sens. Les modérés ne purent les faire valoir ou les rappeler parmi les clameurs qui dominaient, surtout dans le district de Montréal. Au printemps de 1837, les Communes de Londres votèrent les Résolutions Russell qui accordaient au Gouverneur le droit d'employer, sans l'autorisation de la Chambre, l'argent de la Province pour l'administration publique. Après quelques réformes secondaires, accordées à la dernière minute et à contre cœur, c'était l'absolutisme politique, au moins sur la question des subsides. C'était surtout enlever aux nationaux l'arme constitutionnelle dont ils s'étaient servis avec vigueur et quelque succès depuis 1817.

Le sentiment populaire fut alors au paroxysme ; les partisans de Papineau dépassèrent le chef lui-même dans leurs violences verbales et les appels directs à la révolte. Ses lieutenants comme les frères Nelson, le Docteur Côté, et plusieurs autres prirent la tête du mouvement, malgré les réticences de Papineau. Les mandats d'arrestation lancés contre les principaux patriotes causèrent l'explosion. On apprenait en même temps que la révolte éclatait dans le Haut-Canada. Papineau fut alors l'occasion plutôt que la cause de la révolte armée qu'il ne voulait pas et n'avait jamais voulue. On prit les armes pour le défendre, lui et quelques autres chefs. Il s'enfuit aux Etats-Unis et par là voulut certainement dégager sa responsabilité de la prise d'armes.

L'influence de Papineau sur le nationalisme canadien se continua par son nom plutôt que par son action directe. En fait, on le mit désormais de côté pour sa prétendue "tiédeur." Son influence cessa au moins pour la dizaine d'années qu'il passa loin du pays et de la politique. Elle avait été très profonde depuis plus de vingt ans. En arrivant dans la vie publique, en 1808, il avait recueilli de la génération précédente une tradition nationale déjà active : un instinct de conservation développé en ardeur de défense contre toute menace à l'existence de la nation. Sous sa Présidence, ce sentiment national s'était organisé pour une action plus positive ; il s'était renforcé d'éléments empruntés à l'esprit anglais ; il s'était révélé et agguerrri par la pratique des moyens constitutionnels. Puis le caractère de Papineau et ses luttes personnelles avaient donné au nationalisme canadien cette agressivité qui redevint trop vite de l'opposition à outrance. Les efforts si longtemps sans résultat apparent



prouvaient aux modérés eux-mêmes l'inanité de leur lutte. Le nationalisme extrémiste n'avait plus rien pour l'empêcher d'aller jusqu'à la révolte.

Le nationalisme vrai, celui de la grande majorité des Canadiens, se redressera de lui-même après la Rébellion. Même les deux principaux partisans de Papineau, deux des plus ardents avant le prise d'armes, Lafontaine et Morin, se font les défenseurs d'un nationalisme orthodoxe, après l'Union. Ils formulent le point désormais central de nos réclamations : la responsabilité ministérielle. Ils s'en feront un terrain d'entente et de coalition avec les nationaux du Haut-Canada. Nationaux patriotes et réformistes ont trouvé leur formule et leur programme. Le nationalisme canadien tout court se réalise, au moins temporairement et en dehors de Papineau, dans la coalition Lafontaine-Baldwin.

# NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC POLITICS SINCE LAURIER

By GORDON O. ROTHNEY

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THE lifetime of Sir Wilfrid Laurier saw the development of several different concepts of nationalism among the people of Quebec. In the eighteen-sixties he himself was associated with the editors of the Montreal journal, *Union nationale*, and other young nationalists in opposing Confederation. A little later he dreamed of the day when Canada would be politically independent. He was associated with Mercier in the Riel agitations of 1885 and in the electoral campaigns which led to the formation of Quebec's National government in 1887. As Prime Minister of Canada, however, he was accused by many people in his province of having become an imperialist. His policies gave rise to a new nationalist movement inspired by Henri Bourassa, and bitterly opposed to his government. Yet it is generally agreed that he strove at all times for the creation and preservation of Canadian unity. An important instrument for this purpose was his Liberal party, whose policies he endeavoured to define in such a way that no large section of the population would be unable to accept them. In his last election campaign it is true that he obtained a majority in one province only, Quebec. Yet when he died in 1919 he had the satisfaction of knowing that by opposing both conscription and the Union government, he had made it possible for French Canada to continue to support a political party which had been and, with the passing of war-time issues, could again become Dominion-wide in its scope.

The various manifestations of nationalism which characterized Quebec during the career of Laurier have continued to play a part in her politics since his death. Unfortunately they are sometimes not clearly understood in the rest of Canada. The purpose of this brief paper is merely to classify, as objectively as possible, some of the concepts which, growing out of the province's history, continue to be important in determining her attitudes today.

When the nationalist politicians of Quebec speak of the "nation," what do they mean? There are three important answers to this question. Sometimes they have used the word to mean the French-Canadian cultural group; sometimes they seem to refer to the Province of Quebec with all its inhabitants; and sometimes they clearly include the whole of this federal state called Canada.

## I

Nationalism of the cultural type is much the oldest of these three concepts, and without doubt is still the most fundamentally important. French Canadians, like their English-speaking compatriots, wish to preserve and develop their own language and characteristic institutions. If a cultural group be considered a "nation," then we are all nationalists. The Anglo-Saxon element, however, whether as the most numerous people in Canada or as the minority in Quebec, do not apply the term to themselves in this sense. The difference is that theirs is a culture which is widely spread throughout the world. It is in no danger of extinction. Admittedly their schools have a habit of glorifying their own race and its achievements, but they are not on the defensive. They do not think of their cultural group

as a "nation," for it is not sufficiently distinct from what exists in the United States or in the United Kingdom, and its survival in Canada is not threatened.

The French Canadian, on the other hand, has stood alone on the American continents and alone in the British Empire. Ever since 1763 he has been worrying about his *survivance française*. The military conquest was accepted, but the struggle to prevent complete Anglo-Saxon cultural domination has gone on. In the political sphere on some critical occasions this has led to the formation of a French-Canadian *bloc*, such as that which made Panet the Speaker of the first Assembly of Lower Canada, and those which in turn backed Papineau and LaFontaine in their struggles for what we now call democratic rights. At the present time, Maxime Raymond, Paul Gouin, and René Chaloult believe that a situation has arisen which can best be dealt with through the formation once more of a "*Bloc populaire canadien*."<sup>1</sup> These *blocs*, however, have never existed as separate political organizations for long after the passing of the specific crisis which they were formed to meet. They have been organized, not for the purpose of isolating French Canadians, but to defend what are considered by their leaders to be fundamental rights which, for the time being, cannot be protected in any other way.

All recent French-Canadian political leaders have, of course, desired to encourage the culture of their race. But there have been important disagreements as to what is involved in this type of nationalism under present conditions, especially in the field of economics. Even at the time of Confederation, men like A. A. Dorion and Médéric Lanctot accused Cartier of selling out to the big capitalists in matters of importance to their race. In the days of Premier Taschereau, similar charges against the Liberal régime were made in vain by the Conservatives under the leadership of Arthur Sauvé and Camillien Houde. These charges became more effective when, during the great depression, some French Canadians within the Liberal party began to argue that unless the social well-being of a people is secure, a healthy cultural nationalism is impossible. This feeling led to the formation of Paul Gouin's *Action libérale nationale* in the 1930's, which, like the *Bloc populaire canadien* again today, advocated extensive economic changes, notably in the sphere of government (or "national") ownership of essential public services.

The *A.L.N.* was "*Libérale*" both in that most of its members were Liberals in federal politics, and in that it adopted a liberal attitude on questions of social reform. It was "*Nationale*" in that it aspired to uplift the people of the French Canadian "nation" and of Quebec. Such a policy, it believed, would contribute to the strengthening of the Canadian nation as a whole.

Most of the *A.L.N.* programme never went into effect. Founded in 1934, its members soon abandoned the idea of "re-liberalizing" the provincial Liberal party from within. On the eve of the Quebec elections of 1935, Paul Gouin and the leader of the provincial Conservative party entered into an alliance known as the *Union nationale Duplessis-Gouin*. Mr. Duplessis had nothing to lose, for in the federal elections a few weeks earlier

<sup>1</sup>*Que devons-nous attendre du Bloc? Conférence de Paul Gouin au Monument National, le 28 avril 1943* (Edité par le journal *L'Union*, 254 est, rue Ste-Catherine, Local 13, Montréal).



only one French-Canadian Conservative had been elected. Mr. Gouin believed that he, also, had nothing to lose because he thought that anything would be better than the Taschereau government. So an electoral agreement was quickly concluded.

Although this combination fell just short of victory in the 1935 elections, it succeeded in forcing another dissolution of the Legislature in 1936. Before new elections could be held, however, the two leaders quarrelled. Mr. Gouin withdrew from the alliance but failed to prevent most of his former supporters from allowing Mr. Duplessis, a "practical politician," to transform the *Union nationale* into a new unified political party under the sole leadership of himself.<sup>2</sup> The Duplessis government which took office following the 1936 elections, carried through some social reforms, but it fell short of the original *A.L.N.* programme. The idea of "National Liberal Action," however, did not die. Mr. Gouin's attempt to revive his movement in 1939 was killed by the electorate, but ever since that year one of its most prominent original leaders, the Hon. Oscar Drouin, has been a member of the Godbout Liberal Cabinet. Mr. Gouin himself is now a promoter of the *Bloc populaire canadien*, of which one of the main objectives is to raise French-Canadian living standards, both through provincial action and through co-operation with people of a similar political and economic outlook in other provinces.

It is worth noting that, in the past, developments such as this have made possible the formation of Canada's great political parties. It has been Canadian experience that English-speaking organizations cannot "convert" Quebec, nor can French-Canadian movements expand far into Ontario. The Conservative party was produced when home-grown *bleus* led by Morin and Cartier joined with the Tories of MacNab and Macdonald—an alliance which, temporarily at least, now appears to be completely broken. Similarly, the union of Dorion's home-grown *Rouges* with Mackenzie's Grit Reformers gave us the modern Liberal party—a combination which, somewhat uneasily, still continues to exist. History shows, therefore, that the appearance of movements like the *Bloc populaire canadien*, far from necessarily being an obstacle, can in the long run become an instrument for the building of Canadian unity. The condition, of course, is that in the other provinces there can be found people with similar attitudes who do not insist on more centralization of power than French Canadians believe to be consistent with their "national" safety.

## II

The word "nationalism" is often used in Quebec as though it meant, not merely the French-Canadian cultural group, but the whole province. Canada frequently seems to be regarded as a sort of supra-national state to which the people have voluntarily granted some sovereign powers while at the same time retaining many autonomous rights for the provinces. This attitude is, of course, simply a practical political application of cultural nationalism, Quebec being the largest existing administrative unit in which French Canadians are in a position to deal with problems in their own way. At the same time the fact that the province contains an English-

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 29-31, prints the text of Paul Gouin's statements of June 18, 1936 ("M. Duplessis brise l'Union"), and of October 25, 1939 ("Allocution prononcée le 25 octobre 1939, par M. Paul Gouin, au poste CBF, à 10 h. 15 p.m.").

speaking minority cannot be ignored. Thus the first National party, founded in 1871 by Louis Jetté and other young Quebec Liberals, included prominent English-speaking leaders. The same was true of Mercier's National party which took office in 1887, and which he presented to the Legislature as "un gouvernement comprenant toutes les classes et toutes les nationalités, et toutes les nobles aspirations du peuple." Shortly afterwards he declared at Saint-Hyacinthe: "le parti national respectera et fera respecter les droits de la minorité protestante de cette province. Nous désirons vivre en paix avec toutes les races, toutes les croyances."<sup>3</sup>

The *Union nationale*, founded in its present form in 1936, revived the use of the word "*national*" in this sense of a provincial political coalition. Honoré Mercier, as leader of the Liberal party in Quebec, had used the Riel affair to persuade a number of *bleus* to join him in a successful anti-Macdonald alliance. Somewhat similarly, the great success of the Quebec Conservative leader, Mr. Duplessis, in exposing scandals connected with the Taschereau régime, enabled him to rally many former opponents to the support of his successful *bleu-blanc-rouge* campaign for the restoration of honest government.

In office from 1936 to 1939, Duplessis continued to imitate, at least on the surface, Mercier's form of nationalism. His movement, too, was strictly provincial. His Cabinet, too, included non-French Canadians. And he, too, placed great emphasis upon provincial autonomy. The reason which he gave for calling the general elections of 1939 was that this principle was being violated by Ottawa under the authority of the federal War Measures Act. His slogan was "co-opération oui, assimilation jamais." Today, in opposition, the main demand of the *Union nationale* is that the government of the province should "recover and guard its complete autonomy." The *Bloc populaire canadien*, however, regards Mr. Duplessis as being as unreliable in this respect as are the Liberals. It points out that there are two ways of undermining provincial autonomy. One is that of which they accuse Mr. Godbout—outright surrender to Ottawa. The other is that of which they believe both Mr. Taschereau and Mr. Duplessis were guilty—insisting upon autonomous powers, and then failing to use them in a way which would meet the needs of the people. If pressing economic and social problems are not dealt with satisfactorily by administrators in Quebec, the principle of provincial autonomy becomes for the majority of French Canadians nothing more than an abstract theory.

Quebec's doctrine of provincial autonomy is based upon the conviction that the French-Canadian mentality and the French-Canadian standard of values differ in important respects from those of English-speaking Canada, and that therefore French-Canadian problems—that is, problems related to the preservation or development of the French-Canadian culture—should be dealt with by French Canadians themselves, in a French-Canadian way. Of all the beliefs of the Quebec nationalist, this seems to be the most difficult for his compatriots in the other provinces to grasp. In general he accepts the British North America Act's statement of subjects which should be reserved for local jurisdiction. It is only in these spheres that he claims the right of provincial autonomy. He wishes to preserve the type of Confederation which was established in 1867. He believes that

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<sup>3</sup>Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de la province de Québec*; V. Riel (Montréal, 1942), 238, 251.



only if Quebec's complete control of certain matters is maintained, will successful co-operation between our two main culture groups be possible or a strong and united Canada be developed.<sup>4</sup> A Canadian stated before the American Historical Association a year or so ago that the paradox of our history is the fact of "nationhood emerging . . . through the mingling of two opposing elements—autonomy and co-operation."<sup>5</sup> In the view of Quebec nationalism, if this statement is true of the relations of our Dominion with the rest of the Empire, the strength of Canadian nationhood depends equally upon the recognition of the importance of the same paradox in the relations of the province with the rest of Canada—the mingling of autonomy and co-operation.

### III

The third important concept of nationalism in Quebec is that of Henri Bourassa, who regards the whole of Canada as the "nation," and desires that she should be completely independent within the British Commonwealth of Nations. He wishes her not merely to assert this independence, but to exercise it through a foreign policy based, not upon sentimental imperialism, even if only subconscious, but solely upon Canadian interests. He began his crusade at the time of the Boer War and continued it with the aid of his paper, *Le Devoir*, through the first World War. Quebec regards conscription as an extreme example of military imperialism. But in 1917 Laurier made it possible for her to register her protest through one of the two traditional Canadian parties, thereby removing any necessity for the creation of a new Nationalist organization.

After 1919, Quebec continued to identify Conservatism and imperialism. She alone of the nine provinces has given a majority to the same party at every federal election since that date. During this period, she has frequently voted differently from Ontario, whose sectional economic interests are similar to her own. A principal reason has been that, for her, nationalism of the Bourassa type could best be expressed by voting Liberal. Had not Mackenzie King, Sir Lomer Gouin, and Ernest Lapointe supported Laurier in 1917? Outstanding examples of unsuccessful Conservative efforts to live down their imperialist reputation were Mr. Patenaude's 1925 campaign, which presented him as a Quebec provincial nationalist with a Cartier-like formula for uniting English-speaking business men and the French-Canadian masses; and then Mr. Meighen's famous "Hamilton speech," delivered later in the same year. After the failure of Mr. Patenaude, whom it had strongly backed, the Montreal *Daily Star* sadly concluded that "there are things which Quebec fears more than Progressive rule."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup>The following are a few examples of many statements made by contemporary Quebec nationalists bringing out the distinction between provincial autonomy and separatism: Maximilien Caron, "Y a-t-il un provincialisme légitime?" (*Actualité économique*, 15e année, II, mars, 1940); François-Albert Angers, "Faits et nouvelles: Le rapport Sirois" (*ibid.*, 16e année, II, décembre, 1940, 158); Lionel Groulx, *Directives* (Montreal, 1937), 12-13, 178-80, 182-3; Esdras Minville, "Pour former des citoyens canadiens-français. V. Le milieu politique" (*Enseignement secondaire au Canada*, XXII, avril, 1943, 531), and "VI. Le milieu économique-social" (*ibid.*, XXII, mai, 1943, 612).

<sup>5</sup>George W. Brown, "Have the Americas a Common History? A Canadian View" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XXIII, June, 1942, 135).

<sup>6</sup>Montreal *Daily Star*, Oct. 30, 1925. In Quebec the Conservatives made much of the fact that from 1921 to 1926 the King government's majority depended upon the support of the western Progressive party.



In order to win the Lotbinière by-election of 1937, and again to defeat Camillien Houde, by this time Independent in politics, in the Saint-Henri division of Montreal in 1938, members of the federal Cabinet made the most definite promises that the King government's rearmament programme was for the defence of Canada only, and that it would never participate in another overseas war.<sup>7</sup> In view of what the Liberal party had long stood for in the Province of Quebec, it was inevitable that the Prime Minister's "Canada at Britain's Side" policy in September, 1939, should cause dissensions among his French followers. Liberals such as Maxime Raymond and Liguori Lacombe opposed participation in the new war on the grounds of Bourassa nationalism. There were many evidences that, in spite of rationalization, the determining factor in the ministry's attitude was not Canadian, but British sentiment. Otherwise, for example, how could one explain the continued failure even to break off trade relations with Japan, which was certainly as great an "aggressor" as Germany? But Mr. Lapointe's assurances that he had a compact with the representatives of English-speaking Canada to the effect that there would be no attempt to introduce conscription, together with the unpopularity of Mr. Duplessis and Dr. Manion's connection with the Union Government of 1917—these were enough to persuade Quebec to vote Liberal again, provincially in 1939, and federally in 1940.

In 1942, the renewed dissensions within Quebec Liberal ranks over Mr. King's plebiscite policy, Liguori Lacombe's temporary formation of a new Canadian party (note the name), the appearance of the League for the Defence of Canada, the province's 73 per cent "No" vote in the plebiscite in spite of Mr. Cardin's speeches, the revolt of most of the Quebec Liberals over Mr. King's overseas conscription amendment to the National Resources Mobilization Act, the organization of the *Bloc populaire canadien*, and the election of an Independent in the traditionally Liberal electoral district of Charlevoix-Saguenay, were all evidences of the strength of Canadian (i.e. anti-imperialist) nationalism among French Canadians today.

#### IV

That nationalism has been a major factor in the politics of Quebec since the death of Laurier, as it was during his lifetime, is obvious. The outlook of nearly every French Canadian is "national" in some sense, although there are many who do not subscribe to all the concepts listed above. It is important, however, to distinguish carefully between nationalism and isolationism. The two do not necessarily go together. Nor does it follow that because a person was opposed to participation in the present war he knows nothing of what is going on in the outside world. Some of Quebec's most thorough-going nationalists are exceedingly well informed, and exceedingly interested in international affairs. As examples arbitrarily selected from among those who are considered as the most uncompromising nationalists, names like Raymond and Laurendeau of the *Bloc populaire canadien*, or Pelletier and Richer of *Le Devoir*, could be mentioned, to say nothing of Bourassa himself.

<sup>7</sup>A.L., "Mémoires d'outre-tombe" (*L'Action nationale*, XV, mars, 1940, 229-32), quotes extracts from speeches by Mackenzie King (1935), J.-N. Francœur (1937), C. G. Power (1937), Ernest Lapointe (1937, 1938), Fernand Rinfret (1938), and P.-J.-A. Cardin (1938).

Nor do Quebec's nationalists express any desire to isolate their province from the rest of Canada. That they are more interested in their own affairs than in those of other parts of the Dominion is true, but the same may be said of the people of Ontario. This is only natural. No responsible Quebec leader or writer wants a separate state on the banks of the St. Lawrence, and certainly only an infinitesimal fraction of the French-Canadian people has ever seriously thought of such a thing. Among the nationalists of Quebec today, there are many LaFontaines looking eagerly for Baldwins with whom they can co-operate. If it ever seems as though they may isolate their province, this is because they are put in that position by English-speaking Canadians who have not the patience to respect their point of view. Quebec nationalism is, after all, essentially defensive in character. Its proponents wish to preserve their heritage and assist their people, but they have no thought of hurting the interests of anyone else either within Canada or beyond its borders. Of course they may be wrong in their ideas about what is best for themselves or for others—but then again it is at least possible that they may be right. Even historians are not always infallible in judging their fellow-men.

#### DISCUSSION

*Professor Trotter* said that French Canadians need to abandon the idea that the foreign policy of Canada is imperialistic. It represents the views of English Canadians among whom there are no imperialists left. You have to think hard to find an English Canadian who does not think of Canada first. We are in this war for the survival of Canada as a nation, including the French-Canadian as well as the English-Canadian tradition. In the last two years we have passed through a crisis in the readjustment of French and English relations in Canada, and have found once again that the things which bind us together are stronger than the things which divide us. Each will tolerate the views of the other and all participate in the general war effort. There is the solution to the French-Canadian problem by elimination. It is a problem of life that will go on but the diversities in Canada will be the seeds of a larger life.

*Major Lanctot* said that nationalism really means to the French Canadian survival and nothing else. He sees it as his duty to himself and to Canada to keep and to preserve French culture and nationality, like the other nationalities for whom we have fought two wars, like the English against the Normans. The English always make the mistake of finding the French Canadian too French in peace and not French enough in war. In fact, they are not French at all but Canadian, having no idea of going back to France. The English Canadians should stop looking at us as foreigners and priest-ridden just as we should stop looking at the English Canadians as imperialists. There will be complete co-operation when the English Canadians grant French Canadians the right of cultural survival. In this war there is much better feeling in French Canada where the enlistments are three to five times greater than in the last war.



## AIMS IN THE STUDY AND TEACHING OF HISTORY IN CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES TODAY

By R. G. TROTTER  
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THE fact that our Association is devoting this-morning's session to discussion of "The Social Significance of the Study of History in the Contemporary World" is indication enough that we who profess history are aware that we need to re-examine our relation to society. The social sciences and the humanities, not excluding history, have lately been on the defensive in our educational system. It has been necessary, of course, that liberal studies should suffer some war-time curtailment in our universities by depletion of staff and student body, but that is not to admit that these branches of education are lightly to be thrown on the scrap heap even for the time being. The holding of an historical conference may seem to us to be all the more necessary because of the times in which we meet, and our profession all the more important, but our own belief does not serve to establish as a self-evident truth in the mind of the general public that our work is vital to the community of which we are citizens.

If we would justify to the public our role as practitioners of the liberal arts and, more particularly, as educators and scholars professing history, we may well consider what our position is and what it ought to be. Our functions are complex. We are recorders and purveyors of information, facts if you like, and something of their meaning. We are practitioners and instructors in certain techniques and so-called disciplines. We must remember also that we are trustees of liberal culture. If in all these matters we perform our functions adequately, if we show our faith by works as we should, their performance should presumably do more than earn us a livelihood; it should have some appreciable effect on the society which supports us. And incidentally we should then have in large measure the well-earned sympathy and unquestioned support of the public.

At present, however, history holds a place less high than it ought to hold in popular estimation. Perhaps there is ample reason. Diagnosis is indicated. Perhaps we need to examine ourselves as history's professional apostles. Never has history been so extensively purveyed to the people in our own country and elsewhere as in the decades between the great wars. Yet in the rulers of the democracies in that era or at any rate among the people whose attitudes limited the policies of the rulers, one fails to find commensurate wisdom in meeting the problems of their age. I am not trying to suggest that historians could have saved the world all its growing pains, but I do wonder whether, had we been fully true to our trust, we might not have helped our contemporaries to a prompter view and a clearer view of the issues that were at stake in the growing world crisis, and helped them to see earlier than they did the futility of trying to win through by policies of permanent evasion of issues and repudiation of responsibilities.

Have we—again I mean those of us who have got our living out of society by professing history in one way or another—have we been worth our salt? Perhaps we have been innocuous, but I fear that at times we may also have been inept. What really have we tried to profess? Is it possible



that sometimes we have been little more than misers in antiquarianism, interested in our own preserve and valuing it in proportion as it could be kept exclusive? Is it possible that sometimes even when we became commentators on past issues and thus by implication on issues of the present, we were so solicitous to guard the sanctity of our special preserves that we tried to refrain from expressing convictions about the basic issues involved in the facts of our study or indeed to avoid forming them lest by unhappy chance we might voice them? When we did venture to give utterance to ideas about matters touching present issues, however remotely, were we too often content to be mere echoes of the spirit of our time, to present our contemporaries, in fact, with an apologetic for their shortsightedness and their evasions?

In discussing the place of history and our aims in studying it and teaching it, it would be futile to conceive the task as one of defence. We need self-criticism rather than sympathy and must ask ourselves why we have fallen short. I would suggest that some explanation if not excuse for the inadequacies of our guild may be found by recalling three determining facts. First—we have been of our generation in the world; second—we have been of the wider historical fraternity of our generation; third—we have been of our own generation of Canadians. In some respects our work has been the better for these facts, but in some other respects our shortcomings can be attributed to them. The historian, like any other human being, is necessarily of his time and place, but his vocation calls him peculiarly to see beyond the restrictions that these categories impose upon the laity. It is his obligation to work for that truer perspective on human affairs which ought to be attainable through his studies, from their very nature. His responsibility is not merely to get such a clearer view himself but to help his students or his readers also to attain it. In so far as he fails in this he falls short of fulfilling his trust.

The generation between the wars, in our world of the western democracies, may well be called the prototype of deluded generations. It followed slogans of "safety first" yet denied the existence of abiding values in human life because all things were now said to be relative. Through extreme alternations of boom and depression it devised new restrictions on international trade yet talked about permanent prosperity "just around the corner." With international order crumbling before its eyes, it yet dreamed of permanent peace, to be attained by denying realities and evading responsibilities and repudiating commitments.

It was a generation prone to avoid unpleasant realities by building maginot lines and then taking for granted their successful functioning under all conditions. These maginot lines might be built of concrete and steel, or they might consist of documentary formulae and neatly devised institutions. In either case, once the blue prints were passed and the structure set up more or less in accordance with them, people tended to assume that the end had been gained. It is true that the general wish that the last war had brought Utopia gave way, upon the general realization that it had not done so, to disillusioned cynicism about the war and about the peace, for people tended to forget the perils from which victory had saved them. Nevertheless they acted in many ways as if, in fact, Utopia had been established.

The existence of a new international organization, admittedly highly effective for certain non-contentious purposes but an unreal shadow as a means of security, did not lead to a mobilization of power to make it effective but was seized as an excuse for the evasion of responsibilities. War was formally outlawed and deemed thereby to have been banished, notwithstanding that by the Kellogg Pact it was outlawed in a manner that sanctioned, instead of effective action to prevent it, only negative passivity. If our wishful thinking could only be sufficiently negative, we were assured that what we did not want to happen would not happen. Where men would not look, there no peril lay for them. So when nations made war, claiming that this was not war, others acquiesced, rationalizing their failure to act with prompt determination in the face of obvious menace, by insisting that it was immoral to take up arms against aggression except after being so directly hit oneself that counter-action would satisfy a kindergarten definition of defence.

Far be it from me to attempt here to dissect the manifold causes for such delusions as these that were rife in the years between the wars. But among relevant points one or two may be mentioned. Despite the insecurity of a revolutionary epoch, delusions of security were carried over from its comparative reality in the late nineteenth century, when even the more serious squabbles within our civilization had not seemed to threaten its very foundations. Perhaps, too, our generation's optimistic evasion of unpleasant realities came naturally as a false conclusion through the apotheosis of the nineteenth century's democratic dogma. Ours was the first generation in Western lands generally to see the adoption of universal suffrage and an approach to universal literacy. The assumption was easy and popular that out of the new power of the masses and their new knowledge must come promptly new wisdom in high places and effective action such as could and would inaugurate a democratic Utopia. It was also readily assumed that out of the progress of our age in transportation and in communications, as well as in production, would come speedily universal contacts and interdependences that would ensure peace because it would be so obviously a necessary and universal condition of prosperity.

One might continue on such lines. Was there ever a generation as a whole less aware of impending realities? Yet no generation, as I have already remarked, was ever so instructed by its pedagogues in what were called the lessons of history. Could it be that the professors in the democracies were too much part of their generation to be capable of seeing history's really important lessons for it, or, if sometimes they saw the lessons, that they were helpless to get them effective hearing in the face of popular delusions? We are asked sometimes to excuse the politicians of the appeasement era on the ground that they were helpless in the hands of an inept generation. Were historians hardly less the victims of their times? How otherwise account for the failure of their much instructed contemporaries to learn more than they did of the wisdom of the ages at their hands? If the politicians deserve condemnation, what of the historical profession? The analogy is by no means perfect, but perhaps it is good enough for some discomfort. At any rate we have been a part of our generation. Even if we let it go at that the unsatisfactory position of history is partly explained.



Now for the next point in extenuation, if not in excuse, of some of the inadequacy of history as recently professed in Canada. We have been of the wider historical fraternity of our generation. It was an unfortunate generation in the history of history. It is necessary to recall what had happened to history as a study and as a subject of instruction. It used to be mainly a study for the mature mind. It played little part in elementary education and, till half a century ago, not very much in higher education. The historian when he wrote either provided an entertaining narrative for the general reader or a more soberly analytical and sometimes philosophical study for the select reader. In neither case was he thinking of his audience as made up wholly or even mainly of students taking courses and their teachers.

By the beginning of this century, however, conditions were changing rapidly with the necessity of making intelligent voters out of the masses of newly enfranchised and newly literate citizens. Popular education seized on history as a ready means. Text-books became necessary in large numbers, and profitable. Many books besides text-books would find much of their market as collateral reading in connection with course work. If the benefits of the use of these books were to accrue to a wide circle of students and to their authors, they must deal discreetly with contentious issues and avoid those elements of the subject that might prevent a desirably wide use. Standardized versions of history took shape that would carry a minimum of offence to any element in the community. Facts were the material. Questions of significance and of value were best left to the tender mercies of pupil and teacher. Scholastic demands were to be met by the direct use of evidence discreetly edited in source-books so devised as to ensure little likelihood that any conclusions might be drawn that would not be sufficiently flattering to our own age. The adequacy of the set-up for teaching history to the masses became gauged by the complexity of the pedagogical paraphernalia for teaching facts (the unembarrassing facts) and inculcating ideas (the correct ideas).

History in the universities became something to be taught that the students might in turn teach, or that they might themselves become historians, writing history and teaching it for those who would teach in their turn. It became important in the classroom not only to present history but to teach the techniques of historical scholarship. The necessary attention to the latter sometimes led to over-emphasis upon its relative importance, both in the mind of the instructor and in that of the student, at the expense of adequate attention to such matters as the significance of events and the values of institutions and ideas in relation to the bases of civilization. Productive scholarship, by teacher and by student, tended to become an affair to be gauged in terms of bibliography and notes, the value of the contribution to be measured by the length and weight of the baggage train rather than by the strength brought effectively to bear in the front line. In scholarship as in pedagogy, scholastic paraphernalia tended to become an end rather than a means.

Many university students who had no notion of ever teaching history were nevertheless subjected to this sort of pedagogy. Technical organization and mass production were so widely credited with the world's spectacular increase of new material wealth that they must have their

counterparts in the educational processes by which through the teaching of history the enfranchised masses, and the new middle classes, should be made "the heirs of all the ages, in the foremost files of time."

It was a wholesome sign of dissatisfaction with such a situation that doubts developed as to its adequacy. The system still too often confirmed the young student in his preconception of history as dry as dust. Salvation was sought in the so-called "new history," widely received, if not devised, as a pleasant escape from the difficult to the entertaining. History was enlarged in range till it touched on most phases of human activity. In many ways, however, the "new history" was not as new as its apostles liked to insist, and still too often its essential significance was passed by or evaded. Then came a spate of enthusiasm for "contemporary history," purporting to answer man's questions as to where he was going by focusing attention on the last few steps he had taken. Still the tendency ruled to estimate the successes of history teaching by the encyclopedic competence of the student rather than by capacity to weigh significance, to appraise the essentials of complex situations, and to test the values involved.

Admittedly the shortcomings so obvious in this picture were partly a by-product of the admirable ideal of inculcating open-mindedness and objectivity in the student. Pursuing that ideal it was so easy to avoid the roots of contention and abstain from raising fundamental questions as to the values at issue. The historian, as teacher and writer, became abnormally solicitous lest he lay himself open to a charge of bias. It was because he was so eager to avoid such criticism that he habitually refrained from putting forward convictions reached through his studies, and that sometimes he deemed it a merit to reach no convictions. He proposed to give his reader material for the latter's judgment. He withheld his own, allegedly because for worlds he would not influence his reader's views, but perchance on occasion because he was a timid soul, lacking essential confidence in the validity of his own professional calling as involving any larger responsibility than a recording clerkship.

The sort of advanced professional training that was developed as part of this system was rigorously exacting. The Ph.D. was a formidable discipline. But in some ways it spread a blight. It tended to magnify the importance of the particular and the exceptional. Distinction and advancement depended on making what was called a contribution to knowledge. There is nothing necessarily evil in this. But too often the importance of the contribution tended to be measured by the use of "new" materials, or the "originality" of their interpretation that it involved, rather than by the validity or the relative significance of the conclusions reached. The resulting tendency was for young Ph.D's. to belittle the historian's main task, in his relation to his students and the public, of helping them to a truer understanding of the large and permanent elements and values in civilization. And yet obsession with the exceptional and avoidance of the obvious by an historian are in fact guarantees of distortion and bias and, in the long run, futility.

It is arguable that in writing and teaching history our generation of historians have too greatly neglected the obligation of presenting the long view and the universal view. This is not a matter of bringing world history into a single treatise or a single formal course. It involves rather the



question of the approach in handling any portion of history. It must be somehow sensed by the student as a part of a longer and wider story. Granted that history can be presented only in fragments; the important thing is that the fragment should be recognized as such and not treated as if it were a self-contained whole, as has been done too much with every national history. Each has been dealt with as an entity in itself. Thus one finds the strange anomaly that one of the most isolationist of great powers in the last quarter century, the United States, was so notwithstanding a very wide scattering of offerings in the way of history courses in the universities dealing with diverse peoples in all ages. The study of any number of national histories, if each be viewed too separately, can do little in enlarging the outlook to take in the long view and the wide view.

During the period between the wars history assumed a much larger place in Canadian universities. Staffs were increased, programmes were expanded. Perhaps the most striking feature of this development was the larger emphasis that was now laid on Canadian history, both absolutely and in proportion to the whole programme. Canadian history was engaging the attention of a large proportion of Canadian historians, both French-speaking and English-speaking. There was also, however, noticeable increase in the scholarly investigation of historical fields beyond the Canadian. The tremendous growth in the range and the quality of historical scholarship on the productive side during the quarter-century needs only mention here. Much of this production has been in the way of specialized monographs, but recently there has also been conspicuous progress in the production of the larger syntheses that are necessary if the specialist's work is to reach others than specialists, and in the production of text-books that blaze new and promising trails. If one may judge by prescriptions in university calendars and by the character of questions on many examination papers, as well as by one's knowledge of the men and women concerned, the results of recent scholarship have entered into university teaching with gratifying speed. The *Canadian Historical Review*, succeeding the earlier annual *Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada*, marks the epoch, as do also the enlargement and improvement of archival resources and the establishment and growth of this Association. In short, the historical profession in Canada, taken by and large, does not fare badly by comparison with that in other lands in the matters I have been discussing. If I were not a Canadian addressing other Canadians it would be as seemly as it would be honest to state the case much more strongly than that. (Parenthetically, is it possible, after all, that there has been some advantage for Canada in not being in a position during those years to develop much advanced graduate work in our own universities?)

With all their increased competence as a group, Canadian historians nevertheless did not succeed as well as might be desired. Like our colleagues in other Western lands we have been of our generation and we have been of our profession in that generation. Some of our failings, no less than our virtues, may be attributed to these circumstances. But in seeking the reasons for our shortcomings in the last quarter-century perhaps we shall not find them so much in those facts as in the fact that we have been Canadians. That has been our chief and peculiar trouble. As historians we have been the most numerous group at any period in Canada's

history, on the whole the most intensively and diversely trained, and altogether the most productive, but we have been practising our profession during years when to be Canadian imposed peculiar limitations upon the use of our capacities and the scope and character of our work.

In our day Canada has moved rapidly from a condition of external dependence, despite internal autonomy, through successive phases of that curious and evolving condition that we have called "status" to national maturity. The process has involved almost infinite adjustments of an official and technical sort that have not always been easily arrived at in the face sometimes of internal differences of view and sometimes of external lack of understanding of our aims and capacities. It has involved, also, large readjustments of attitude on the part of Canadian citizens generally. The latter have been on the whole very conscious that some such transformation was taking place and eager that in its accomplishment the things they most cherished in Canadianism should be safe-guarded, and the ends they desired be realized. They have not always understood the conditions or the purposes determining each specific step. Many have looked askance at some of the changes, either from sheer lack of understanding, or from understanding only too well that the shape of things to come was not in all respects to be just as they desired. These rapid readjustments in the position and institutions of a young nation have involved necessarily the revelation of a good deal of immaturity of outlook, lack of perspective, bumptiousness, and sensitiveness. In other words, in the process of approaching national maturity, Canada passed between the wars through a period of adolescence and Canadians suffered the discomforts of spirit incident to that process.

We historians on the whole, at least in English-speaking Canada, were more affected by this situation than we were factors in moulding it. The chief distinction between us and the laity was often that we were more sensitive to maladjustments incidental to the process and more insistent in the demand for clean-cut, logical, and consistent definitions of the changes. Our guild became indeed the spearhead of an introverted national self-consciousness, hypersensitive about the whole situation.

As historians, furthermore, we were like professional experts in military science in our tendency to assume that current campaigns should be conceived according to the pattern of earlier struggles. We were mostly nineteenth-century liberals in our conceptions of national liberty. We were inclined to define it in absolute terms and in terms involving utter repudiation of external connections, links, ties, responsibilities, loyalties, or what you will. We were often prone to think that Canada's adequate place as a nation could be found only within the limits of old categories of nationalism. Yet interested as we were in the affairs of the world at large we could hardly help being aware that the world of the nineteenth century was unlikely to come again and that, whatever theory of nationalism we might prefer, actually Canada was reaching her majority in a world in which independence, even for great powers and much more so for a small power like Canada, must be qualified or accompanied in practice by an increasing degree of interdependence. Its growth was becoming as essential, indeed, in our external relations as in the internal relations among diverse groups within the nation. Before the official definitions of our national position



could be completely elaborated so as fully to express our own sovereign position, many foresaw and some feared that external threats to our survival would compel us, as in the event they did, to shift our major emphasis from independence to interdependence.

It is an interesting question whether the Canadian people might not have been better helped to an understanding of the trends in our national life by Canadian historians if the latter had not tended to be among the most sensitive and least happy of Canadians in their adjustments to the pace and the character of our national emergence. This whole situation, moreover, has had its influence on our own views of history, an influence not in all respects salutary.

Canadian historians are, of course, not alone in labouring under difficulties imposed by national feeling. National historians in any land in eras of great national consciousness tend to distort the significance of earlier chapters in their country's history, seeing them out of perspective because of attitudes toward current trends. They tend often to romanticize their country's past. The Abbé Maheux has called attention to the influence in French-Canadian historiography of the romantic tradition of historical writing which was so strong in Europe at the time that historical scholars in French Canada set the pattern of their people's view of their own history. It would not be invidious to remind ourselves that English Canadians also have had a romantic tradition which has led them to flaunt the virtues of Canada's heroic role and cast other peoples in appropriately contrary roles. English-Canadian historians have tended to build a tradition of unique national virtue founded on successful defensiveness against outside powers rather than build on a conception of constructive advance in relation to a changing world in which outside powers have counted in many ways positively as well as negatively.

Something of this tradition of preferring to attribute our growth in things good to our own genius in the face of odds and opposition from outside, we have borrowed from the Americans. For them, Britain has played the romantic role of villain, notwithstanding that the American heritage of personal freedom and political liberty stems from England, and from English law and representative institutions as planted in the early colonies, and notwithstanding that since the Revolution, as well as before, the principal factor in the outer world making possible the steady growth of these traditions in American society has been the security of an era of growing British sea-power and a spreading British Empire. We sometimes echo this in our own history, though we have often directed our romanticism toward the United States as an even greater romantic villain than Britain.

Has our nationalism led us to an over-emphasis on what can be summed up in the phrase "loyalist tradition" as defending us from losing our identity in the United States? Have we put beside it in due proportion the debt that we owe for our continued identity to the fact that much of the time the United States itself has provided pressures and resistances from within its own borders against admitting us into its national system, or the more obvious indebtedness to the American people and nation in the spheres of economic and cultural development? Have we, on the other hand, always maintained a just balance in the account of our relations with Britain and the Empire and now the Commonwealth? We have matured as a nation in some

ways in antagonism to influences and controls from across the Atlantic and from across our southern border, but also for our maturity as a nation we are indebted in manifold ways to both Britain and the United States, for profitable example, for leadership, for personnel, and for material means that have come from these two nations. My argument is that if we did not so often see our nation's history through a distorted romantic tradition, we would allow larger place to the advantages that accrued to us from both directions throughout our long period of dependence, and to the continuous and permanent elements of our interdependence with both these peoples. The young person who is over-absorbed in contemplation of his own person, and obsessed by self-conscious sensitiveness about the adjustments of his status, is not the young person who is most quickly treated as an adult by those with whom he has dealings.

In spending so much of my time on the past I have not been unmindful that my assigned theme is our aims today. The past, particularly the recent past, has implications for us at the present time. Some of these are already, I hope, sufficiently obvious for purposes of starting a discussion. May I add certain further observations? First I would say again that whatever our shortcomings and however unfortunate may have been the limitations placed upon us by our times and by our situation in the world and in this country, it is my belief that the historians of Canada need not be ashamed of their professional contribution to Canadian life. It has been growing rapidly in quantity and no less so in quality, with an increasing and fruitful diversification of interest and a maturing capacity in synthesis and interpretation. In all of this there is good promise of growing ability to serve well our Canadian community.

Such service as only historians can give is needed in increasing measure. If our people are not to be taken in by facile nostrums, if they are not to be led astray from their best destiny by the blind, they need as greatly as may be a sense of history. Only with that sense alive and quick and full can they face more realistically the possibilities open before them. Better understanding of the history of the growth of the Canadian people and the development of their internal life and institutions with all their complex diversities is part of the need. No less necessary is the history of the Canadian people and state in relation to the wider world. Canadians cannot understand Canada without knowing the history of those lands and places from which we have drawn our human stock and the bases of our culture, nor those as well which have been important in the world picture or with which we have significant relations. Only in such a large perspective can Canadian history be satisfactorily understood, as only in rich relationship with such a larger world can Canada fully realize her potentialities as a nation.

The people as a whole cannot, of course, assimilate so large a story as a chronicle packed with detail. They will be interested in only a comparatively few outstanding and typical events. But while the popular mind must not be expected to become encyclopedic, it can acquire a sense of the historic tides in their ebb and flow. Indeed, in moments of overwhelming crisis the Canadian people have already more than once revealed their sense of historic destiny with a degree of unity that has surprised the pessimists and disconcerted the outsiders, enemy and neutral. There would, however,



be less of fumbling uncertainty between times of crisis and a quicker growth of conscious unity were the people to attain a larger sense of history in its broader meanings.

In the measure that a sense of history is adequate, does it not involve conscious appreciation of the direction of major trends and a clear distinction between the possible and the futile? An understanding knowledge of history ought to enlarge appreciation of the practicalities of life in a free society sufficiently to save its possessors from too-ready and supercilious condemnation of the fumbings of well-intentioned human beings and too quick rejection of the second-best. Appreciation of the complexity of the historical process should better prepare one to take a reasonable attitude in face of the complexities of the current scene. It is a grave question if a democratic society based on universal suffrage can long preserve any essentials of true democracy unless its citizens develop a sound historic sense of the genius of its own institutions.

Furthermore, while that sound sense may properly contribute to a people's pride in its own past, it is an unwholesome history that finds reason for pride mainly in the belittling of others rather than in emphasis upon constructive achievement. A nation, no less than an individual, may have its perspective sadly warped by too egocentric an outlook. A people that knows history, moreover, knows that history never quite repeats itself, and is wary of absolutes; it realizes that flexibility is an essential of policies and of institutions if they are to be adaptable to new needs and to new purposes in relation to changing possibilities and in the face of practical and necessary limitations.

Large as these claims may be for history as deserving an important place in the culture and in the education of our nation, a still larger and more important claim must be made. In a country like ours, possessing a great and venerable heritage of freedom, history has long been a major means of preserving that heritage and passing it on to posterity. In our day history has become more important in this role than ever in the past. Other studies which once held a major place in the curriculum of school and college have lost standing as instruments for the purpose. It is partly that the heritage of humane civilization is no longer linked so largely as it once was with the study of the classics, partly that in linguistic and literary studies, as well as in the sciences, educational emphasis has tended to be placed more and more on scholastic techniques. Even history, as we have noticed, has been in some danger of falling into technical pedantry despite the greatness of its opportunity and its responsibility for ensuring due place in our world for the permanent values of civilized life. History's peculiar opportunity is to bring these values out of the abstract and unreal by study of the past in which can most livingly be seen and appreciated their valid sanctions.

To meet the challenge of today the historian must abandon the apologetic attitude of the academic recluse. He must come down out of his ivory tower. It is not enough for him to be a seeker after truth; he has no business to keep the results of his work to himself and his kind. He is willy-nilly a citizen as well as a writer or a teacher of history. Of course, he should not let his sense of values, his sense of truth, be distorted by partisan exigencies. He must still strive his utmost to be honest in all

his history. The attempt, it is to be hoped, should promote his honesty in everyday common things as a member of society. At any rate he cannot completely divorce his two roles; each affects the other. For him to pretend otherwise is at best self-delusion, at worst conscious evasion and travelling under false pretences.

We are told today that Canada stands at the airways crossroads of the world of tomorrow. As a matter of fact, she stands at the world's crossroads in more than that. She can become one of the world's great cockpits of conflict, or she can become a major focal centre in the building of a better world society. History has been pointing for a long time to the latter as Canada's opportunity and destiny. Her fate has depended from the beginning upon much that happened in distant places; not only in the days of Pitt was it determined by events on the high seas and in Europe and as far away as India, as well as on Canadian soil. As time has passed, the frontiers of her security have widened, not narrowed. They reach today around the Seven Seas and to the four corners of the world. If Canada would not repudiate her destiny her people need to know such things and to abandon their parochial outlook and the habits of the ostrich. This also is a matter in which historians must come to the aid of the people. Our trust is a great one.

The most Canadian of Canadians today is not merely an enthusiast for Canada. He cherishes the values on which depends the survival of our common civilization with its opportunities for enlarging freedoms. His eyes are open to his country's destiny. With his nation filling a grown-up role in the world, he does not waste his emotions in romanticizing the difficulties that were incidental to the process of growing up. There was a stage in the process when even an ultra-national emphasis could involve a wholesome subordination of provincial and parochial prejudice to a larger national loyalty, as well as a healthy emergence from an outgrown colonial dependence, but his nation has moved on past that stage. The truest Canadian today has lost or is losing his excessive introversions, whether provincial or national. In the awakenings bred of world crisis comes recognition that Canada's national maturity is attained and that opportunity for continued growth depends upon enlarging interdependence with other peoples. I believe we may cherish confident hope that Canada's historians will be whole-hearted and far-seeing Canadians in the years ahead, and that their work as scholars and as educators will rather help than hinder the whole Canadian people to realize to the full the high national destiny that beckons them in an interdependent world.

#### DISCUSSION

*Professor Sage* found this paper a healthy sign of needed self-criticism. He doubted if there was any such over-emphasis on technique amongst historians as had been stated, saying that the real trouble is that this generation lacks vision. In so far as the nationalist emphasis is concerned he felt that French-Canadian historians are away ahead of other Canadians in this matter. He doubted if Canadian historians are as hypersensitive about Canadian nationalism as Professor Trotter affirmed. He went on to say that Canadians are too colonial, not sufficiently national, that they should get beyond 1867; they emphasize the Loyalist tradition too much because it is



one of the few Canadian traditions upon which to build. This is so true that if the United States had not been there Canada would have had to invent her since opposition to the United States has given us almost the only sense of Canadianism we have. He wondered if Canadian historians teach a need of history; if Canadians have any sense of history; why Canadian historians do not lead opinion. He pointed out that there are no general statements of aims in university calendars, and no agreement on the history courses required in various universities; that there is no liaison between French-Canadian and English-Canadian universities, and that this matter should be investigated further and remedied. In general the problems facing Canadian historians are the same for historians everywhere.

*Professor Lower* observed that historians in Canada had done a remarkably good job during the last twenty-five years. Canadian historians had stood somewhat apart from those of other countries and must not be confused with them. They have been adolescent in outlook and have had problems; they must answer their adolescent questions before they can take their place in society in general.

*Professor Masters* stated that Canadian historians have created great potential historical wealth and have been dynamic. They have been dependent upon the work of the other social sciences, especially economics. The influence of religion in historical development as shown in the President's address offers an important field for investigation. Professor Masters was not as depressed as some others about the historians.

*Professor Prince* said the "new history" has tended to paralyse some aspects of historical writing such as military history, and biography. The "great man" theory has been too much decried, and there has been too much indifference to medieval history.

*Professor Morton* affirmed that historian and poet have more in common than is recognized. Each is a maker of myths, only the historian has neglected his job of making myths in this decadent, analytical age. If the historian has intuition he should not abstain from using it.

*Professor Underhill* said the feeling he carried away from the meetings each year was that we are always just about to become mature. What is this mature point of view? Can historians ever rise above their own generation? What is the new vision? We suffered from extreme nationalism before; now we have a vision of interdependence. Professor Trotter was asking us to sink ourselves in the new vision. There will be just as serious a mis-realization in twenty or thirty years. What we need is a much deeper contact with poets and philosophers. Today they are greatly disturbed. Professor Trotter evaded the real conflict of values. We are too complacent. Philosophers have a good deal of right to despise us.

*Professor Lower* pointed out that the philosophers to whom Professor Underhill referred were also penetrating historians.

*Professor Brown* stated that history should bridge the gap between poetry, philosophy, and the social sciences.

*Professor Lower* said that historians are too apologetic and humble toward economists. Economics is an important subject in Canada because it happens to fit the present situation.

*Professor Sissons* posed the query: Can the social sciences not be philosophic? He remarked that history teaching here suffers from the great

importance of the state in education. Certain gaps in historical writing are due to the same influence, e.g., the story of the Clergy Reserve settlement of 1854. He stated that the late Dr. Skelton had done a very great service to Canada, since he had made his mark as a student, as a teacher, and as a citizen in public life. History would be better off if historians took more part in public life.

*Professor Skilling* stated that history has been narrow in context geographically, and asked if the remedy was not a new geographic extension in history teaching.

*Professor Trotter* said there was point to Professor Underhill's remarks. Probably historians cannot rise far above their generation but they must try or else they will be reflecting the views of our grandfathers' time since it is so easy to think in terms of earlier periods and to transfer outworn views to the present. The mind of the Canadian people has not grown up, but the Canadian nation is in a real sense one of the few mature nations in the world. Historians should help the mind of the Canadian people to catch up with realities, notwithstanding that this is an increasingly difficult task because of the accelerating process of change in the world.



## NATIONALISM—THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN EUROPE\*

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OVER fifteen hundred years ago an African Bishop, from his seat near the scene of the recent fighting in Tunisia, sought to explain the dissolution of the Roman Empire and to clear his Christian faith from the charge of responsibility for that gigantic calamity. A thousand years later the medieval Christian Commonwealth, in which some members had seen the slow realization of St. Augustine's *City of God*, and which Dante had declared "should be ruled in its motors and motions by a single prince as single motor"<sup>1</sup> was similarly in dissolution. A new thinker, Machiavelli, like Dante an Italian and a Florentine, set himself to work out the intellectual basis for a new type of political organization. He did more. For recent writers on Machiavelli have seen in him not merely the champion of the Prince, and of Reason of State, but also the exponent and defender of the modern doctrine of Nationalism. Machiavelli found his best exemplar, after ancient Rome, in the national state which Louis XI had created in France; and in the next century Richelieu, like Augustine a Bishop, nay more a Cardinal, but bearing no other discernible resemblance to the African Saint, applied the Machiavellian doctrine with a thoroughness and lack of scruple which made the French monarchy the very impersonation of the national state, and also gave France the hegemony in Europe. With the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and the Humanitarian Movement, moral and idealist influences, Deist if not Christian, emerged again. There is an antithesis between Frederick the Great, the arraigner of Machiavelli and the first servant of his subjects, and Frederick as the greatest exponent, up to that date, of the unqualified power of the State. The French Revolution resolved the antithesis by declaring the people to be sovereign, but this solution, pregnant though it was for the future, proved too starkly in contrast with the practice of the day, in France as elsewhere, to win validity at the time. It remained for the outstanding political philosopher of the nineteenth century, Hegel, to invent a dialectical process by which German idealism could be harmonized with the limitless power of the national state, and so to arrive at the conclusion that "all value which man possesses, he possesses through the State alone." The process of History might be toward Freedom, but it was freedom of the spirit only. The State was power, an end in itself and a law to itself. The true beauty of History, Treitschke found a generation or more later, lay precisely in the conflict of such states.

Today we are reaping the fruits of this development of thought. We are in fact at a crisis in the history of the modern national state and our thinking about it. I do not suggest that this crisis is comparable to that

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\*Mr. Flenley's paper was delivered at a joint session\* of the Canadian Political Science Association, the Canadian Historical Association, and Section II of the Royal Society of Canada. A paper presented at the same session by Mr. Alexander Brady, University of Toronto, on the general topic of Nationality and Nationalism will appear in the November issue of the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*.

<sup>1</sup>*De Monarchia*, I, ix.

faced by the African Bishop and to which his disciple Orosius sought to give an historical framework. Yet, there *are* thinkers who see us at the end of the period which began with the modern national state, with modern capitalism, and with modern science, at what we used to think of as the Renaissance of classical culture. Recently I have been engaged in collecting material as to what is thought about post-war problems, and I found a very large body of opinion which sees the root cause (or *a* root cause) of our present tragedy in the unbridled sovereignty of the national state, and the only hope for the future in its supersession by some other form, whether the establishment of federal organizations for parts or the whole of Europe, and indeed more widely, or in the setting up of supra-national bodies and controls of one sort or another, economic, political, or military.

On the other hand it would indeed be rash to predict that there is any likelihood or even possibility of the immediate or proximate overthrow of the National State or the spirit of Nationalism. On the very eve of this war, the contributors to a solid and thoughtful study of Nationalism ended their survey with the conclusion that "The Nation is the political unit, and Nationalism the group symbol, of the present stage of civilization." We fight today as United Nations. We daily invoke national sentiment in our war effort. The principle is enshrined in the Atlantic Charter, and in dozens of speeches and declarations of war and peace aims. We recognize the claims of many nationalities, at present subject, to be free. We envisage the advance toward freer national status of hitherto dependent peoples all over the world. Here then is our dilemma and our problem. Hegel in his day found a synthesis which led directly to the *Machtpolitik* of a Bismarck, and indeed a Hitler. *Our* problem is to find a synthesis which will harmonize what we regard and accept as the just claims of the individual citizen, national societies, and humanity at large.

This problem is by no means solely a European one, but is present in its greatest complexity and urgency there. I do not intend to try and sketch the general development of European Nationalism (or Nationality) through the period from the French Revolution onwards, when the modern doctrine may be said to have taken shape. That has been done many times already, at far greater length and far more effectively than I could do it here. Nor need I take up your time discussing the many definitions which have been given of Nationalism. My task, as I see it, is to ask what light more recent history throws on the problem, how and why it is that a force which, from the middle of the nineteenth century at least was almost generally accepted as beneficent, as the natural and normal basis of political arrangement, and which under the title of self-determination was applied as a leading principle in the peace settlement of 1919, how it is that this principle is now so criticized and attacked as a major source of the ills of our age? And to do this I can only select certain recent tendencies or developments in Nationalism which seem to me significant, and indicate their share in the development of the subject.

But before I do that, two observations must be made. In the first place criticism of Nationalism is not new. Apart from earlier expressions of regret at the passing of the universalism of the Middle Ages, in part, as in Novalis, fruit of the nostalgia of the Romantic Movement, at the very height of the nationalist movement in mid-nineteenth century two eminent thinkers and writers, starting from opposite poles, raised their



voices in opposition to the prevailing trend. The Catholic historian Acton, influenced both by his faith and by his sympathy for the non-national Austrian Empire, in a famous essay on Nationality (1862) condemned the view that the nation and the state should be co-extensive, and argued that the modern theory of Nationality marked a retrograde step in History. He saw in it the greatest adversary of the rights of Nationality, since it would deny to subject nationalities the claims it made for itself, a prophecy borne out in our own day. A few years earlier Karl Marx had denied the claims of Nationality in the interests of socialist revolution: "the working man has no country." The national state was the expression of the interest of the dominant class, and he would have none of it, save as an instrument for assuring the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whether the later Marx maintained these views is a question I can safely leave to the wider knowledge of the economists. There seems to be difference of opinion on this point.

In the second place it must not be forgotten that there were other forces at work in the nineteenth century running counter to Nationalism. Marxian socialism, at any rate in its first phases, was one of these, and I need not remind you of the cultural and even economic forces working in the same direction, of the beginning of International Law, of humanitarian and scientific efforts, all of them necessary preliminaries before the idea of a League of Nations could be born or translated into fact in 1918.

I said that I was not going to try and follow the development of Nationalism from the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century to our own day. Yet there is one distinction which has been made, which throws light on the process, viz:—that between the *cultural* nation, its nationality based on common traditions, on language, literature, and, it may be, religion; and the *state* nation, possessing a common political unity and independence. This distinction is less valid for such western European countries as France and Britain, when nation and state (or state and nation) developed together. But it has much value for central and east-central Europe, where a major development of the nineteenth century was the process by which *cultural* nations struggled to become *state*-nations as well. The process began with Greece, Serbia, and Belgium, rose to its most portentous achievement in the unification of Germany and Italy, and reached its consummation in the peace settlement of 1919.

Long before this process was completed the identity of Nation and State had become an accepted principle with most liberal thinkers. J. S. Mill put it succinctly enough: "The boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with nationalities." The outstanding champion of the political rights of nationalities in the middle period of the nineteenth century was, of course, Mazzini, who wrote and worked unceasingly for forty years to make his beloved Italy a free and united nation, and who undoubtedly did more than anyone else to popularize the nationalist gospel in Europe. Mazzini was not always wise or practical in his activities for the cause of Italian nationality, and he certainly assumed too lightly that the Italian people were ready to govern themselves. But there are certain other features (or accompaniments) of Mazzini's nationalism which are worth noting today.

Mazzini was an internationalist as well as a nationalist. "We come in the name of God and Humanity" [not the nation], he declared in *Faith and the Future* (1835). "The Family, the Nation, and Humanity are the three

spheres within which the human individual has to labour for the common weal, for the moral perfecting of himself and of others. . . . Your *first* duties, first in importance, are to Humanity" he wrote in *The Duties of Man* (1844 and 1858). And Mazzini was as sympathetic to the rights and claims of other nationalities as to those of his own. So far as I know he was entirely free from any suspicion of racial or national superiority. Nor did he give to the State any of that adulation with which later Fascism was to adorn it. "That institution which we call government is only a Direction," he wrote, "You have no Master but God in Heaven and the People on Earth." For Mazzini, though he repudiated both the Papacy and much of organized Christianity, was a living exponent of the Christian qualities of unselfishness and self-sacrifice. And, finally, the core of Mazzini's political faith was his belief in the People, in Democracy. For him the people was not merely a *Folk*, to be led (to the slaughter it might be) by a *Leader*, but a body responsible, with duties as well as rights. Granted that there is something naïve and certainly inexperienced in Mazzini's faith in Italian popular government, such faith is infinitely more hopeful for the future than the arrogant and cynical contempt expressed and practised by a Hitler and a Mussolini. And Mazzini would have cried of Nationalism (as Mme Roland did of Liberty) "What crimes are committed in thy name" had he lived to foresee the later developments of the faith he preached.

But Mazzini died in 1872, just over the dividing line of 1870 which saw the successful uniting of both Italy and Germany. That year 1870 was indeed a turning point, a milestone, of the greatest importance in European history. Papal infallibility found its definition, the Paris Commune made its unavailing if partly prophetic gesture, Berlin became the new capital of Europe, the giant figure of Bismarck occupied the centre of the stage, the new imperialism backed by the ever more rapid advance of science was in the air. I need not elaborate so obvious a list. What I wish to suggest is that it is after this decisive year (though of course not beginning then) that there manifested themselves in European Nationalism certain qualities which have made Nationalism what it is today, and these I must briefly refer to. Inevitably, much of what I have to say refers to Germany, since 1870 had made Germany both the great example of successful nationalism, and the leading state in Europe.

The triumph of German nationalism, achieved by Prussia through three speedy, staccato, and successful wars within six years, injected a *militarist* quality into the Nationalist movement, gave it a military stamp. Prussian militarism was an old story of course, truer than many old stories. "I find pleasure in nothing in this world except in a strong army" wrote the first King of Prussia over a hundred years earlier. Now the faith seemed triumphantly vindicated on the larger scale of Germany, and indeed (for those who could achieve it) of Europe, as a part of the panoply of Nationalism. Many countries had fought wars for national freedom. But this permanent identity of armed force with national unity was something new. No one at all familiar with German literature but must admit that from Kleist to Ernst Jünger of today (or from Clausewitz to Bernhardt and Banse) there has been present in it a warlike element not present in anything like the same degree in the literature of other European peoples. Treitschke, a convert from that earlier German liberalism which lacked



this quality, made a good sounding board for the sentiment: "Only in war does a nation become a nation, for war is the mightiest and most effective moulder of nations. . . ." "The second most essential function of the State is to make war. . . . It is precisely political idealism that demands war," and so on.

If the second essential of the modern national state to Treitschke was to make war, the first in his eyes was Power: "The State is in the first instance Power." This, too, was in the direct Prussian tradition, and the absorption of Germany by Prussia in 1870 extended the sphere of that tradition over the whole Reich. True, the new state was a federal one, and there were important limitations of imperial authority, but what the Emperor might not do, the King of Prussia could often achieve. And although the new Reich had a framework of parliamentary government, any hopes of its free or fruitful development were effectively scotched by Bismarck. Thus Nationalism in Germany came to be more closely identified with the State, and this just at a time when other forces were marshalling themselves in the same direction.

The most obvious of these were economic, for it is just in this period that Economic Nationalism in its modern form began to take definite shape. I do not mean, of course, that all the remarkable economic development of Germany in the Bismarckian Empire was carried through by the State. But the initiative and support of the State played an important part in the co-ordination of scientific education, research, and its application to industry. "State initiative," as Dawson wrote over thirty years ago, "is the tradition of German government." There were the traditions of Prussian Cameralism and mercantilism, Fichte's *Closed Commercial State* (1800), List's *National System of Political Economy* (1841), and now the teachings of the "historical school" of German economists, all illustrating or reinforcing the trend. Its applications were seen in the turn from free or freer trade to protection and tariffs in the seventies; the control by the state of the railways and other means of communication; the remarkable legislation for the conditions of industry and the working class by which Bismarck sought to undermine socialism. The turn to tariffs was, of course, not confined to Germany, any more than the new phase of imperialism which set in after 1870. This likewise illustrated in some of its aspects the newer nationalism which sought to extend itself, to take in all those who could be claimed as belonging to it, and to find room for its expansion whether over contiguous areas, or further afield. Socialism, after the failure of the First International, dissolved in 1876, tended likewise to fall into a nationalist pattern, with the German Social Democratic party as the outstanding example of organized socialism before 1914. True, its declared ends were international, but its organization and, as 1914 revealed, its spirit were far more national than international, in Germany as elsewhere. Thus economic life took on a more nationalist colouring and increased the political and actual powers of the national State, in preparation for the greater heights of economic nationalism to be manifested in our own day.

Much of the achievement of this latest phase of the industrial revolution was due to the achievements of science and technology. We usually regard science as international rather than national: "Science knows no boundaries of race, nationality, religion or region" as one writer puts it. But science could also be used to subserve more national ends. The days

when an English scientist could travel about freely in a country with which Britain was at war, as Sir Humphrey Davy had done in France by permission of Napoleon, had passed away. It has been remarked that Darwin's teachings on natural selection, the struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest, came with a curious timeliness for the nationalist wars. War, said Moltke, was "a providential fact"; it was also seen as a biological necessity. And after 1870 science was invoked (or abused) to foster another feature of the modern nationalism, its *racial* interpretation. Some of this had a more real foundation in the clash of races now becoming more marked in the Austrian Empire, where German and Slav, Magyar and Slav or German, fought with increasing bitterness to preserve or advance their own cause at the expense of the declining Habsburg régime. But much of it was based on the more dubious, if not spurious theories of racial inequality developed by Gobineau and others, and fed by the imperialist expansion and the concern for national prestige. That aspect of nationalism, like the economic, was to reach its height in the fanatical and fantastic nightmare of Nazi Germany, but already in Bismarck's day anti-semitism had raised its voice, echoing earlier pronouncements by Fichte and others on German racial purity and superiority.

By 1900 the Frenchman Charles Maurras had invented Integral Nationalism, a curious medley of traditionalism and monarchism, Latinism and Catholicism, anti-semitism and general disgust with the Third Republic in the days of the Dreyfus affair. But although the doctrines of Maurras and the *Action française* were to be a disturbing factor in French political life, especially during the crises of the nineteen-thirties, and were even to provide a momentary basis for a stop-gap régime after the military crash of 1940, integral nationalism was rather French in *origin* (like so much else in the cultural development of Europe) than a national faith in France itself. France had made her decisive contribution to Nationalism at the time of her first Revolution, and a well-known French writer on the subject of Nationalism sees the principle declining in the France of this period. She had, partially at least, outgrown it; and integral nationalism in France was at bottom a defensive protest. The real development of what we have now come to call totalitarian nationalism was to come across the Alps and across the Rhine.

Thus by 1914 Nationalism had changed materially from the days of Mazzini and "Liberal" Nationalism. Nationality had become Nationalism, one of the many German "ismuses" at large by that day. Bacon in the *Novum Organum* refers to "the Idols and false notions which take possession of the human understanding, and take deep root therein," and by 1914 Nationalism was in fair way to be such an Idol. And it was now, when Nationalism had been thus changed by its connection with Militarism, the devouring state, racialism, and economic nationalism, that the problem in Europe was further complicated by the results of the War of 1914-18.

For the peace settlement of 1919 marked "the apogee of the right of self-determination," as E. H. Carr puts it. The long narrow strip of European territory stretching from Finland to Greece ran like a geological "fault" through the structure of the continent. Here was the meeting place of races, of religions, of cultures, even of alphabets. The area had rumbled with discontent and revolt throughout the nineteenth century. The earthquake shock of 1914-18 destroyed its weaker foundations, the



retaining walls of the four adjacent empires, German, Austrian, Russian, and Turkish, crumbled simultaneously; and from the confusion there emerged a kaleidoscopic confusion of fourteen small or middle-sized states, a larger number than in the whole of the rest of the European continent, some entirely new, some older, some heroic revivals after long submergence, but all alike sovereign nations in the full political meaning now accepted as essential to Nationalism, and all concerned to preserve their identity, above all from reabsorption within their former framework.

Looking back from this day, and admitting the superiority of hindsight over foresight, it seems hardly likely that this efflorescence of national states in east central Europe could survive in its entirety in the form of absolute sovereignty in which it was established. Their creation ran counter to what had seemed to be a trend of the nineteenth century toward consolidation into larger political and economic units. Most of them were militarily weak, many of them were politically and socially backward, with little experience of conducting political affairs. They had been neglected or subjected (or both) by their former masters. They had just been ravaged by war, famine, and disease. They were surrounded by revolutionary movements, notably that in Russia, which affected them. Their boundaries were in many cases very imperfect whether from a political, an economic, a military, or an ethnic point of view. As to this last, there was an inextricable confusion of racial or national groups through much of this area, so that the drawing of accurate boundaries was impossible, even had the peace-makers been possessed of super-human wisdom. These treaty-makers did try to provide for this difficulty by Minorities Treaties, but the problem continued to bedevil the fortunes and lives of most of these states, whether new or old, both in their internal politics, and in their relations with each other. The new political divisions ran across the lines of trade and economic life generally developed in the immediate past. The new states had been able to emerge because their greater neighbours and former masters had fallen; but sooner or later these, Germany and Russia at all events, would rise again and that would create difficulties for them. True, there was the League of Nations, but that was to prove too weak to be able to save them in the hour of supreme trial. It was a pity that old fears and new jealousies prevented them from forming any effective unions or even alliances amongst themselves. Instead, a number of them tended to follow only too faithfully the pattern set by the Nationalism of the day in its economic and other policies.

And meanwhile that Nationalism was developing into an *Idol* beyond the dreams of Bacon, under the corpulent rhetoric of a Mussolini, the pseudo-mysticism of a Rosenberg, and the sadistic hatreds of a Hitler. This latest stage of Nationalism is so near and so familiar that I need not go into it. It marked indeed the completion, the totalization of the Nationalist creed as it had developed on Italian, German (and Prussian) soil in the period we have been surveying. The three fundamental concepts of the National Socialist State are defined by Ernst Rudolf Huber, its official constitutional-legal expositor<sup>2</sup> as those of the *Volk* or people, the *Führer* or leader, and the Party or Movement. But neither these nor the so-called corporate state as developed there or in Italy; or the farrago of pseudo-philosophy, pseudo-racial science and economics, in reality con-

<sup>2</sup>In *Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches*.

tribute anything fresh to the world. Even the methods used, proscription and persecution, terrorism and war, are old. "It is not only the *bodies* of men," wrote Polybius over two thousand years ago, "and the ulcers and imposthumes which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable state of inflammation, but their *souls* most of all. For as in the case of ulcers, . . . so at times it happens that similar plagues and gangrenes fasten upon men's souls; and when this is so, no wild beast can be more wicked and cruel than a man."

Only the overwhelming material power, made available to the large modern national state by the achievements of western science, is new. It is Nationalism not *in excelsis* but *in infernis*, its virtues eclipsed, its vices given free play. We are almost reduced to agreement with Professor Paul Tillich, the eminent theologian, and ex-German, that Nationalism is the most dangerous incarnation of the demonic principle, especially when it assumes (as in Nazi Germany) a religious form, striving to take the place of true religion. For that is the logical end of totalitarian nationalism, to comprehend everything, including God.

And that brings us back to the dilemma of present-day Nationalism with which we began. There are those, like Professor Cobban, who see the modern sovereign national state as the root of all evil, and would supersede it by federal arrangements; or like Mr. H. G. Wells, who want to see a world revolution to set up a world state. There are those who would, at least, break up the national state of the arch-offender, Germany, as an essential to future peace. Without attempting to discuss these and other proposals for the future, there are, it seems to me, one or two conclusions which may be drawn from the material presented in this paper.

In the first place it appears that it is just these developments of Nationalism since about 1870—militarism, the excessive power of the State, economic nationalism, and national intolerance, which have done so much to discredit Nationalism today, and which we fight to overcome. From which it seems plain that there must be in the future some limitation of these overgrown powers: limitations of the National State's military powers, of its economic powers, of its capacity to oppress minorities. And this involves international controls in various fields, international organization (such as a revised and revived League of Nations), interdependence in place of complete independence, definite infringement of the sovereignty of the state-nation of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Then, the special problem created by the existence before 1939 of many small national states in Europe, unable to defend themselves unaided, and subject to the drawbacks we have indicated, suggests that economic and political union of some at least of these states should be encouraged, to aid and supplement any more general international organizations. It is tempting at this distance, and with Europe reduced to a flux under the Nazi heel, to redraw the map of the continent in terms of the federal union of such groups as the Scandinavian countries; the Balkan States; all or part of east-central Europe; the Netherland countries. But no student of history will deny the difficulties in the way of securing the permanent establishment of such unions, any more than he can fail to see the obstacles to those wider schemes of federal union which have been put forward and supported with so much earnestness.

But whatever new political forms may emerge in Europe as the result of this war, Nationalism will not disappear. And attempts to destroy it



will only encourage the resurgence of its more dangerous qualities. Nor can I feel that we should attempt to destroy it. For Nationalism, like human nature, is compounded of good as well as evil. It has been the source of many valuable and fruitful things in the past, the lever for much of the progress human society has made. When John Bunyan's Christian was toiling up the Hill Difficulty between the two fatal side paths of Danger and Destruction, he found as he climbed that he had lost what he called his "Evidence," and had to go back for it before he could attain to the Palace Beautiful. Today Nationalism has likewise lost some of its "evidence," and will have to return for it in order to reassume its proper role, which Mazzini saw as providing a natural and necessary link between the individual and humanity, allowing and fostering the harmonious growth of all three. That is still the role of the National Society. But I would add that its success in achieving this depends not so much on the possession of full political sovereignty, or indeed on the qualities of Nationalism itself, as on the general level of development of the members of the society. "The success of any form of government," as Cobban puts it, "is relative to the political development of the people it governs." If the citizens of the national state are sufficiently advanced in the art of governing themselves, in the capacity for using and not abusing freedom, in toleration of diversity of opinion, then nationalism will cease to be a menace. In other words, the real problem is one of political and social education, and that, as I need not remind a body of educators, is a noble but an arduous task, requiring in Milton's phrase "sinews almost equal to those which Homer gave Ulysses."

# THE EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE IN CANADA

## A STUDY IN DEMOCRATIC NATIONALISM

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"ALL America was thus, at the outset of the Plantations, abandoned to Democracy."<sup>1</sup> Chief Justice Smith's inclusive comment expressed the diagnosis of the American Revolution accepted by British politicians. Under lax and too benevolent rule the colonies had fallen into insubordination and an excess of liberty.

On remedy no less than on diagnosis there was agreement. The colonies remaining must be preserved to the Empire and sound political example by the grant of the British Constitution in its plenitude. Not any part thereof, either as in the past an excess of its popular features, or as might have been expected, an increase in authority, but the Constitution in its perfection, with authority and liberty in just equipoise, each confirming and augmenting the other. Not only the frigid Grenville but also the generous Fox unhesitatingly prescribed that due mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which was considered the unique virtue of the Constitution.<sup>2</sup>

The Constitution might be granted; British history and the English social order could not. What in effect the British North American colonies obtained by way of political institutions was, on the one hand, an executive appointed by and responsible to the Crown, and buttressed by appointive Legislative Councils, and on the other, Houses of Assembly elected on franchises for which the property qualifications were so wide as to exclude no significant element of the colonial populations. Not until 1884 was the suffrage in Great Britain to be so widely extended.

Thus the representative of the Crown faced the representatives of what may, with some licence, be called colonial democracy. This was but little like, in its elements, the boasted harmony of the British Constitution, really the harmony of a close-knit aristocracy which had absorbed the powers of the Crown and not yet incurred the jealousy of the people. But this attempt at reproduction of the Constitution of itself expressly affirmed the sovereignty of parliament, and implicitly denied the essential democratic premise of the sovereignty of the people.

The superb confidence in the efficacy of British institutions, which had weathered the American Revolution, was to be severely tried by the French. Again the result was to confirm the belief of the British, of both the Old World and the New, that in the Constitution lay the sovereign antidote against both abuses of authority and excesses of popular sentiment. To the conservatism of the anti-revolutionary Loyalist was added that of the anti-Jacobin.

Shaped as they were, then, in a revolutionary age, the early political institutions of British North America were certainly anti-revolutionary. Yet they are not properly to be termed reactionary. They were liberal

<sup>1</sup>Adam Shortt and A. S. Doughty (eds.), *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada*, Part II, 1759-1791 (Ottawa, 1918), 1019, Chief Justice Smith to Dorchester, Feb. 5, 1790.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 983.



in that they rested on a wide base of civil liberties, granted a generous measure of popular representation, and centred on the Crown, regarded as the ultimate safeguard of popular rights. Though conservative in form and temper, and liberal at bottom, yet they were in no sense democratic. The American Revolution had spread widely the conviction that democracy meant republicanism; the French Revolution the conviction that revolution meant anarchy and dictatorship.<sup>3</sup> British North America by the terms of its existence was a repudiation of both republicanism and revolution. Yet neither in this bias nor in the institutions themselves was there anything, as the economic and social order expanded, seriously to obstruct the rise of a reforming spirit and the development of a fuller measure of political liberty.

For such a development there was ample motive. The colonists had set out to work British institutions in an American environment. They sought to combine parliamentary monarchy with colonial democracy. They had to resolve the paradox of remaining British while becoming American, of extending self-government while continuing subjects of the Crown. To this was added the complication of carrying from the cosmopolitan eighteenth into the nationalistic nineteenth century the unassimilated French population of Lower Canada. This three-fold paradox of British sentiment and American practice, of democratic self-government under the Crown, of the preservation of racial identity in democratic nationalism, is a principal theme of Canadian political development. On this problem the study of the extension of the franchise in Canada throws some glimmer of light, providing, it must be confessed, what may perhaps be termed negative illumination.

For the student of the franchise in Canada is at the outset confronted with three remarkable and somewhat disconcerting facts. First, as already indicated, the franchise from the beginning was wide in British North America.<sup>4</sup> The distribution of property was such that a property franchise had either to be wide or extremely narrow.<sup>5</sup> The second is that it was not extended—in the Canadas—until 1853, whereas manhood suffrage was universal in the United States from 1845. Thirdly, at no time was the extension of the franchise as such a major political issue in any part of Canada. Democracy, as measured by the franchise, came to Canada almost by stealth, certainly not as an army with banners.

<sup>3</sup>Note Elgin's comment on the United States half a century later. "A population combining the material force of high civilization with the loose political morality & organization of barbarous hordes" (A. G. Doughty, ed., *The Elgin-Grey Papers*, Ottawa, 1937, I, 268, Elgin to Grey, Dec. 6, 1848).

<sup>4</sup>*Nova Scotia*, 1758, Possession in own right of freehold estate (W. P. M. Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties, and Documents of the Constitutional History of Canada*, Toronto, 1930, 9; 1789-1851 (roughly 40s. freehold (29 Geo. III, c. 1 (Nova Scotia))). *New Brunswick*, 1784-1791, Manhood suffrage; thereafter low property qualification until 1889 (A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, Oxford, 1928, I, 395). *Canada*, 1791, by the Constitutional Act, 40s. freehold in the counties, real estate of £5 yearly value or payment of annual rent of £10.

<sup>5</sup>Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties, and Documents*, 233. Craig to Liverpool, May 1, 1810, "... the present franchise is of little use ... scarcely excluded one farmer in a thousand." Farms were so nearly equal in value that any raising of the qualification would have excluded too many; accordingly Craig proposed a property qualification for members of the Assembly of £100 clear annual revenue from land or £2000 in personal property.

Here is another example of the paradoxical quality of Canadian political development, that in an age of increasing democracy and national consciousness, Canadians enjoyed liberal institutions without professing democratic doctrines, brought down the walls of Downing Street without blowing the democratic trumpet, and achieved political nationalism but not in the name of democracy. How is this to be explained?

In the first place it is clear that not only the original anti-democratic sentiment so powerful in British North America before 1820, but also the breadth of the franchise itself accounts for this lack of concern with the extension of the franchise. Whatever else was defective in the British North American polity, it was not that representation was not sufficiently popular. Indeed, this polity was basically adequate to the needs of colonial society. It was a matter not so much of a shift of sovereignty or a re-modelling of institutions but a re-defining of working conventions that was required in the one great political advance of Canadian history, the winning of responsible government.

Signs were not wanting, of course, such as the demand for an elective Legislative Council, that Canadians might be driven to seek the American path of democratic republicanism. That way, however, was not desired by more than a small minority, French or English, and it was pre-emptorily closed by the suppression of the rebellions of 1837.<sup>6</sup>

The democratic quality of that upheaval of agrarian and racial discontent were not unnoted by the authors of the mildly reactionary Act of Union. Not only was it, as Gosford and Ellenborough protested in the Lords, a gerrymander perpetrated on the French;<sup>7</sup> by it, was introduced a property qualification for members of the Assembly of the not inconsiderable figure of £500 of real property.<sup>8</sup> This had already been attempted in the abortive Canada Trade Bill of 1822<sup>9</sup> and may have owed something to the example of the English Qualification Act of 1838 and the efforts of John Beverley Robinson in England in 1839-40.<sup>10</sup> Its intent was, of course, to increase the weight of property in the legislature without increasing the property qualifications of voters, which were left as established by the Constitutional Act. This purpose it seems never to have achieved.

It is not, at any rate, apparent that it affected the composition of the post-Union Legislature any more than the proscription and exile of the advanced Reformers had already done. On the other hand, the political effect of the Act of Union was to add to the purged Reformers the solid bloc of the antagonized French, and so create the combination by which responsible government was carried.

Responsible government, then, was won on the basis of the existing franchise in British North America. Its achievement did not alter the frame of government, necessitated no increase in the popular element in the constitution, and evoked no democratic fervour. It was the work of moderates, and the general effect of responsible government was to put government in the hands of responsible men. Grey saw the issue in these

<sup>6</sup>Aileen Dunham, *Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1815-1836* (Toronto, 1927), 148.

<sup>7</sup>*Hansard*, vol. 55, 247-9.

<sup>8</sup>3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, s. 28.

<sup>9</sup>Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties, and Documents*, 245.

<sup>10</sup>C. W. Robinson, *Life of Sir John Beverley Robinson* (Toronto, 1904), 251. See also note 5.



terms. "This is indeed a most important crisis in the history of Canada & the experiment you are Now trying will probably not only determine whether its connection with this Country is to last, but also whether it is to have the advantage of a mixed & well regulated Gov<sup>nt</sup>. or is to be given up to Extreme democracy."<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless the moderates were to be constrained to enact much of what men of more advanced views proposed. For 1849, a year of turmoil and confusion in Canada, was actually a year of decision. Two things besides responsible government opened up a new era, an era of democratic advance and political reform. The old Toryism of Canada died, discredited by rowdy petulance; in the Reform party the democratic urge, an urge sobered by the events of 1837 but still strong, was loosed anew. Canadian Toryism before 1849 had made its contribution to Canadian political life by nourishing even in the American wilds the true Tory concept of an integral society, but by arrogating to itself a monopoly of loyalty had threatened the working of parliamentary government. That evil being diminished, it was possible to advocate reform without provoking any credible charge of disloyalty. This the Clear Grits of Canada West and *les rouges* of Canada East were proceeding to do.

In these radical reformers the authentic voice of democracy is first distinctly heard in British North America. Theirs was the impulse that made Canada as much a social democracy as it was to be for some decades by forcing the abolition of primogeniture, of the Clergy Reserves, and seigniorial tenure. They were political democrats no less; a Grit platform of 1850 demanded that the franchise be extended "very greatly," that the three branches of the legislature be elective, and proclaimed that "the acknowledged and legitimate source of political power is the people themselves."<sup>12</sup> *L'Avenir*, organ of the *Parti rouge*, proclaimed, "Liberal in our time means nothing but democrat."<sup>13</sup> To this origin is to be attributed the moderate extensions of the franchise in 1853<sup>14</sup> and 1859,<sup>15</sup> the making of the Legislative Council elective in 1856,<sup>16</sup> and, it may be, the resumption in 1849 of the very democratic practice of indemnifying members of parliament.<sup>17</sup>

*Les rouges*, however, grew middle-aged and ripe for Laurierism; the Grits became increasingly the party of a single measure, that of representation by population. This was a typically Grit cause, both in that it sought mathematical representation and in that it looked to local autonomy. It was largely to achieve representation by population that Grits supported the coalition of 1864 and Confederation. By then Gritism had become fairly definitely established as a movement of democratic advance and local autonomy. For Gritism was atomistic. The product no doubt of Benthamism and Jacksonism, it was certainly the product of an agrarian society, and had as its political ideal a minimum of government administered in small units close to the people.

<sup>11</sup>Doughty (ed.), *Elgin-Grey Papers*, I, 125, Grey to Elgin, March 22, 1848.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 619.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 343.

<sup>14</sup>16 Vict., c. 153 (Canada).

<sup>15</sup>22 Vict., c. 82 (Canada).

<sup>16</sup>17 & 18 Vict., c. 118.

<sup>17</sup>12 Vict., c. 33 (Canada). Members of the Upper Canadian Assembly had been indemnified since 1793 (33 Geo. III, c. 3 (Canada)); of the Lower Canadian Assembly since 1836 (6 Wm. IV, c. 2 (Canada)).

Quite otherwise was the development of the party of the new conservatism that had arisen to replace the old Toryism. The inheritor of all the moderates, the Canada East *bleus*, the Baldwinite and Hincksite Reformers, it grafted them into the Tory tradition of integration and became the party, as it felt its way through the confusion of Union politics, of expansion and centralization. As the party of political repose and economic expansion, it could at once guarantee the religious and imperial sentiments of its followers and serve the ends of the commercial and railway interests of which it was political agent. And it was fortunate in possessing in Macdonald and Cartier two masters of political combination.

With the Reformers committed to local democracy, and the Conservatives to continental expansion, it is not surprising that Confederation was, by and large, a Conservative party measure, and also a measure conservative in tone and substance. A striking venture in federalism, it neither, except in establishing representation by population, widened the basis of self-government nor altered the depository of sovereignty.

On the contrary, Confederation was, in the debates on the Quebec Resolutions in the Canadian legislature, advocated by Cartier as a means of resisting not only American aggression but also American democracy. "In our Federation the monarchical principle would form the leading feature, while on the other side of the line, judging by past history and present conditions of the country, the ruling power was the will of the mob, the rule of the populace. Every person who had conversed with the most intelligent American statesmen and writers must have learned that they all admitted that the governmental powers had become too extended, owing to the introduction of universal suffrage, and mob rule had consequently supplanted legitimate authority."<sup>18</sup> McGee urged: "The proposed Confederation will enable us to bear up shoulder to shoulder; to resist the spread of this universal democracy . . . . We need in these provinces, we can bear, a large infusion of authority."<sup>19</sup> Macdonald<sup>20</sup> and Brown<sup>21</sup> echoed the repudiation of universal suffrage and popular sovereignty.

The very mode of implementing Confederation was a public demonstration that in British North America sovereignty resided not in the people but in parliament. Those in the Canadian legislature who argued that the measure should be submitted to the people found little support, and were duly voted down. One notes Goldwin Smith's remark in 1884 that, "The constitution of the Dominion itself lacks moral validity and the highest claim to allegiance, because it was settled by the politicians with the Imperial Government and was never submitted to the people,"<sup>22</sup> but the question, of course, was purely one of political expediency and not at all one of legal competence.

Confederation itself, then, gave no impetus to democracy in Canada, but rather the reverse. It did evoke expression of a brief and transient

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<sup>18</sup>*Confederation Debates*, 59.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 143-6.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 39. "Not a single member of the [Quebec] Conference . . . was in favour of universal suffrage."

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 90. "... its greatest defect, *except universal suffrage*, is that under that [the American] Constitution the representatives of the people must reside in the constituencies for which they sit."

<sup>22</sup>*The Week*, I, 47, Oct. 23, 1884.



nationalism, an aspiration rather than a sentiment, an aspiration that was conventional rather than passionate. "Then was the accepted time [Confederation]," wrote Bystander in 1884, "if ever Canada was to be made a nation and to enter on an experiment in democracy independent of that carried on in the United States."<sup>23</sup> The great opportunity seemed to pass. Not yet was an issue drawn that could provoke a debate in Canadian politics on the nature of democracy in Canada.

Such an issue was to arise in 1885. From 1867 to 1896 the Conservative party dominated federal politics. It sketched out the transcontinental state and confirmed it with the transcontinental railway. It became even more the party of Confederation, of expansion and centralization. The federal Liberal party had only one period of power at Ottawa, but the provincial Liberal parties took over province after province. Thus the party was confirmed as the party of local democracy, of provincial rights. In this increasing division of the parties on the nature of Confederation the federal franchise became involved.

No franchise was provided for the Dominion by the B.N.A. Act, 1867, but the provincial franchises were to be used until the federal parliament should act.<sup>24</sup> Macdonald saw in a federal franchise the completion of the work of Confederation, as well as a means of preserving the ascendancy of conservative principles<sup>25</sup> and, no doubt, of the Conservative party. The Liberals, on the other hand, had been lowering the qualification for the franchise, introducing the ballot, and abolishing the property qualification for representatives in the provinces. As defenders of provincial rights, and on grounds both of principle and partisan interest, they now constituted themselves defenders of the use of the provincial voters' lists in federal elections. Thus the question was at root one of the nature of the Canadian union, whether it was a legislative union modified by concessions to local prejudice and distance, or a league of autonomous communities.

After three times introducing and withdrawing a franchise bill between 1870 and 1884, Macdonald in 1885 brought down the Dominion Franchise bill. The Quebec members were restive under this centralizing measure, and two actually bolted. But Macdonald kept the party in hand and drove the measure through in face of the Liberal filibuster. It established low but complex property qualifications, which were to be uniform throughout the Dominion.<sup>26</sup>

The bill was received by the press with the usual adulation or vituperation according to political ties. The *Manitoba Daily Free Press* gave the Liberal view trenchantly. "Sir John first gerrymandered Ontario, and now, finding even that iniquitous measure to have been insufficient to protect his government from the popular indignation kindled by their misdeeds, he proposes to commit a new and still viler outrage upon the liberties of the people of Canada."<sup>27</sup> *Grip* also saw a partisan hand in the powers

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 26, May 29, 1884.

<sup>24</sup>30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 41.

<sup>25</sup>Sir Joseph Pope, *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald* (Toronto, 1930), 615-16. "The great question to be asked in deciding whether or not a man shall exercise the franchise, was whether or not he has a sufficient interest at stake in the country to be entrusted with a share in its government" (*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Macdonald, on introducing the first Dominion Franchise bill, 1870).

<sup>26</sup>48 & 49 Vict., c. 40 (Canada).

<sup>27</sup>*Manitoba Daily Free Press*, April 29, 1885.

granted the barristers authorized to revise the voters' lists. "Why not," he asks Sir John, "have the barristers do the voting directly instead of indirectly?"<sup>28</sup> On the whole there is little evidence that the bill either met a popular demand or was meant to be painfully impartial in its working.

The Liberal opposition argued that a federal franchise, besides being uncalled for, difficult to establish or work, and introduced for partisan advantage, was in addition a violation of the nature of the federation. In effect, so ran the contention of Blake, Laurier, and Mills, only in the provincial legislatures are individuals represented as such. In the federal parliament it is the provinces which are represented by provincial delegations. Said Blake: "Ours is a federal system, its basis is the federal principle, and this basis of our system, although not a perfect federation, yet as a federal constitution, is representation in the popular chamber, according to the population of each Province. There is the base. Your fundamental principle is that in the Commons House of Parliament each Province shall be represented by so many members as the population of that Province is in proportion to those of the other Provinces. It is provincial representation therefore."<sup>29</sup> Laurier touched fundamentals with these words: "This is the mistake in this Bill, it treats this country as a single community, and in the plan we find the well known predilection of the rt. hon. gentleman in favour of a legislative union. He does not admit that it is right to have seven different communities. His opinion is that it would be right to have one community, and acting on that view he has devised the franchise which is best adapted to suit the conveniences of a simple community. Well, I start on this principle . . . that we have in this country seven different communities . . . our constitution is based upon diversity . . . diversity is the basis of our constitution."<sup>30</sup>

This second debate on Confederation reflects the tenor of the times. The first twenty years after 1867 witnessed in the provinces a steady if undramatic extension of the democratic principle. By 1889 all the provinces and territories west of Quebec had manhood suffrage. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the property qualification was to be lowered,<sup>31</sup> and in Quebec the property qualification of representatives had been abolished in 1896.<sup>32</sup> The British example, the Grit tradition, the bidding of the provincial Liberal parties for support against the federal Conservative party, the rising numbers and political consciousness of the working class, underlined by the activities of the Knights of Labour,<sup>33</sup> account for this advance. Yet what was at stake between the parties, as in the debate on

<sup>28</sup>*Grip*, XXIV, 18, May 2, 1885.

<sup>29</sup>*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1885, 1182.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 1168-9.

<sup>31</sup>(a) *Manhood suffrage*: B.C., 1876, 39 Vict., c. 66; North West Territories, 1886, 49 Vict., c. 24 (Federal); Ontario, 1888, 51 Vict., c. 4; Manitoba, 1888, 51 Vict., c. 2.

(b) *Qualification lowered*: Nova Scotia, 1884, 46 Vict., c. 4; New Brunswick, 1889, 52 Vict., c. 3.

(c) In Quebec the franchise was extended by the qualifications being diversified rather than by being lowered until manhood suffrage was introduced in 1936 (I Edw. VIII, (2), c. 8). In Prince Edward Island a property franchise for election of Assembly men lasted till 1922 (12 Geo. V, c. 5 (P.E.I.)), and for the election of the Councilmen of the Assembly a property qualification is still maintained.

<sup>32</sup>59 Vict., c. 9, s. 120 (Quebec). It had been abolished in Ontario in 1873.

<sup>33</sup>*The Week*, *passim*.



the Franchise bill, was not so much any principle<sup>34</sup> as control of the voters' lists and the nature of Confederation. Only on these points did controversy become lively.

What is important is that it was in the provinces that democratic evolution, however lukewarm, was proceeding. For democracy, as a popular sentiment, was local in its origins and attachments in Canada. The theme of our political history is the quest for local self-government. The conflict the colonies had waged with Downing Street the provinces were now to wage with Ottawa, with not dissimilar results.<sup>35</sup> Confederation was a *tour de force*, performed without popular backing, carried on no surge of democratic sentiment, and against the grain of much in our history. The Liberal victory of 1896 symbolized the triumph of localism in Canada, and brought the country back to its true line of development, the line of local liberty subordinate only to the Crown and necessity. For, in truth, only in the provinces was the electorate homogeneous enough to allow the majority principle to work without reserve.

After 1888 there was a long lull in the extension of the franchise in Canada. The Liberals, without marked opposition, reverted to the provincial franchises in 1898. But by 1914 two things had happened. Democracy had become respectable, giving way to socialism as the epithet of political abhorrence, and the Progressive movement in the United States had infiltrated unacknowledged into Canada. Growing friendliness with the United States and increasing national confidence undoubtedly contributed much to these developments. The new West in particular proved receptive to the democratic influence from south of the border.

How much so, and how sharp a break was made with the tradition of popular government in Canada is shown by T. C. Norris's statement on direct legislation in a Liberal election manifesto in Manitoba in 1914. "We are living in a democratic age, and we have democratic institutions. Our government is founded on the principle that laws are made for the people, and that the people rule."<sup>36</sup>

But when the Initiative and Referendum Act, duly passed by the Norris government in 1915, came before the Appeal Court of Manitoba, Mr. Justice Richards, in crisp judicial accents, made clear how far Canada was from being abandoned to democracy. "In Canada," commented his Lordship, "there is no sovereignty of the people."<sup>37</sup> For in Canada the franchise is a means of determining the representation of the people, but not an expression of the will of the people.

So far the law. The custom of popular government, however, was to take yet further steps before the impetus of the War of 1914. Under Wilson progressive democracy took up arms, and those who would carry democracy abroad must see that it is without reproach at home. Already in 1916 Manitoba and Saskatchewan had given the vote to women. The remaining provinces followed from time to time, and the Dominion as soon as 1918. The confusion caused by the Military Voters Act and the

<sup>34</sup>Compare, for example, Macdonald's insistence that the franchise was a trust, as in note 25, with Blake's utterance in the Aurora Speech: "It is a trust, a sacred trust, which the voter holds in the exercise of the franchise."

<sup>35</sup>C. R. W. Biggar, *Sir Oliver Mowat* (Toronto, 1905), I, 146.

<sup>36</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1914, 591.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 1916, 659. See also E. R. Cameron, *The Canadian Constitution* (Toronto, 1930), II, 142.

War-time Elections Act of 1917, and the disappearance of the property qualification west of Quebec made necessary and possible the Dominion Election Act of 1918. By that Act and without notable debate universal suffrage was established for federal elections. Subsequently the conservative eastern provinces abolished the property qualification,<sup>38</sup> and in 1940 the extension of the provincial franchise to women in Quebec<sup>39</sup> completed the extension of the franchise in Canada.

Thus at what may well have been high-water mark of democratic sentiment, Canadian democracy achieved full growth, slowly, conservatively, without comment.

Yet comment is called for. Democratic nationalism in Canada has resolved the Canadian paradox. Forced to combine the desire to remain British with the necessity of becoming American, the British North American has emerged Canadian. Canadian political development, lacking any revolutionary bias, has reconciled loyalty with self-government in the fullest autonomy and widest democracy under a common Crown. Popular government in Canada has resulted not in political disruption but in at least a *modus vivendi* of the two founding stocks of the Dominion.

This not inconsiderable achievement is none the less not the whole story. Canada is a residual state, the outcome in part of the Anglo-American balance of power, and has sought always to participate in the maritime empire of Great Britain and the continental empire of the United States, and never to have to choose between them. Canada is a state with a polarized constitution, which combines extremes of local liberty in quiet times with convulsive centralization in emergency. As such the Canadian state leads a precarious existence, in which to survive is to triumph. A man living on a tight rope does not change his clothes merely to be fashionable.

What light does a study of the extension of the franchise throw on the history of so dubious an organism? Perhaps this much. Democracy in Canada, parliamentary monarchy worked by popular impulse, is a quiet elaboration in the light of British and American example, of the basic liberalism of the British constitution. The nationalism in which Canadian democracy has its being is not assimilative and integral nationalism—the nation and the state can never be identified in Canada—but a nationalism differentiating and minimal. Only in the provinces, and in some only to a degree, does there exist that agreement on fundamentals essential to the free working of parliamentary institutions. Hence provincial democracy has been complete and decisive; the majority principle has full play. In federal government, where no such community of interest and outlook exists, the majority principle must in some matters be prohibited, in others used with reserve and infinite tact. The *Week* at the time of the execution of Riel quoted Sir Henry Maine: "Democracies are quite paralyzed by the plea of nationality. There is no more effective way of attacking them than by admitting the right of the majority to govern but denying that the majority so entitled is the particular majority which claims the right."<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Nova Scotia, 1918. R. S. Nova Scotia, 1923, c. 3. Quebec, 1936, I Edw. VIII, (2), c. 8.

<sup>39</sup>*Statutes of Quebec*, 4 Geo. VI, c. 7.

<sup>40</sup>The *Week*, III, 25, May 20, 1886.



Yet democracy is the common possession of the Canadian peoples. And it functions precisely because it is not majoritarian democracy, but democracy founded on civil and religious liberty, on toleration, and moved by popular will restrained by a tradition of authority beyond transient majorities, a tradition borne by the Crown. It is this temperate and temporizing democracy, proceeding not by will alone but, under well-understood limitations, by compromise and compact that makes democratic nationalism, however sluggish at times, a working fact in Canada. Not otherwise may a country of two languages yet speak with one voice; of diverse peoples, maintain one nationality; of many faiths, enjoy one freedom of worship. Of this tortuous and always doubtful mode of political and national existence the conservative and conventional extension of the franchise is, in its very tedium and obscurity, a fair example.

#### DISCUSSION

*Professor Sage* said in commenting on Professor Morton's paper that an aspect of the development of democratic institutions in Canada had yet to be studied in the influence of certain ethnic groups in Canada, such as the Icelandic and Ukranian.

*Professor Lower* pointed out certain contrasts between the democratic urge in Great Britain and in Canada, and particularly in the influence of the United States on the development of Canadian political thought.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA'S PERMANENT EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION

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It has been customary to describe the growth of Canada's Dominion status as the inescapable consequence of the original concession of responsible government in the 1840's. It was inevitable, according to this view, that the scope of responsible government should be continuously expanded to include more and more of the functions of government, internal and external.<sup>1</sup> In regard to external relations, the practice has been to present the development as a succession of more or less spectacular advances of a constitutional nature, such as Canada's participation in commercial negotiations, or her representation at the Paris Peace Conference. As a result, little attention has been paid to the steady, unspectacular growth of Canada's external representation between the great constitutional episodes, or to the functional nature of that growth. Canada's permanent representation abroad (as distinct from her representation at conferences), and especially the earlier phases of it, have likewise been neglected.<sup>2</sup> A better understanding of the history of this system of permanent external representation may be secured if it is viewed as a series of responses to particular needs confronting the Canadian state at different historical stages, rather than as the foreordained evolution of an idea or principle.

In no case is this more evident than in the earliest type of Canadian representation abroad. It is seldom realized that that representation is as old as the Dominion itself, and that its initial purpose was the promotion of immigration, the natural concern of a young country. Indeed D'Arcy McGee, Minister of Agriculture and Immigration for the Province of Canada, had appointed Mr. William Dixon, Canadian Agent for Immigration, at Liverpool for the season of 1866, and with the formation of the Dominion Mr. Dixon was put in charge of a Dominion Agency of Immigration, in London.<sup>3</sup> There were soon appointed under Dixon subordinate agents in the British Isles, sometimes numbering as many as nine, at the ports of Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow, Belfast, Dublin, etc., and on the continent of Europe, at first in Antwerp, then in Paris, at times in Switzerland, Germany, and elsewhere. Although in no sense diplomatic agents, Mr. Dixon, with his two small rooms in Adams Street, and his staff of two clerks and a messenger, and the other emigration agents must be considered as the precursors of the present ministers and high commissioners. A temporary experiment in 1874 in the form of an Agent General for Canada, primarily concerned with emigration but working for other government departments, was discontinued after somewhat less than two years, and

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Chester Martin, *Empire and Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1929), xiv, xv, 327; J. W. Dafoe, "The Problems of Canada" in *Great Britain and the Dominions*, Harris Foundation Lectures, 1927 (Chicago, 1928), 194, 206.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. R. M. Dawson, *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936* (London, 1937), 4, and Chester Martin, *Empire and Commonwealth*.

<sup>3</sup>*Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1867-8, no. 3, v; 1869, no. 67, 5.



representation through a Chief Emigration Agent was resumed.<sup>4</sup> With the establishment of the High Commissioner's office in 1880, however, the supervision of the emigration agents was taken over by the Emigration Branch of that office, and after 1899, by the Inspector of European Immigration Agencies, under the High Commissioner. From the seventies onward the main features that were to remain characteristic of the work of the emigration agents began to appear. Their primary purpose was to attract to Canada agricultural labourers, tenant farmers, and domestics, a purpose which brought them into a "noble competition" with the "Yankees," the other British colonies, and later South American countries. As a means to this end their principal activity was the publicizing of Canadian opportunities through advertising in the press, posters in post-offices and railway stations, visits to agricultural fairs and markets, the distribution of books, maps, and pamphlets, and lecture tours.<sup>5</sup> This publicity, reaching a high peak under Clifford Sifton, as Minister of Interior, never entirely banished the prevalent ignorance of Canada of which the agents complained but was instrumental in providing the Dominion with a large proportion of its present population.

The economic growth of Canada, requiring foreign markets for surplus agricultural and industrial production, created the need for a new type of representation abroad. It is not necessary to recite here the well-known evolution of Canadian autonomy as regards commercial negotiations, with the steadily increasing significance of Canadian representatives in such trade discussions. Almost no attention has been paid, however, to the equally momentous enlargement of Canada's *permanent* commercial representation. Throughout the eighties and the early nineties, the Liberal opposition, led by Edward Blake, David Mills, and Sir Richard Cartwright, and a Conservative D'Alton McCarthy, waged a vigorous parliamentary campaign for independent negotiation of commercial treaties through Canadian representatives, appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Canadian Cabinet and entering into direct communication with foreign governments. This proposal was linked in their minds with the idea of permanent representation in foreign capitals, especially in Washington, and was but an extension of the principle of responsible government from local affairs to external commercial relations. Although their argument for autonomy was often couched in constitutional terms, it was the commercial needs and interests of Canada which primarily motivated the proposal. Only Canadian representatives, responsible ultimately to the Canadian parliament and conscious of Canadian interests, could, they believed, serve those needs and interests adequately.<sup>6</sup>

Toward these proposals the Conservative government was none too sympathetic. Sir John A. Macdonald and others recognized the need for encouraging external trade but preferred to associate Canadian representatives with the British diplomatic service where specific negotiations required

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 1876, no. 7, 118.

<sup>5</sup>For the above information on emigration agencies, Reports of the High Commissioner and of the European Emigration Agents were consulted in *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1867-1914.

<sup>6</sup>*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, April 21, 1882, 1068-78, 1080-95; Feb. 18, 1889, 172-94; April 7, 1892, 1104-51; May 2, 11, 1892, 1950-2482.

it.<sup>7</sup> Beyond that they wished to rely on the creation of non-diplomatic commercial agencies. From the early eighties the emigration agents had been devoting much attention to the promotion of trade, with the approval of the government, and by the end of that decade an important part of the work of the High Commissioner lay in this field.<sup>8</sup> By 1886 the government had formed the intention of supplementing this work by "commercial agencies," to be set up at favourable points.<sup>9</sup> By 1892, when the Department of Trade and Commerce was established, there were already eight trade representatives: one in Paris (the Paris commissioner), two emigration agents in Great Britain serving as trade agents, and five in the West Indies. The last-named were local business men, receiving \$250 per year for part-time services. The first European commercial agent, apart from the Paris Agent, was appointed in 1894 for the Scandinavian countries. The first permanent salaried commercial agent was sent to Australia in 1895. Year by year the number of "trade commissioners," as the full-time representatives came to be called, advanced, and offices were set up in Great Britain, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Far East. By 1914 there were sixteen such trade commissioners, and three other commercial agents.

This network of representatives, subordinated to a separate section of the Department of Trade and Commerce, was by 1915 known as the Commercial Intelligence Service, its present name. Its primary purpose was and is "to bring together the domestic seller and the foreign buyer for the sale of Canadian products and to cooperate with the commercial community to build up the volume of Canada's foreign trade."<sup>10</sup> Most of the methods now used to achieve this purpose were introduced early in the twentieth century. The chief method was not, as in the case of the emigration agents, to publicize Canada abroad but to inform Canadian exporters of business opportunities abroad. This was accomplished by the sending of "trade enquiries" from foreign business men and of regular reports to Ottawa for publication in what was later called the *Commercial Intelligence Journal*, and by periodic tours of Canada by the agents themselves.<sup>11</sup> The trade commissioners had purely commercial functions and were in no sense diplomatic or even consular officers. Consular services continued to be provided for Canadians by British consuls. It was sometimes suggested that the trade commissioners were handicapped by the lack of diplomatic status which would enable them to come into direct contact with foreign governments. No change was made in their status, however, until the founding of the Canadian legations, when the commissioners in those capitals joined the staff as commercial attachés.<sup>12</sup> In countries where there were no

<sup>7</sup>See speeches of Conservatives (Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Hector Langevin, Mr. George Foster, Sir John Thompson, and Sir Charles Tupper) in the above debates.

<sup>8</sup>*Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1887-1892, Reports of Sir Charles Tupper, High Commissioner, to the Minister of Agriculture; 1893, Report to the Minister of Finance.

<sup>9</sup>*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, May 29, 1886, 1659; June 2, 1886, 1773.

<sup>10</sup>*Canada, Annual Reports*, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1925-6, II, 23.

<sup>11</sup>For all this, *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1893-1914, were consulted; also, *House of Commons Debates*, 1886-1914, appropriations for "commercial agencies" and, after 1909, for "trade commissioners."

<sup>12</sup>Mackenzie King, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Jan. 30, 1928, 60; April 8, 1930, 1382.



Canadian trade representatives, arrangements were made by George Foster before the first World War with many British consulates to concern themselves with Canadian trade.<sup>13</sup>

By 1880 the Canadian government felt the need of a more adequate representation of the Dominion in London. According to the Memorandum submitted at the end of 1879 to the British government by Macdonald, Tilley, and Tupper, advocating a "resident minister," "Canada has ceased to occupy the position of an ordinary possession of the Crown. She exists in the form of a powerful Central Government, having no less than seven subordinate local executive and legislative systems, soon to be largely augmented by the development of the vast regions lying between Lake Superior and the Rocky Mountains. Her Central Government is becoming even more responsible than the Imperial Government for the maintenance of international relations towards the United States, a subject which will yearly require greater prudence and care, as the populations of the two countries extend along, and mingle across the vast frontier line, three thousand miles in length."<sup>14</sup> This change in status required an elevation in the status of the Canadian representative in London. The proposed resident minister would, they suggested, assume responsibilities in the spheres of emigration, trade, and finance. His greater prestige and quasi-diplomatic rank would, it was argued, aid and assist him in the promotion of emigration, especially from the continent. In view of Canada's growing interest in external trade and the forthcoming commercial negotiations between the United Kingdom and European governments, it was imperative to have a Canadian representative on the spot to be consulted or to participate in these discussions. Moreover the Canadian representative could assume the financial functions hitherto performed by Sir John Rose, ex-Cabinet minister who had been since 1869 informally serving as Financial Commissioner for the Dominion of Canada in London.<sup>15</sup> In fact these were the functions later performed by the High Commissioner, the title for the new agent finally agreed upon by the British and Canadian governments. Although performing various tasks for other government departments, the High Commissioner was primarily responsible, and reported directly, to the Minister of Agriculture (later to the Minister of Interior) on his emigration work and to the Minister of Finance (later to the Minister of Trade and Commerce) in trade matters.<sup>16</sup>

It had been recognized by the Canadian government's Memorandum that a colony such as Canada then was could not have separate diplomatic representation, and they were firmly reminded of this in the reply of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. "Looking, however, to the position of Canada as an integral portion of the Empire, the relations of

<sup>13</sup>Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, Jan. 30, 1914, 323, April 3, 1915, 1932, and March 13, 1916, 1653; Report of the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1922, no. 10, 14; A. B. Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions* (Oxford, 1916), 297.

<sup>14</sup>Text of Memorandum, *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1880, no. 105, 2-4.

<sup>15</sup>See the Memorandum, and the speeches of Sir John A. Macdonald, (*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, April 29, 1880, 1857-9, 1872-4) and of Sir Leonard Tilley (*ibid.*, March 8, 1881, 1272-4).

<sup>16</sup>See George Foster, *ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1893, 189-93; Reports of the High Commissioner to the Prime Minister, *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1892, no. 7b\*, 1896, no. 5A.

such a person with Her Majesty's Government would not be correctly defined as being of a diplomatic character" and "would necessarily be more analogous to that of an officer in the home service, than to that of a Minister at a Foreign Court."<sup>17</sup> The Canadian government believed, however, that the transfer to Canada of control over many important matters meant that "their discussion and settlement have become subjects for mutual assent and concern, and thereby have . . . assumed a quasi-diplomatic character as between Her Majesty's Government representing the United Kingdom *per se* and the Dominion, without in any manner derogating from their general authority as rulers of the entire Empire." For this reason the resident minister ought to have "a quasi-diplomatic position at the Court of St. James, with the social advantages of such a rank and position" and ought to be "specially entrusted with the general supervision of all the political, material and financial interests of Canada in England, subject to instructions from his Government." He would be "an official representative" and the channel of communication between the governments of the United Kingdom and Canada. Moreover, he would on occasion be accredited to foreign courts to associate with the British Minister in trade negotiations.<sup>18</sup>

There was indeed a precedent for this in the unique status enjoyed by Sir John Rose as Financial Commissioner, who according to the Order-in-Council of 1869 setting forth his duties was "accredited to Her Majesty's Government as a gentleman possessing the confidence of the Canadian Government with whom Her Majesty's Government may properly communicate on Canadian affairs." In fact Rose had performed many semi-diplomatic duties on behalf of the Canadian government.<sup>19</sup> In spite of this earlier precedent the High Commissioner came to occupy a very different position from that urged by the Canadian government. The British government from the outset refused to concede him diplomatic status and did not treat him as the only channel of communication between the two governments.<sup>20</sup> Although Sir Charles Tupper, Conservative Cabinet member and simultaneously High Commissioner from 1883 to 1896, was able to develop the political side of his duties to some extent as a result of his unique dual role, the Liberal government after 1896 was reluctant to use Lord Strathcona, a Conservative appointee, for such purposes. As a result the High Commissioner long remained a mere government official and a business agent of various departments, and not an ambassadorial representative of his government.<sup>21</sup>

With the death of Lord Strathcona in 1914, Sir George Perley, a Cabinet member, resided in England, as a temporary expedient, and throughout the

<sup>17</sup>Text given in *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1880, no. 105, 1-2.

<sup>18</sup>See Memorandum cited, and copy of a report of a Committee of the Privy Council, December, 1879, *ibid.*, 4-6.

<sup>19</sup>Morden H. Long, "Sir John Rose and the Informal Beginnings of the Canadian High Commissionership" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XII, March, 1931, 27, and the whole article).

<sup>20</sup>See Hicks-Beach's reply cited in footnote 17, and A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (3 vols., Oxford, 1912), III, 1460.

<sup>21</sup>Keith, *Imperial Unity*, 536-41; A. G. Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy* (2 vols., London, 1929), I, 360-4; A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (2 vols., Oxford, 1928), I, 281-7.



war acted as High Commissioner, keeping Canada in close touch with the course of the war and bringing before the Allied governments Canada's productive capacities.<sup>22</sup> During 1916 and 1917 Perley also acted as Minister of Overseas Forces, supervising the Canadian forces in Britain and France, being replaced in this post by Sir Edward Kemp in 1917.<sup>23</sup> During these war and post-war years the diplomatic side of the High Commissioner of necessity developed considerably, and his position was enhanced still further by the change in the status of the Governor-General in 1926.<sup>24</sup> Thus it was possible for Mackenzie King to say in 1927 that "the position of High Commissioner has become increasingly significant as a diplomatic post, and . . . does correspond to the position an ambassador would hold between nations," with the right of access to all British government departments.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, in King's opinion, this post was "the head of that representative service which has to deal with the affairs of Canada abroad."<sup>26</sup> R. B. Bennett, however, denied that the High Commissioner was in any way an ambassador, but argued that he was a political representative of the Canadian government, subject to change with a change of government.<sup>27</sup> The fact was more important than the theory. The functions of the High Commissioner had of necessity broadened considerably from his original business functions, and he had become, in fact, if not in form, a diplomat.

A somewhat similar pattern of change is evident in the case of the Canadian representation in Paris. The predecessor of Canada's first Minister to France was the Hon. Hector Fabre, appointed in 1882 as a representative of the Quebec government in Paris, and from the first used by the Dominion for the promotion of trade and emigration. Responsible to the London High Commissioner in this aspect of his work, the Paris Agent was unofficially graced with the title, Commissioner-General. Like other emigration agents he sought to publicize Canada but was primarily interested in the emigration of Frenchmen of property and means.<sup>28</sup> A more important part of his activity was the promotion of trade and for a few years after 1892 he held the post of commercial agent under the Department of Trade and Commerce.<sup>29</sup> Although apparently not very effective in either capacity, M. Fabre was continued in office by the Laurier government, which considered him of value as a general commissioner, providing

<sup>22</sup>Keith, *Imperial Unity*, 541-7, 584; A. B. Keith, *War Government in the Dominions* (Oxford, 1921), 170-1. See the speeches of Sir Robert Borden, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Feb. 24, 1915, 391, April 9, 1915, 2318-19, Feb. 9, 1916, 664, Feb. 21, 1916, 957-9, 960-1, 963, 967-8, Aug. 6, 1917, 4177-8.

<sup>23</sup>Sir Robert Borden, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Aug. 7, 1917, 4436, 4438; *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1917, no. 41; Keith, *War Government*, 76-7, 85.

<sup>24</sup>A. B. Keith, *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions* (London, 1933), 189-92; N. W. Rowell, *The British Empire and World Peace* (Toronto, 1922), 192-5; Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy*, I, 360, 362-4; Borden, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, June 30, 1920, 4539; King, *ibid.*, April 13, 1927, 2465-6.

<sup>25</sup>King, *ibid.*, April 13, 1927, 2466.

<sup>26</sup>King, *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1928, 58-9, May 15, 1931, 1647-50.

<sup>27</sup>Bennett, *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1930, 491, May 15, 1931, 1646-7, 1650-1, 1658-61. See A. B. Keith, *The Dominions as Sovereign States* (London, 1938), 282-3.

<sup>28</sup>For the above, see *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Feb. 17, 1882, 45, Feb. 15, 1884, 337, April 3, 1884, 1304; 1305, April 8, 1885, 931-5, and the Reports of Hector Fabre, *Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1887, no. 88.

<sup>29</sup>See Fabre's Reports and *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, June 7, 1887, 820-1, Sept. 17, 1891, 5103, June 30, 1892, 4423-6.

France with information about Canada.<sup>30</sup> After an "ambassadorship" of almost thirty years, M. Fabre was succeeded in 1911 by Philippe Roy who also acted as trade commissioner. Under the Borden government the Paris Agent ceased to represent Quebec and became solely a Dominion agent.<sup>31</sup> Like Mr. Perley in London, M. Roy was active during the war in seeking French government orders for Canadian products and preparing the way for increased post-war trade.<sup>32</sup> Like the High Commissioner, too, the Paris Agent gradually began to perform quasi-diplomatic duties, communicating at least in minor matters directly with the French and foreign governments.<sup>33</sup> By 1928, Mackenzie King could say that M. Roy's position had already become "much more nearly that of a minister" and that he had time and again been granted the right of immediate approach by the French government and the British Ambassador "as a matter of courtesy."<sup>34</sup> Once again, the fact was more important than the form. A most significant metamorphosis of function had occurred before the establishment of the Legation in 1928 had set the seal of constitutional authority upon it.

Canada's representation in the United States, culminating in the establishment of the Legation in 1927, was similarly the outcome of special needs and circumstances. The earliest record of representation in the United States is of a resident immigration agent in Massachusetts in 1875, concerned with the repatriation of French Canadians. Thereafter other immigration agents were established at various points, at first to protect European emigrants proceeding to Canada via the United States, later to encourage American migration. By 1914 there were twenty such salaried agents, supervised by a travelling inspector of agencies.<sup>35</sup> Commercial agents in the United States were held unnecessary by successive Canadian governments, and it was believed that trade with the neighbouring republic would develop freely out of the efforts of Canadian business men without the need for governmental intervention. There was some feeling in the nineties, as we have seen above, in favour of diplomatic representation in Washington. "Such is the magnitude of the interests between Canada and the United States," declared Sir Richard Cartwright in 1889, "that if there be one point on the earth's surface where it is important to Canada to have an agent who shall keep our Government well advised, who shall be responsible to the Government and people of Canada, who shall take his orders from us, and who shall know that it is his business to look after the interests of Canada and nothing else, it is there. . . ."<sup>36</sup> In the minds of Cartwright and McCarthy, there were many questions which would be the concern of such a representative, but most prominent among them was the promotion of trade. Concretely, their proposals did not envisage separate diplomatic representation, which was considered incompatible with imperial unity,

<sup>30</sup>Laurier, *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1891, 5094-5, April 19, 1901, 3451-2, June 9, 1905, 7209.

<sup>31</sup>Borden, *ibid.*, June 30, 1920, 4539.

<sup>32</sup>Borden, *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1916, 982; Rowell, *ibid.*, April 29, 1919, 1901.

<sup>33</sup>Borden, *ibid.*, June 30, 1920, 4539; King, *ibid.*, June 15, 1923, 4001, June 2, 1925, 3837-8.

<sup>34</sup>King, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1928, 59-60.

<sup>35</sup>Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1876-1914 (Report of the Minister of Agriculture to 1892, of the Minister of Interior, 1893-1903, of Inspector of Agencies in the U.S., 1904-14).

<sup>36</sup>Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, Feb. 18, 1889, 174.



but suggested an attaché at the British Embassy, subordinate to the British Ambassador and the British Foreign Office, but authorized to communicate directly with the Canadian government.<sup>37</sup>

The Conservative government admitted the need for some fuller representation of the Dominion in Washington but flatly rejected the proposed attaché in the British Embassy. Their proposed alternative, although never clearly defined, involved an agent with a status somewhere between that of a mere commercial agent and an independent diplomatic representative, having the right of access to the British Minister and the American government, and having the right to report directly to the Canadian government. They were determined, however, to take no step until, in agreement with the United Kingdom, the exact status of the proposed agent was determined.<sup>38</sup> George Foster, reporting in 1893 on his discussions in this connection in London with the British government noted that they would be willing "to facilitate in any way a full representation of Canada's interest, through their Minister at any of these [foreign] capitols, and further, would be willing to act in every possible way so as to give a Canadian agent or unofficial representative, whatever advantages could possibly be given through the Embassy, or by the Minister representing Great Britain in that country." "Serious difficulties" would, however, be in the way of Canadian representatives "with ambassadorial or ministerial functions."<sup>39</sup> Thus the matter stood down to the Great War, and neither the Laurier nor the Borden governments took steps to establish either a diplomatic or a commercial agent in Washington, in spite of parliamentary pressure.

The outbreak of the war brought the problem sharply to the fore and led to the initiation of discussions with the British government by the Borden government in 1917. The special war needs were satisfied by the temporary appointment in 1918 of the Canadian War Mission, made up of business men. In order to avoid diplomatic difficulties, the Mission represented, not the Canadian government but the Cabinet and the heads of departments.<sup>40</sup> Its functions were clear-cut; it was to secure for Canadian importers priority orders, export licences and transport permits issued by American departments, and later on, to assure American markets for Canadian munitions exporters.<sup>41</sup> As Newton Rowell put it, the war situation required the government "to step in and protect Canadian industries and the development and maintenance of our industrial life" and "to get the business . . . by going after the business."<sup>42</sup> Although not formally a diplomatic mission, it did in fact perform such duties.<sup>43</sup> After the war the Mission was temporarily continued so as to avoid an interregnum between it and the permanent representation which the government was by that time

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<sup>37</sup>See the speeches of Cartwright, Laurier, and McCarthy in the *Debates* cited in Footnote 6.

<sup>38</sup>See the speeches of Foster, Tupper, and Sir John Thompson in the *Debates*, Footnote 6.

<sup>39</sup>George Foster, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, March 2, 1893, 1615.

<sup>40</sup>Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy*, II, 103; Keith, *War Government*, 172.

<sup>41</sup>Borden, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, April 18, 1918, 905-6, May 17, 1920, 2451-3; Rowell, *ibid.*, May 5, 1919, 2070-7.

<sup>42</sup>Rowell, *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>Borden, *ibid.*, April 21, 1921, 2388-9; Sir Robert Borden, *Canada in the Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1929), 96.

again discussing with the British government. Indeed even after the work of the Mission had been wound up in 1921, Mr. M. M. Mahoney, its secretary, remained in Washington for some years as "agent" of the Department of External Affairs. In addition a Bureau of Information was set up in 1919 in New York City, devoting itself largely to the promotion of trade, and was succeeded in 1921-2 by a Trade Commissioner's Office, the first office of its kind in the United States, intended by the Conservative government to be the beginning of an extensive system of commissioners in the United States.

By May, 1920, agreement had already been reached between the Canadian and British governments on the appointment of a Canadian "Minister Plenipotentiary" in Washington to act as "the ordinary channel of communication . . . in matters of purely Canadian concern." It was provided that in the absence of the British Ambassador the Canadian Minister would take charge of the "whole Embassy," so that the new arrangement was not taken to "denote any departure . . . from the principle of diplomatic unity of the British Empire."<sup>44</sup> There was little disagreement in the Canadian parliament as to the real need for such a representative and few were ready to cast doubt on Rowell's assertion that "a Canadian, possessing the intimate knowledge which a Canadian should have of Canadian affairs and trade conditions, is better qualified to look after Canadian interests than a man who has not the knowledge or experience."<sup>45</sup> It was the turn of the Liberals in opposition, however, to criticize the attachment of the Canadian representative to the British Embassy, and for the Conservatives to defend it, thus reversing the roles taken in the 1892 discussions. In particular the Liberals assailed the dual responsibility of the Canadian representative and feared that he would be a "camouflaged chief clerk," subordinate to the British Ambassador and even the British Consul.

The government denied that there would be any difficulty as to the division of duty and responsibility and defended the arrangement as a guarantee of the continued integrity of the Empire and of the prestige of the Canadian representative. Although the principles of self-government and autonomy were frequently alluded to in the debates, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the government was more concerned with the fact of representation, than the form, since formally the Canadian representative would be dependent and subordinate and the diplomatic unity of the Empire would be preserved. Said Arthur Meighen, "We take this step not because we are a nation and merely to express our nationhood. We take it for the service it is going to be to us. We take it because it will be a help to us, but it does illustrate the growing nationhood of our country."<sup>46</sup> There were those who believed, and were comforted by the fact, that the "right of legation" had *not* been clearly established by this development, and reconciled themselves to the Washington representation only because the principle of self-government had not been pushed to its logical con-

<sup>44</sup>Text in Dawson, *Development of Dominion Status*, 202.

<sup>45</sup>Rowell, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, May 17, 1920, 2444. W. S. Fielding denied the need for a Washington representative. See the important *Debates* in the House, May 17, 1920, 2442-75, June 30, 1920, 4533-43, April 21, 1921, 2378-2436.

<sup>46</sup>Meighen, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, April 21, 1921, 2431.



clusion in the form of a separate diplomatic representative.<sup>47</sup> Nor did the "logic" of self-government lead to any conclusion as to the extension of the idea to other countries than the United States. Such a step might be taken, but not necessarily, American relations "differing wholly" from relations with other countries.<sup>48</sup>

The proposal of Washington representation, originally taking this "imperialist" form, was finally translated into fact in 1926 by Mackenzie King, who, true to his earlier criticism of the dual nature of Borden's scheme, put the Canadian Minister in charge of a separate legation. Moreover he clearly indicated his expectation that Canada would ultimately have representatives in every country in the world.<sup>49</sup> The Conservative opposition, led by R. B. Bennett, bitterly opposed representation in this "nationalist" form, deploring the effect it would have on imperial unity and suggesting in place of a diplomat a trade commissioner.<sup>50</sup> But the die was cast. Canada's representative in Washington was to be in form, as well as in fact, a diplomatic representative. The right of legation had been established.<sup>51</sup> But as in the case of Paris and London, the need had created the right. Had the Conservatives had their way, the need would have been fulfilled without the right. As it was, the fulfilment of the need was accompanied by the achievement of the right. The final result was a functional, not a theoretical product.

In conclusion, it remains to demonstrate that the later expansion of Canadian representation in Paris and Tokyo reflected the circumstances and needs of Canada rather than the strict letter of a constitutional theory. These steps were taken, and others followed later, as the special needs presented themselves, and the steps were justified by those needs, not by a constitutional principle. Their establishment did not automatically follow from the creation of the Washington Legation, which had been considered a product of the peculiar nature of Canadian-American relations.<sup>52</sup> The motive of trade promotion played an important part in the decision to set up missions in Paris and Tokyo. Moreover the two representatives were looked upon as Canada's sole representatives in the two continents, Europe and Asia, not merely as ministers to the two countries in question. Then there was the intention of giving Canada the means of fulfilling her general responsibility in foreign relations as an independent state. The purpose of these two legations, said Mr. King, was not to emphasize Canada's status, which was already recognized, but rather to assume the responsibility corresponding to that status.<sup>53</sup> This implied, of course, that representatives would later have to be established in other countries. "We are sending

<sup>47</sup>See P. E. Corbett and H. A. Smith, *Canada and World Politics* (London, 1928), 140, 184-6; Keith, *War Government*, 173-5; Keith, *Responsible Government* (1928), 909 n.; A. B. Keith, *The Sovereignty of the British Dominions* (London, 1929), 438, 447-8.

<sup>48</sup>Meighen, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, April 21, 1921, 2430.

<sup>49</sup>King, *ibid.*, June 2, 1925, 3842.

<sup>50</sup>Bennett, *ibid.*, April 13, 1927, 2472, 2481-2. Sir Henry Drayton and Borden were also opposed (*ibid.*, June 2, 1925, 3839-40; Borden, *Canada in the Commonwealth*, 98).

<sup>51</sup>P. J. Noel Baker, *The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions in International Law* (London, 1929), 150-2, 251.

<sup>52</sup>Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy*, II, 104-5, 106, 291.

<sup>53</sup>King, *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Jan. 31, 1928, 60.

representatives to Paris, Washington and other places," said Mr. King, "to deal with special and individual problems arising between foreign countries and ourselves, and the natural, necessary and inevitable development is to send as conditions warrant permanent representatives to the capitals of foreign countries."<sup>54</sup> More concretely, King advanced the curious argument that it was wise for Canada to establish relations with her four "nearest neighbors" on the continents of Europe, Asia, and North America, "the four great powers that are instrumental in controlling world affairs."<sup>55</sup> To the thesis propounded by Mr. King, Mr. Bennett and the Conservative opposition could not agree. They were ready to admit the commercial value of Canadian ministers. But they were inexorably opposed in principle and practice to further diplomatic representation, which would render impossible, in their view, the desirable unity of the Empire in foreign policy. "It [the commonwealth]," said Mr. Bennett, "cannot speak with one voice if power is given to the representative of Canada or any other part of the commonwealth to speak with a dissenting voice."<sup>56</sup> Mr. King was on sounder ground, however, in his argument that a joint foreign policy would still be possible through joint action of the several British representatives at a foreign capital.<sup>57</sup>

By 1928 there was no doubt that Canada was not only free constitutionally to establish legations wherever she wished, but that, right or no right, Canada would do so wherever the need appeared to demand it. Mr. Bennett, as Prime Minister, did not make any additions to Canada's diplomatic system, but did not discontinue or change the status of any of the existing legations. It was clear, however, that wherever the costs and the likely results justified it, Canadian diplomatic representation would be inaugurated. From this fact the later events, right down to the appointing of ministers to Chungking and Moscow, and of the first Consul-general, in New York City, followed almost inevitably, not as of right, but as of need. On the other hand, wherever this did not take place, British embassies and consulates continued to be used, in minor matters even without instructions from the Foreign Office.<sup>58</sup>

If Canadian historians, constitutional lawyers and statesmen like to think of the development of Canada's representation abroad in terms of an idea—responsible government—first vindicated by Robert Baldwin, it may make Canada's history nobler and more purposeful, and does not too grossly distort the formal course of events. None the less a clear understanding of the development can only be secured if its content as well as its form is considered. Seen in this light, the development of our permanent representation abroad has been the product of circumstances and needs, not of theories and principles. The theories, indeed, have often had to hobble

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, June 9, 1928, 4162.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, June 9, 1928, 4157. See W. L. M. King, "Canada's Legations Abroad" (*The Canadian Nation*, II, March-April, 1929, 26).

<sup>56</sup>*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, June 9, 1928, 4166.

<sup>57</sup>See for the above the statements by Mackenzie King, *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1928, 57-62, June 9, 1928, 4155-63, April 8, 1930, 1382-4; Bennett, Jan. 30, 1928, 27-9, May 28, 1928, 3484, June 9, 1928, 4163-7, April 8, 1930, 1383-4, July 30, 1931, 4335-6, 4344; Perley, Feb. 2, 1928, 116-17, June 9, 1928, 4153-5.

<sup>58</sup>Keith, *Imperial Unity*, 19-20; *The Sovereignty of the British Dominions*, 447, 450-1; *The Dominions as Sovereign States*, 582-3.



along after the facts, sadly crippled by the facts, and desperately striving to overtake them. What Newton Rowell, in defending the idea of Canadian representation in Washington, once said about the British Empire may be well applied to Canada: "... the British Empire has not been built up on constitutional theory, it has not developed on theoretical lines. Its development has been in accordance with the actual needs of the hour and the conditions which faced its people in different quarters of the globe."<sup>59</sup> So it is with Canada's permanent representation abroad.

#### DISCUSSION

*Professor Trotter* asked whether the separate representation secured by the Irish Free State under the Treaty had any direct influence on the appointment of a diplomatic representative at Washington; but Mr. Skilling had no evidence showing any direct bearing of the former on the action of the Canadian government.

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<sup>59</sup>Rowell, *The British Empire and World Peace*, 191.

## SOME ASPECTS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER VERSAILLES

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IN the period following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, those countries which had accepted membership in the League of Nations faced the necessity of finding a synthesis between their traditional policies and the obligations of the Covenant. In doing so, their efforts were in part directed toward giving the League the particular character or emphasis which fitted their own interpretation of its functions.

Canada sought membership in the League of Nations primarily as a recognition of its self-governing status. But League membership forced Canada to take a stand on a variety of international issues which were new in setting if not always in their essential characteristics. Prior to World War I, Canada's relations had been almost exclusively with the United Kingdom and the United States. In the inter-war period, its major concern continued to be with those countries. In what Mr. MacGregor Dawson has called the period of tentative centralization from 1920 to 1922, and the period of decentralization from 1922 to 1926<sup>1</sup> which was ushered in by the Chanak incident, Canada continued to work out in the Commonwealth the implications of its autonomy. At the Conference of Prime Ministers of 1921, Mr. Meighen demonstrated with vigour and effectiveness, Canada's concern for good relations between the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>2</sup> But in addition to concerning itself with these relationships, Canada had to face the implications of its membership in the new international body, both in terms of what it believed the League should do and of what support it was willing to give the League in the carrying out of these purposes.

In an attempt to throw light on Canadian attitudes and policies in the League of Nations in the years from 1920 to 1923, three topics with which Canadians were particularly concerned have been singled out for special analysis: the relation of the Assembly to the Council; the question of international regulation of raw materials; and the problem of Article 10. The first of these topics is little known, and it is believed that there is new light to shed on all three. If one leaves aside constitutional developments in the Commonwealth and the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, both of which have been treated in detail by others, they are the questions in which the Canadian attitude had the greatest influence in this early post-war period. Moreover, in their general implications they have great significance for the present time for they touch on three basic issues: the relation between small and great powers within international organization, the extent and character of international regulation, and the means of ensuring peace within the international community. In the period under consideration, they emerge as separate and distinct from one another but they have a measure of general unity through their

<sup>1</sup>R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936* (New York, 1937), 36-103.

<sup>2</sup>See J. Bartlet Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference" (*Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1935, 45-58).



effect on the shaping of the character of the League and from the Canadian point of view, through the personalities involved and the policies they exemplify. The first two of these subjects have their chief significance during the First Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920; the third is of importance throughout the period and for that reason will be treated last.

The First Assembly which met at Geneva in November, 1920, was in many ways decisive for the future development of the League. Like any good constitutional instrument, the Covenant left unsettled many questions of relationship and function. The first general gathering of League members had to concern itself with these questions and it was due to effective leadership, provided in part by Canadians, that the Assembly became a force in League affairs.

In a group which included a high proportion of well-known leaders such as Cecil, Barnes, Nansen, and Viviani, the Canadian representatives, Sir George Foster, the Hon. C. J. Doherty, and the Hon. Newton W. Rowell, ranked high. By some, the Canadian delegation was considered to be the most useful among those of the smaller powers, particularly for its effective work in committees, and Wilson Harris believed Rowell to be "among the eight or ten leading figures of the Assembly."<sup>3</sup>

When the Assembly first met in November 15, 1920, it had no officers, no committees, no rules of procedure, no plan of work. The extent of its functions and the character of its relation to the Council were still undetermined. It was in regard to the latter question that Rowell began to assume a leading role in the Assembly.

The discussion on the relation between the Assembly and the Council focused on three main points. The first was whether the League had an analogy in constitutional law in the relation between cabinet and legislature; the second was whether representatives in the Council and in the Assembly spoke for themselves or for their governments; the third was the knotty problem of concurrent jurisdiction. Both in his addresses in the plenary sessions and as Rapporteur with Viviani for the First Committee to which the question was referred, Rowell maintained a firm stand in support of an independent position for the Assembly and of a responsible attitude by the Great Powers. In opposition to the Italian representative, Tittoni,<sup>4</sup> he carried his point that not the individual delegates but the States represented on the Council "should be held accountable" for their decisions.<sup>5</sup> In regard to general relations between the Assembly and Council, it was agreed that the League of Nations had no analogy in constitutional law and was in fact a single organism having at its disposal two bodies through which its work could be done. In the more complex question of concurrent jurisdiction, Rowell eventually convinced Viviani that he should not suggest that residual powers belonged to the Council.<sup>6</sup> In the final Report, due to Rowell's action, there was no attempt to make precise definition of the spheres of activities of the Council and Assembly where these were not clearly designated in the Covenant.

The basis of Rowell's action was his desire to build up the authority of the Assembly. He spoke frankly in the plenary session of his personal agreement with the "substantial body of opinion . . . which would magnify

<sup>3</sup>Wilson Harris, *What They Did at Geneva* (London, 1921).

<sup>4</sup>For his speech, see *Assembly Records*, 1920, Eighth Plenary Session, 178 ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1920, First Committee, Third Meeting, 12.

<sup>6</sup>Rowell papers, Rowell to Viviani, November 27, 1920.

the functions of the Assembly."<sup>7</sup> Recognizing, however, that agreement could not have been reached on resolutions which enlarged the functions of either the Assembly or the Council, he took recourse in the typically Anglo-Saxon expedient of avoiding precise definition, lest it subsequently form a limitation on the powers of the Assembly.

The action was more important than may appear at first sight. From the point of view of the League, it was a decisive move in preparing the way for the Assembly to develop into a strong representative body, with direct responsibility in any issue which properly belonged under the Covenant. The activities which the Assembly undertook in 1920 went far toward giving effect to this claim to full coordinate authority. Moreover, in emphasizing the responsibility of states for the declarations of their representatives whether in the Council or in the Assembly, there was an attempt, not always successfully implemented, to secure a close relation between international utterances and national policy. On this point, the stand taken by Rowell was in line with the general Canadian attitude that representatives speak not for themselves but for their governments. In regard to its attempt to keep the Assembly to the fore in League affairs, it illustrates a policy characteristic of all the Dominions. Only in the Assembly were the Dominions sure to be represented. The British Empire representative on the Council was in practice always the representative of the United Kingdom alone. Even after 1926 when one of the Dominions always had a seat on the Council, there was no feeling that it represented in any way the other Dominions. Thus it was only in the Assembly that Canada could be sure of exercising influence. The desire to protect the control of its own affairs, which played such a role in Canada's Commonwealth relations, was a contributory motive for supporting the power of the Assembly. Lastly, the action demonstrated a Canadian interest in the affairs of the League which needs to be remembered when other more negative incidents are being considered.

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The Canadian reaction to the second issue, that of international regulation of raw materials, centred around two points, the interpretation of the functions of the League, and the expediency of the approach as a means of solving the problem. The question had already been raised before the First Assembly met, and the Canadian attitude toward it had been indicated. At the first annual meeting of the International Labour Conference held in Washington, November, 1919, M. Digno Baldesi, the Italian workers' delegate had proposed that "The conference should draw the attention of the League of Nations to the importance of an equitable distribution of raw materials in preventing unemployment and to the expediency of setting up a Permanent Committee which would guarantee this equitable distribution among the various countries, according to their present need and future industrial requirements."<sup>8</sup> Rowell, who was serving as the Canadian government delegate, pointed out the impracticability of the suggestion, and maintained also that it was outside the jurisdiction of the Conference. A sharp discussion followed and the proposal was only

<sup>7</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1920, Fourteenth Plenary Session, 290.

<sup>8</sup>*Provisional Verbatim Record*, First Annual Conference, International Labour Organization, 20.



defeated by 43 votes to 40. This experience formed the backdrop for Rowell's statements on the subject in the First Assembly.

The issue was raised in that gathering by the Belgian delegate Lafontaine who maintained in his speech in the plenary session that the League of Nations should deal especially with the problem of armaments and with economic problems. Among the latter, he ranked raw materials which, he declared, should no longer be considered the possession of the country within which they were found but "must be at the disposal of all mankind, under conditions of as great equality as possible."<sup>9</sup>

Rowell, who spoke next in the plenary sessions, undertook to answer this directly. In introduction, he maintained it was necessary to keep a clear differentiation between the primary function of the League which was to prevent war and to substitute other means of settling international disputes, and the secondary functions such as those under Article 23 relating to health, transport, etc., which he felt should not be emphasized to the neglect of the League's primary function.

In reference to the secondary function [he declared], I venture to submit that it is important that we should not seek to go outside the terms of the Covenant, that we should not seek to promote proposals here or elsewhere which cannot possibly be realized because they are outside the scope of the Covenant. The nations could not possibly submit to them without losing control of their own internal affairs. It is essential, if the League is to discharge its primary functions, that it should not consist of a few of the great nations of the world; it must consist of all the great nations of the world, and it should consist of those great nations, so soon as they are in a position to comply with the conditions of the Covenant and apply for admission.

In considering this matter I think there is a viewpoint from the New World that it is wise for both the Council and the Assembly to consider. If there is one idea held more tenaciously than another on our side of the Atlantic it is that we must retain control of our own internal affairs. You can never expect the great nation south of Canada to become a party to this League so long as there is any suggestion or contention that you are going to interfere with the domestic affairs of that country. Therefore I think it is unfortunate to throw out to this Assembly and to the public any proposal to the effect that the Covenant of the League covers the question of raw materials. I submit, with respect, it is clear beyond peradventure that it does not. It is a question of tremendous importance to all the nations of the world. Everyone recognizes that. But to introduce it here and obscure the primary function of the League is only to militate against its efficiency and impair the position it should hold in the public estimation of the world.<sup>10</sup>

This is the statement which Signor Tittoni, the Italian delegate, declared "expressed so categorically a *non possumus* in connection with the matter of raw materials and their proprietary rights for the nation which possesses them." Later in his speech, Tittoni appealed with great eloquence "to those Powers who are the fortunate possessors of raw materials, to those Powers who are rich, not to wait for the request from the poorer Powers

<sup>9</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1920, Eighth Plenary Session, 164.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 169.

and the Powers who are dependent upon them, but to come before this Assembly and say that they will waive their national interests and national egoisms in the general interest of humanity, justice and equality."<sup>11</sup>

The division of opinion concerning the functions of the League was equally obvious in the Second Committee where the issue was again raised. No conclusion was reached, however, and the opposition of the Canadian, Australian, and Indian representatives in the Committee prevented any resolution from being presented which implied that raw materials were a subject for international regulation.

Rowell's attitude to the issue was based on three major considerations. First and foremost, he did not believe that the Covenant provided for action of this type. A reading of the relevant article on which proponents of action based their claim makes it difficult not to accept his contention. Article 23 began "Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League"; and continued in section (e) "will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League." It was difficult, particularly for a lawyer, to read into this a justification for international regulation of raw material. Even if agreement were reached that such a subject did fall under this article, action could be taken only through international covenants and by the express consent of the governments concerned. Secondly, Rowell quite frankly believed that it was not a feasible approach to the issue because it would require a degree of regimentation in economic life and of outside control in internal affairs for which the Canadian people were not prepared. In the third place, Rowell still hoped for American membership in the League and as he said later, "any suggestion that the League of Nations sought to control or regulate the distribution of raw materials would put a weapon in the hands of the opponents of the League in the United States which might destroy any chance of the United States entering the League."<sup>12</sup> It was not the only occasion on which Canadian representatives constituted themselves the spokesmen for North America and endeavoured to prevent any steps being taken which they felt might militate against eventual American entry into the League.

The Canadian stand on raw materials at the First Assembly has been cited frequently as evidence of an unenlightened and selfish attitude toward an issue of international concern. Particularly was it attacked at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict when it was suggested that the Canadian action in blocking inquiry into the question of raw materials had been a contributory cause of Italian expansionism.<sup>13</sup> In evaluating this contention, it is important to note that in fact the inquiry into raw materials was not blocked but was continued and that an elaborate report on the subject by Professor Gini was presented to the Second Assembly. By that time, however, it was not difficulty in securing raw materials which was the problem but difficulty in disposing of them. Hence, there was a change in approach which Rowell fully endorsed. Restrictions on the

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>12</sup>Newton W. Rowell, "The League of Nations and the Italo-Abyssinia Dispute" (*Board of Trade Journal*, Nov., 1935).

<sup>13</sup>E.g. Escott Reid, "Did Canada Cause War?" (*Saturday Night*, Sept. 28, 1935).



distribution of raw materials were seen to have been a by-product of the general system of trade barriers in existence after the war. In regard to these trade barriers, Rowell later quoted with approval the Report of the Economic Committee to the Assembly in 1921 which while recognizing "the incontestable right which states have to dispose freely of their natural resources or of the output of their countries in respect of raw materials" warned against restrictions or differential regulations which might injure the production of other countries. "Had this position been taken at the First Assembly," Rowell maintained, "there would have been no occasion for any difference of opinion."<sup>14</sup>

It is unfortunate that a wider exploration of the economic problem did not take place at the First Assembly and that the issue of raw materials was not placed in the general setting where it belonged. Exaggerated claims were met by a sharp response which was justified by the legal context and the practical circumstances. But further consideration might have revealed more basic issues and pointed toward positive means of meeting them. In considering the Canadian attitude, however, it is important that neither in practice nor in declarations was any attempt made to support a principle of exclusive or widely differential regulations in regard to its exports.

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The third issue to be considered, the attitude to Article 10, illustrates not only Canada's approach to the issue of preserving peace but also its thesis that in taking active measures there should be a differentiation of obligation determined by the extent of the responsibility for the settlement, the size and stage of development of the power concerned, and the degree of danger to which it was exposed. It is well known that already at the Peace Conference, the Canadian representatives had sought for the deletion of Article 10 of the Covenant which states that "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." In a memorandum which did not become public until 1921, Doherty attacked the obligations of Article 10 "both generally, and from the point of view of countries in the condition and stage of development of Canada in particular." In general, he opposed it as embodying an "absolute obligation of mutual protection of existing possessions," which implied, he believed, a complete stabilization of the *status quo* without reference to the justice of particular titles of possession. Pointing out that territorial disputes were the most common cause of war, Doherty felt that the inflexibility of the guarantee would be inclined to lead to wars rather than to prevent them. If such a guarantee were to be made Doherty proposed that it should be by the Great Powers and specifically limited to the territorial settlement of the Peace Treaties. In any case, he opposed placing the obligation on Canada, partly because Canada had no responsibility for the settlement, partly because Canada was a nation "still merely in process of formation," partly because it imposed a mutual guarantee in which he believed the inequality between the risks

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<sup>14</sup>Rowell, "The League of Nations and the Italo-Abyssinia Dispute."

run and the burdens imposed worked greatly to the detriment of Canada.<sup>15</sup> Implicit in the statement, is a belief which may well be questioned, that guarantees are dangerous because they freeze the *status quo*. There was also an emphasis on differentiation of function between great and small powers which was a not unnatural attempt to reproduce in the League a distinction present in the British Commonwealth relation.

Unsuccessful at the Peace Conference, although Doherty believed that they came "within an ace of succeeding,"<sup>16</sup> the proposal to omit Article 10 was reintroduced at the First Assembly, discussed at the Second Assembly, and referred to the Third Assembly, 1922. At that gathering, the representatives of the new Liberal ministry, having become convinced by conversations in Geneva that it would be impossible to secure the deletion of Article 10 at that time,<sup>17</sup> dropped the request for elimination of the Article and asked instead for clarification of its exact meaning and effect.<sup>18</sup> In particular they were interested in knowing whether it was "within the power of the Council to set the nations at war by their decision?" It was a reiteration, as the Hon. W. S. Fielding pointed out, of the questions which had been raised in the Canadian Parliament at the time when the Canadian government had sought approval of the Treaty of Versailles<sup>19</sup>—and it marked an interesting shift in emphasis from the Doherty memorandum, though apparently the shift was made perforce! In order to secure this clarification, two amendments were proposed by the Canadian delegation. The first was that the Council's advice on means to fulfil the obligation of the Article should take into account "the political and geographical circumstances of each State"; the second that a further clause should be added which read, "The opinion given by the Council in such cases shall be regarded as a matter of the highest importance, and shall be taken into consideration by all the Members of the League, which shall use their utmost endeavours to conform to the conclusions of the Council; but no Member shall be under the obligation to engage in any active war, without the consent of its parliament, legislature or other representative body."<sup>20</sup>

After a good deal of discussion, consideration of the fate of Article 10 was again adjourned. Before it was taken up by the Fourth Assembly in 1923, the opinions of twenty-five governments on the Canadian proposal had been received in answer to a Council request. Out of these answers and the discussions of the Fourth Assembly, the final step was taken. With the somewhat reluctant consent of the Canadian delegation, its points were incorporated in an interpretative resolution in place of the amendments it had proposed. In introducing the resolution, the Rapporteur, M. Rolin of Belgium, pointed out that it would not have much legal force but great moral influence. Along with others, he maintained in addition that the resolution in no way weakened the effect of Article 10.<sup>21</sup> The repre-

<sup>15</sup>League of Nations, Committee on Amendments to the Covenant, *Memorandum submitted by the Canadian delegation* (C.215, M. 154, 1921). Reprinted in G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *Canada at the Paris Peace Conference* (Toronto, 1942), Appendix C.

<sup>16</sup>*Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, 11, 4, Oct., 1921, 794-5.

<sup>17</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1922, First Committee, Fifth Meeting, 23, Lapointe.

<sup>18</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1922, Fifteenth Plenary Session, 215-16.

<sup>19</sup>*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, Second Session, 1919, I, 80, 91, 95, 103, 116, 129, 153, 157, 169, 190, 197, 212, 231, 385, 500.

<sup>20</sup>Quoted in *Assembly Records*, 1923, Twelfth Plenary Session, 75-6.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*



sentative of Persia showed himself unconvinced on this point by casting the single negative vote against the resolution<sup>22</sup>—thereby preventing it, under the unanimity rule, from having binding force. Comparatively little concern was expressed, however, about this feature of the situation. From the Canadian point of view, it is interesting to note that Senator Gouin who followed the Rapporteur accepted that "The interpretation submitted by the First Committee makes no fundamental change in Article 10." All he asked was that Canada be given "a clear interpretation of Article 10, in order that we may know what obligations we have undertaken by signing the Covenant which has united us."<sup>23</sup>

Although the interpretative resolution differed markedly from the original proposal to delete Article 10, two major points had been secured. The recognition that political and geographical position should be a determining factor in making recommendations for action answered by indirection, the original point of differentiation of status and risk. In the second place, the agreement that constitutional authorities should make the ultimate decision in regard to specific means for meeting obligations protected Canada's jealously guarded autonomy. But between the original attempt and the final result, there was the difference between avoiding the obligations of a collective guarantee and securing an assurance that, in particular situations, the position of countries would be taken into consideration in proposing measures to be taken, and that individual rights of decision on action were safeguarded.

In seeking to evaluate the Canadian attitude in regard to Article 10 in relation to its general conception of how peace should be preserved, it is worth noting that the Doherty memorandum had accepted Canada's general obligation under the other Articles of the Covenant which it acknowledged "may subject her to becoming engaged in wars entered upon for the enforcement of the obligations of the nations Members of the League." This risk which Doherty considered to be "extremely remote," and which did not impose an absolute obligation of military or naval action, had the special justification that it was "the sanction of violation of the very Covenants into which all the parties are now entering." Moreover, in such cases Canada would be represented on the recommending body and so, as he pointed out "it will be her own decision for which she will be called upon to ensure respect."<sup>24</sup> These statements endorse the conclusion that, from the beginning, the Canadian action was motivated by the desire to safeguard Canada's ultimate right of decision in particular instances, by a belief in differentiation of function, and by reluctance to guarantee all existing territorial arrangements, not by unwillingness to assume some risks to support the procedures of the Covenant for the maintenance of peace.

The primary function of the League of Nations, Rowell had said, was "to prevent war and to preserve the world's peace by substituting some other method of settling international disputes."<sup>25</sup> Other states felt, and probably rightly, that the best way to prevent war was to establish a collective guarantee against aggression. The Canadian approach after

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 80-1.

<sup>24</sup>C. 215, M. 154, 1921, cited above.

<sup>25</sup>*Assembly Records*, 1920, Eighth Plenary Session, 169.

Versailles was from a different angle. It emphasized the substitutes for war provided by other means for settling international disputes. Chief among these was placed the Permanent Court of International Justice. Progress in disarmament and full publicity for treaties were looked on as useful aids. Only secondarily and with reluctance did Canadian representatives face the possibility that force might ultimately be necessary. Even in the Doherty memorandum, however, it was accepted that the use of force might at some point be inevitable. Moreover, in 1923, the Canadian government explicitly accepted the obligations of Article 10, reserving only its right not to enter into war without the decision of its own legislature.

Over and over again, Canadian statesmen informed their League audiences that Canada looked for no individual advantage from the League, except as Doherty put it "the great benefit and advantage of living in the better world that we believe the League is destined to bring about."<sup>26</sup> Secure in its British connection (which was accepted comfortably as a means of protection however it might be eyed askance as a source of potential trouble through unwelcome commitments) and in its good relations with its southern neighbour, Canada could well afford in the early twenties to emphasize its blessings. Looked on from this perspective, and analysed with understanding of the motives, its actions were not uncommendable. At the moment when Canada was asserting its right of ultimate decision within the Commonwealth, it was not likely to do less within the League of Nations. It might, however, have recognized that there was some difference between accepting decisions made by the United Kingdom and acceding to the demands, or even desires of the great majority of the nations of the world, though had the latter had more consistency, it is difficult to say that Canada would not have done so. Similarly, Canada's emphasis on differentiation of function was an obvious outgrowth of its position within the Commonwealth. In addition, it had a justification which is generally recognized today.

Seen from the angle of building a strong League, Canadian policy had less to commend it. The attack on Article 10 weakened the faith of dangerously situated countries in the League's protective power. What sympathy was shown for the Canadian action came largely out of the hope that it might lead to American entry into the League, though the Canadian delegations were always careful to insist that this was not their motive. Their approach to the problem of peace was that war should be avoided rather than prevented. But though it was important to provide means of settling disputes, it was unrealistic in the existing stage of development of the international community not to face squarely the necessity of pledging collective action to prevent the securing of ends by force. Also the Canadian statement on raw materials undoubtedly rankled, though largely because it was not placed in its proper context. On the positive side was Canada's support of the position of the Assembly. So, too, was the high calibre of its delegation at the First Assembly and the active role it had assumed in League affairs.

Already in the first years of its League membership, Canada faced some of the most important issues of principle in international affairs with which it was to be confronted in the inter-war period. It was not wholly unprepared for them but the experience it could draw upon was limited.

<sup>26</sup>C. 215, M. 154, 1921, cited above.



Canadian statesmen were hopeful that international affairs could be conducted on the pattern of British Commonwealth relations. Canadian public opinion was confused by the intricacies of status. In the harsh events which succeeded the earlier period of discussion, both illusions and confusions were to be ruthlessly exposed. When Canada faces again the equally significant issue of principle which must be decided at the conclusion of this conflict, it will have not only knowledge of the inadequacies of a negative policy but also the experience of positive action in the war to guide it in accepting the full implications of its international position.

## NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS AND SITES

By the

NATIONAL PARKS BUREAU, LANDS, PARKS, AND FORESTS BRANCH,  
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND RESOURCES

THE National Parks Bureau is entrusted with the restoration, preservation, and administration of national historic parks and sites, and the commemoration of the public services of outstanding Canadians.

The Bureau is advised in this phase of its work by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, an honorary body composed of recognized historians representing the various parts of the Dominion.

Since the inception of this work it has been customary for the Board to meet in Ottawa each year. Due to the war, however, these meetings have been deferred during the past three years.

The personnel of the Board is as follows: *Chairman*, His Honour F. W. Howay, New Westminster, B.C.; Dr. J. Clarence Webster, Shediac, N.B.; Professor Fred Landon, London, Ont.; Professor D. C. Harvey, Halifax, N.S.; the Hon. E. Fabre-Surveyer, Montreal, P.Q.; J. A. Gregory, M.P., North Battleford, Sask.; the Rev. Antoine d'Eschambault, St. Boniface, Man.; Major G. Lanctot, Dominion Archivist, Ottawa, Ont.; W. D. Cromarty, National Parks Bureau, Ottawa, Ont.

### NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS

*Fort Anne National Historic Park* is situated in Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. The museum building, restored in 1935, was originally the Officers' Quarters and was built in 1797-8 under the supervision of Edward, Duke of Kent, the father of Queen Victoria, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in North America with headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

During the year the south end and west side of the museum building, the floor of the Acadian Room, and other parts of the interior woodwork were painted. Additional publications and articles of interest were obtained for the museum.

A total of 2,938 persons signed the museum register during the year and it is estimated that an additional 3,600 visited the park without registering.

*Port Royal National Historic Park* is situated at Lower Granville, Nova Scotia. A replica of the group of buildings which sheltered the first European settlers in Canada has been erected on the exact site where the Port Royal Habitation stood nearly three and a half centuries ago. The original Habitation was the headquarters for about two years of Samuel de Champlain, famous explorer and chief geographer to Henry IV of France, who chose the location and drew up the plan of settlement.

During the year a weatherproofing and preserving liquid was applied to the outside woodwork of the Habitation, and all exterior ironwork was cleaned and oiled. An old farm house and out-buildings which stood near by have been dismantled and the grounds cleared and levelled.

Visitors registered in the park during the year numbered 1,639.



*Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park* is situated about three miles from the town of Louisburg, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. Here were enacted the early stages of the long struggle which culminated in the possession of Canada for the British Crown. Erected more than two centuries ago by the French who had named the settlement in honour of Louis XIV, King of France, Louisbourg was captured by the British forces in 1745, but was subsequently handed back to the French. The fortress was again besieged by the English and finally captured by them in 1758. It is interesting to recall that one of the brigades of infantry engaged in the recapture of Louisbourg was commanded by General Wolfe, who was later to die heroically at Quebec.

During the year an old French anchor was raised from the bottom of the harbour and placed on a stone base adjacent to the Museum Building. The entrance roadway was graded and levelled; loose stone was removed from the foundation of the Citadel, and all tablets on the park property were cleaned. The floors of the Museum basement and boiler room, also the flagpole, entrance gate, and all signs were painted.

Among the visitors to the park during the year were His Excellency, the Governor General and the Princess Alice. A total of 2,666 persons signed the visitors' register, but many others entered the park without registering.

*Fort Beauséjour National Historic Park* is situated near Sackville, New Brunswick. Built by the French, the fort was intended to be an Acadian stronghold against the undefined claims of the English to Acadia. Around the fort the Acadians had their homes and farms. It was captured by the British, under Monckton, in 1755, when the fort was strengthened and its defences extended by a system of entrenchments, traces of which still remain.

During the year the bronze tablets bearing historical data relating to the fort were removed from the cairn, and placed on the stone curtain wall which has recently been restored; the cairn being subsequently taken down. The caretaker's residence was painted and a concrete walk constructed in front of it. The paths throughout the park were cleaned and raked and the hay cut.

Visitors registered at the museum during the year numbered 3,020 and it is estimated that about 1,500 others entered the park.

*Fort Chambly National Historic Park* is situated about twenty miles southeast of Montreal, on a conspicuous headland on the Richelieu River. The first fort, built by the French in 1665 as a protection from the Iroquois, was of wooden construction. After many vicissitudes, it was rebuilt of stone, this work being completed in 1711. In 1760 the fort was surrendered to the British who, with a small armed force, held it until 1775. In that year the Americans captured the fort; they evacuated in the following year, but burned everything that was combustible, leaving only the four walls standing. The fort was later repaired and garrisoned by Sir Guy Carleton and played an important part in the War of 1812.

During the year the fences and flag-pole were painted, all surplus iron and scrap metal was disposed of to the local salvage committee, and general improvement work was carried out.

During the year 10,244 persons signed the museum register and it is estimated that over 2,600 more visited the park without registering.

*Fort Lennox National Historic Park* is located on Ile-aux-Noix in the Richelieu River, about thirteen miles south of St. Johns, P.Q. The present fort, which stands on the site of one previously erected by the French, was built by the Imperial authorities in the period from 1812 to 1827. The island, comprising an area of 150 acres, was acquired by the National Parks Bureau in 1921 and extensive works have since been carried out on the buildings and grounds. The entire property has now been taken over for war purposes.

*Fort Wellington National Historic Park* is situated at the east end of the town of Prescott, Ontario, and adjacent to Highway No. 2. The Fort named after the Duke of Wellington was erected when the British authorities decided to fortify Prescott as one of the most vulnerable points of attack in the War of 1812, and as the main base for the defence of communications between Kingston and Montreal.

Improvements carried out during the year included the painting of the exterior of the blockhouse, and the interior of the caretaker's residence. The museum, which is situated on the second floor of the blockhouse, was renovated and new tables and cases obtained to display the exhibits. The parking area was cleared of weeds and calcium chloride spread on it to remedy the dust nuisance. The guardhouse was whitewashed and the palisades surrounding the fort were repaired.

A total of 4,826 persons signed the museum register during the year and it is estimated that an additional 550 entered the grounds.

*Fort Malden National Historic Park* is situated in Amherstburg, Ontario. The fort was built in 1797-9 by the Second Battalion Royal Canadian Volunteers. It was strengthened in 1812 as the principal military station on the western frontier and dismantled and abandoned in September, 1813. Only slight evidences of the original fortifications remain.

Considerable fill was placed at the rear of the protection wall and along portions of the river bank, and a number of dead trees were removed from the property. A concrete base was constructed to receive the windlass from the schooner "West," presented by United States engineers. A rack was made and fitted into position in the museum, to display the sword collection, and the iron grilles over the basement windows were painted. Four plate glass exhibit cases were donated by the Amherstburg Public Library Board. Many articles of interest were obtained, including a drum used by the Patriot forces during the invasion of Windsor in 1839.

The interest that is being taken in this museum is shown by the fact that 14,709 persons signed the register during the year while many others visited the park without signing.

*Fort Prince of Wales National Historic Park* is situated at the mouth of Churchill River, Churchill, Manitoba, and comprises an area of approximately fifty acres. The fort was built from plans drawn by English military engineers, to secure control of Hudson Bay for the Hudson's Bay Company and England. Construction was commenced in 1733 and completed in 1771. It was surrendered to, and partially destroyed by, a French naval force under La Pérouse in 1782. Its ruins, which are among the most



interesting military remains on this continent, have been partly restored and over forty old cannon have been unearthed and those suitable mounted on the walls of the fort.

General supervision was continued throughout the year.

#### NATIONAL HISTORIC SITES

On the advice of the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada over three hundred sites of national importance have been marked and are now being suitably maintained. These include Indian earthworks, forts, and villages; French forts, trading posts, and mission enterprises; sites connected with British exploration and naval and military operations in the long struggle for the possession of Canada; posts of the Hudson's Bay Company; and sites related to the social, economic, and industrial development of the country.

## REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

By NORMAN FEE

THE Executive and Council of the Canadian Historical Association held four meetings during the year, two at Toronto and two at Hamilton. Council which had been authorized by the General Meeting in 1942 to proceed with the amalgamation of the *Canadian Historical Review* and the *Annual Report* decided, after discussing the matter in detail with the University of Toronto Press and the Editors of the *Report*, that due to the enlistment of the manager of the University of Toronto Press and the general pressure of business no further action should be taken until after the war. The Committee named to examine the application of Dr. V. J. Kisilewsky for a grant-in-aid toward the preparation of a history of the Ukrainians in Canada recommended that no action be taken at the present time and that Dr. Kisilewsky be urged to prepare, as an independent venture of his own, an article in English on some phase of his proposed research and submit it for acceptance to some learned journal. It was felt that if such an article were prepared it could be made the basis for a further consideration of a grant toward his major project. At the annual fall meeting of Council, Mr. Fieldhouse suggested that Council consider the possibility of having a paper on some general topic in European history presented at the Annual Meeting. This suggestion introduced a long discussion on ways and means for creating a wider interest in the affairs of the Association. The question of continuing the Annual Meetings during the war was discussed at the Council Meeting in Toronto and again at the Annual Meeting in Hamilton. The importance of these meetings in time of war as well as in peace cannot be over-emphasized. They provide an opportunity for the discussion of Canada's characteristics, history, and present problems which is invaluable. They attract not only academic members but a number, we hope an increasing number, of men engaged in business and public affairs; and this year saw also a gratifying increase in the representation from French Canada. The exchange of views made possible by these circumstances, and the constructive and serious tone which in general pervaded the discussions, was a heartening evidence of vitality in a war-time Canada which faces its problems with resolution and, we hope, with an increasing awareness of their nature and complexity. Council commended the President for his efforts during the year and particularly for his stand on the question of continuing the Annual Meetings during the war.

It was disclosed at the annual meeting of the Association that in their zeal to comply with the request for war salvage some people were throwing away old books and newspapers and in some cases family documents. In order to check possible destruction of historical material, a committee was named with Major Lanctot, the Dominion Archivist, as chairman to bring this matter to the attention of the general public and to historical societies and also to suggest ways and means in which they might help to save this material.

### THE ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual Meeting for 1943 was held at McMaster University, Hamilton, on May 24 and 25. The theme of the programme, which had been arranged by a committee under the chairmanship of Professor Eric



Harrison of Queen's University, was nationalism in various aspects as it relates to Canada. At a session on historical writing and politics the following papers were presented: "Durham et la nationalité canadienne-française," by the Abbé Arthur Maheux, Laval University; "History and French-Canadian Survival," by Professor R. M. Saunders, University of Toronto; "Papineau et l'orientation du nationalisme québécois," by the Abbé Pascal Potvin, Laval University; "Nationalism in Quebec Politics since Laurier," by Mr. Gordon O. Rothney, Sir George Williams College.

At a joint session with the Canadian Political Science Association, which was meeting concurrently, papers were read by Dr. J. M. Nadeau, curator, Bibliothèque St. Sulpice, on "The Growth of Federal Authority in the Provinces," and by Dr. H. A. Innis, University of Toronto, on "Economic Trends and the Constitutional Framework." "Aims in the Study and Teaching of History in Canadian Universities Today" was the subject of a session which brought forth a spirited discussion, the paper being read by Professor R. G. Trotter, Queen's University, and the discussion led by Professor W. N. Sage, University of British Columbia. Two of the broader aspects of nationalism were presented at a joint session of the Canadian Historical Association, the Canadian Political Science Association, and Section II of the Royal Society of Canada: "The Historical Approach to the Problem of Nationalism in Europe," by Professor R. Flenley, University of Toronto; "The Problem of Nationalism in Canada and the British Commonwealth," by Professor Alexander Brady, University of Toronto. The final session on "Nationalism and Canada" had three papers: "The Extension of the Franchise in Canada: A Study in Democratic Nationalism," by Professor W. L. Morton, University of Manitoba; "The Development of Canadian External Representation," by Mr. Gordon Skilling, University of Wisconsin; "Canadian Foreign Policy," by Miss Gwendolen M. Carter, Tufts College.

The President of the Association, Professor A. R. M. Lower, of United College, Winnipeg, devoted his presidential address to a discussion of the characteristics and fundamental relations of French and English Canadians. The address was a sympathetic but penetrating and thought-provoking treatment of a subject which, Professor Lower suggested, presents the major antithesis in Canadian history.

The Association is much indebted to McMaster University for its hospitality and admirable local arrangements. An interesting feature was provided by the National Film Board in the showing of several films which have been prepared for educational purposes. The following officers were elected for 1943-4: President, George W. Brown, University of Toronto; Vice-President, W. N. Sage, University of British Columbia; English Secretary and Treasurer, Norman Fee, The Public Archives, Ottawa; French Secretary, Séraphin Marion, The Public Archives, Ottawa; new members of Council, A. G. Dorland, University of Western Ontario; M. H. Long, University of Alberta; Norman Macdonald, McMaster University; Pascal Potvin, Laval University. Professor A. G. Dorland, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, has consented to be chairman of the Programme Committee for 1944.

## REPORT OF THE TREASURER

### STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1943

#### RECEIPTS

April, 1942 - Balance on Hand .....	\$ 79.42
May 1, 1942, } Bank Interest .....	1.15
to } Membership Fees and Sale of <i>Reports</i> .....	1,205.83
April 30, 1943 }	

#### DISBURSEMENTS

Cunningham & Co., Auditors .....	\$ 10.00
University of Toronto Press—	
Printing <i>Report</i> .....	\$457.45
<i>Canadian Historical Review</i> .....	458.00
	<hr/> 915.45
<i>Bulletin des recherches historiques</i> .....	75.00
Canadian Political Science Association .....	104.00
Professor G. M. Wrong .....	6.00
Administration—	
Clerical Assistance .....	\$ 40.00
Leclerc Printers .....	22.15
Expenses of Secretary-Treasurer .....	35.00
Petty Cash, including Freight and Postage .....	25.00
	<hr/> 122.15
Bank Operating Charge .....	.10
	<hr/> \$1,232.70
Balance on Deposit, Bank of Montreal—Savings No. 2851 .....	53.70
	<hr/> \$1,286.40
	<hr/> <hr/> \$1,286.40

Examined and found correct,

CUNNINGHAM & Co.,  
Auditors

NORMAN FEE,  
Secretary-Treasurer

Ottawa, May 14, 1943.

### STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1943

#### RECEIPTS

April 30, 1942—Balance on Hand .....	\$318.98
April 30, 1943—Bank Interest .....	1.57

#### DISBURSEMENTS

April 30, 1943—Balance on Deposit in Bank of Montreal .....	\$320.55
	<hr/> \$320.55
	<hr/> <hr/> \$320.55

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